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Black's Law Dictionary1 defines an easement as a right of use
over the property of another. An easement is a right in the owner of
one parcel of land, by reason of such ownership, to use the land of
another for a special purpose not inconsistent with a general prop-
erty right in the owner.2 It is an interest that one person has in the
land of another.' A primary characteristic of an easement, that its
burden falls upon the possessor of the land from which it issued, is
expressed in the statement that the land constitutes a servient estate
or tenement and the easement a dominant tenement.4 The servient
estate may utilize the easement area for its own purposes or in con-
junction with the dominant estate as long as such use does not inter-
fere with the dominant estate.5 An easement is distinguishable from
a "license," which merely confers personal privilege to do some act
on the land. Easements do not allow exclusive possession of the
area. They are categorized as incorporeal hereditaments. Ease-
* Knud E. Hermansen is an associate professor in the College of Engineering,
University of Maine. He is also a land surveyor, civil engineer, and attorney offering
consulting services in Old Town, Maine.
** Donald R. Richards is a partner in the surveying firm of Richards & Cranston
located in Rockland, Maine.
The authors would like to thank Mr. Joseph J. Wathen, Esq., Staff Attorney with
the Maine Municipal Association; Mr. Bruce VanNote, P.L.S., Esq., Staff Attorney
with the Maine Department of Highways, and Mr. John T. Mann, P.L.S. and Mr.
Reubon Wheeler of Mann Associates for their help, review, and comments in
preparing this Article.
1. BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
2. In Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83 (1861), the court held:
The distinction between an interest in the soil, or a right to a profit in it,
and an easement, is not always palpable. The line of separation is some-
times obscure, in some points unsettled, with no established principles by
which to determine it.
All rights of way are easements. So is the right to enter the close of
another and erect booths upon public days; or to dance, or to play at any
lawful games and sports.
Id. at 99 (citations omitted).
3. Bonney v. Greenwood, 96 Me. 335, 341, 52 A. 786, 789 (1902) ("An easement
may be concisely defined as 'a privilege without profit which one has for the benefit
of his land in the land of another.' ").
4. Id ("It is among the essential qualities of every easement that there are two
distinct tenements or estates, the dominant to which the right belongs, and the servi-
ent upon which the obligation is imposed.").
5. Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222 (Me. 1979).
ROADS AND EASEMENTS
ments also are known as rights-of-way6 and servitudes, although
there is some distinction among these terms. While roads for the
most part are easements devoted to access and travel,7 not all ease-
ments are roads.
Easements, more so than other forms of title, often are difficult to
identify, research, and locate. This difficulty exists for three reasons.
First, easements ordinarily are not contiguous to other easements.
The records usually provide no references to adjoining easements
that can be relied upon to correct a defective or vague description.
Second, an easement is a nonpossessory estate that is shared with
other persons. Public easements are enjoyed by all, and private
easements do not necessarily restrict the servient estate from using
the same area in any manner that will not interfere with the exercise
of the dominant estate.' As a result, it usually is not possible or
desirable to spend time and money to mark the boundaries, set up
barriers such as fences or walls, or clearly document the easement to
prevent trespass and perpetuate the easement's boundaries, as nor-
mally would be done with a possessory estate. Third, the amount of
effort required in title research or a survey is inversely proportional
to the effort and care that went into the original description. Scriv-
eners normally spent very little time preparing the original descrip-
tions so that great effort may be required in subsequent title
searches and surveys.
The primary reason for the casual preparation of the original de-
scription of the easement is the fact that most easements have no
separable value. In fact, an easement could not exist without sup-
porting some property or some party to the detriment of some other
property. The easement derives its value from the property or party
it serves and from its capacity to enhance the enjoyment of that
property or party. The result is twofold: (1) the easement is no
more valuable than the property it supports and (2) care and con-
cern for the easement usually come second to the property that it
supports.
In many instances the shape of an easement contributes to de-
scription problems. Most easements exist as a strip. The full enjoy-
ment of the easement does not necessarily require the use of the full
width or length of the easement strip. Because the precise location
of the easement's boundary does not necessarily increase the benefit
enjoyed, many easements seldom are precisely defined or located.
Determining and defining easements requires extraordinary effort
due in part to the fact that many easements, especially access or
6. Shepherd Co. v. Shibles, 100 Me. 314, 318, 61 A. 700, 702 (1905) (-A right of
way is an easement.").
7. Some roads exist as fee simple title, especially some of the recently created
public. See, eg., Mn. REv. STAT. AN. tit. 23, §§ 3023, 3025 (West 1992).
8. Ricker v. Barry, 34 Me. 116, 121-22 (1852).
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road easements, are ancient. Some have existed beyond any living
memory or reasonably available records.9 The road easements were
created to serve the original settlements and continue to provide
service to the present time. As the court noted in MacKenna v. In-
habitants of Town of Searsmont:'°
When a highway is first established in some unfrequented lo-
cality, it may exist for a time as a rude road, with a narrow
track, and only occasionally used. With the growth of popula-
tion and business, and the transformation of the lonely neigh-
borhood into a thriving, increasing city, the highway may also
go through the transformations of being turnpiked, planked,
macadamized, and paved for its entire width. From bearing an
occasional rude cart, it may come to sustain an endless succes-
sion of wagons, drays, coaches, omnibuses, and other vehicles
of travel and traffic. There is a continual march of improve-
ment in streets and in vehicles. 11
Despite the difficulties surrounding easements, nearly every piece
of property in Maine must rely on private or public easements for
access and enjoyment. Consequently, the practitioner must be fa-
miliar with certain aspects of title regarding easements and their use.
This Article will discuss various concepts regarding the use, crea-
tion, and extinguishment as well as other problems often associated
with easements.
II. EASEMENT TERMS AND CLASSIFICATIONS
Terms commonly associated with easements are "servient estate"
or "servient tenement" and "dominant estate," "tenement," or
"party." The servient estate is the land the easement crosses and
burdens. The dominant estate is the land or person benefited by the
easement.
9. In many instances the available documents regarding an easement and its limi-
tations are sparse and of poor quality by normal standards of acceptance. The
courts have recognized this fact and often require less evidence of ancient ease-
ments. In Piper v. Voorhees, 130 Me. 305, 155 A. 556 (1931), the court said:
The admissibility ... is sanctioned because the rights and liabilities are
generally of ancient and obscure origin, and may be acted upon only at
distant intervals of time, and therefore direct proof of their existence ought
not to be required; because, in local matters in which the community are
interested, all person living in the neighborhood are likely to be conver-
sant; because, common rights and liabilities being naturally talked of in
public, what is dropped in conversation respecting them may be presumed
to be true; because conflicting interest would lead to contradiction from
others if the statements were false; thus a trustworthy reputation may arise
from the concurrence of many parties, unconnected with each other, who
are all interested in investigating the same subject.
I at 307-08, 155 A. at 558.
10. 349 A.2d 760 (Me. 1976).
11. Id at 763 n.1 (quoting Briggs v. Lewiston & A. Horse R.R., 79 Me. 363,366-
67, 10 A. 47, 48 (1887)).
[Vol. 48:197
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Easements may be classified by reference to their use (for exam-
ple, road, utility), the manner of creation (for example, prescription,
dedication), and their effect (for example, negative easement). In
this Article, two classifications will be used: (1) appurtenant ease-
ments and easements in gross and (2) public and private easements.
These classifications generally have legal connotations that affect
the permitted use and location of the easement.
A. Appurtenant Easements and Easements in Gross
Appurtenant easements benefit a property rather than a person.
The easement attaches to the land and belongs to the property; it is
inseparable and incapable of use without the appurtenant prop-
erty.1 2 The property benefited by the easement is known as the "ap-
purtenant property." In the accompanying figure, Parcel A is the
appurtenant property and dominant estate for the access easement
while Parcel B is the servient property.
An easement in gross benefits a person rather than a parcel of
land.' 3 An example of an easement in gross is a utility easement
where the utility company benefits from the easement. In Figure 1,
the utility company is the dominant party while Parcel A and Parcel





The utility easement is an easement in gross while the access easement is an appurte-
nant easement for parcel A. Both parcel A and parcel B are servient to the utility
easement. Parcel B is servient to the access easement and the public road easement.
12. Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 558, 33 A. 174, 176 (1895) ("[A]n easement that
is appurtenant is incapable of existence separate and apart from the particular mes-
suage or land to which it is annexed, there being nothing for it to rest upon.").
13. In LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984 (Me. 1979), the court said:
An easement in gross may generally be described as an interest in land
which "is not appurtenant to any estate in land or not belonging to any
person by virtue of his ownership of an estate in other land, but is a mere
personal interest in or right to use the land of another .... "
Id. at 987 n.2 (quoting Reed v. A.C. McLoon & Co., 311 A.2d 548,552 (Me. 1973)).
1996]
204 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:197
As a rule, in cases of doubt the easement is presumed to be an
appurtenant easement rather than an easement in gross.' 4 This pre-
sumption can be rebutted by appropriate evidence.
B. Public Easements and Private Easements
Public easements and private easements are relatively simple clas-
sifications that have their greatest relevance in regard to roads.
Public easements are easements that the public can use at its plea-
sure. 15 Private easements are easements that may be used by one or
more persons but not by the general public.
In the past there were three recognized categories of public road
easements in Maine:' 6 (1) state roads; (2) county roads; and (3)
town roads. Further, there were at least three historical statutory
categories of town roads:17 (1) town ways;18 (2) private ways (now
public easements);19 and (3) winter roads."0 All three levels of gov-
ernment had the power and responsibility to accept, open, maintain,
and extinguish public roads."' After July 29, 1976, the responsibility
14. Id. at 987 ("The traditional rules of construction for grants or reservations of
easements require that whenever possible an easement be fairly construed to be
appurtenant to the land of the person for whose use the easement is created.").
15. Note, however, the public easement within the meaning of title 23, section
3021 of the Maine Revised Statutes does not refer to title, instead. it refers to the
municipality's maintenance obligations.
16. Because this Article focuses solely on Maine roads and easements, all statu-
tory references are to Maine statutes.
17. Additionally, municipalities had power to establish bridle paths, trails, land-
ings, and parking places. See R.S. ch. 84, §§ 34-38 (1944).
18. Title 23, § 3021(3) (West 1992) states:
"Town way" means... [a]n area or strip of land designated and held by a
municipality for the passage and use of the general public by motor vehicle;
... [aill town or county ways not discontinued or abandoned before July
29, 1976; and ... [a]ll state or state aid highways. or both, which shall be
classified town ways as of July 1, 1982, or thereafter, pursuant to section 53.
19. 1l § 3021(2) states: "'Public easement' means an easement held by a munic-
ipality for purposes of public access to land or water not otherwise connected to a
public way, and includes all rights enjoyed by the public with respect to private ways
created by statute prior to the effective date of this Act."
20. R.C. ch. 84, § 30 (1944) states:
The municipal officers may lay out a way as aforesaid for the hauling of
merchandise, hay, wood, or lumber, to be used only when the ground is so
covered with snow that such hauling shall not break the soil. When so laid
out, they shall state in their return the purposes for which it is laid, and that
it shall be used only in the winter season, and shall order the person for
whose accommodation it is laid to pay into the town treasury an amount
equal to the damages of such location for the benefit of the owner of the
land over which it is laid and the expenses of such location, and it shall not
be accepted by the town until such amount is so paid. No town shall be
liable for damage to any person traveling on such way.
21. See, e.g., title 23, § 2051 (West Supp. 1974), amended by P.L. 1975, ch. 711,
§ 1, which states:
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for county roads (except in the unorganized parts of the county) was
transferred to the towns.22
III. EASEMENT STATUS AND USES
One of the first tasks a practitioner must perform when attempt-
ing to retrace roads, utilities, railroads, and other corridors of use is
to determine the status of the title. Many corridors of use such as
railroads, utility lines, and roads may exist either as an easement or
in fee simple. Retracement of corridors of use that exist as fee sim-
ple title is no different from other property held in fee simple title.
Such cases lead the practitioner to other documents detailing prop-
erty title and boundaries. The analysis of easements, however, is
somewhat different from the analysis of land title.
A. Easement or Fee Simple Title
To determine the status of the title (fee simple versus easement),
a two step process is appropriate. First, the practitioner should ex-
amine the operative records (usually the original records). This is
seldom an easy task. Records often cannot be found, or, if found,
are not complete. Even when complete records are found, practi-
tioners sometimes discover that the government failed to create or
extinguish properly a public easement, placing its current status in
doubt.3 If the records are not discovered or the information re-
County Commissioners may lay out, alter, close for maintenance, or dis-
continue highways within the unorganized areas of their counties and grade
hills in any such highway. The county commissioners may close county
roads for maintenance and preserve the right-of-way for the use of abutting
landowners, and any others using said way for the access to their property.
and public utilities and corporations with facilities legally located within
said way, at their own risk. Nothing in any city charter shall be so con-
strued as to deprive them of the power to lay out, alter, close for mainte-
nance or discontinue county roads within the limits thereof.
See also Craig v. Davis, 649 A.2d 1096, 1097 (Me. 1994): Town of Fayette v. Manter.
528 A.2d 887 (Me. 1987).
22. See P.L. 1975, ch. 711, § 1. See also Craig v. Davis, 649 A.2d 1096. where the
court said:
As part of that same enactment, section 2051 was amended to eliminate the
county commissioners' former jurisdiction over laying out and discontinu-
ing county ways except in unorganized areas of their counties, P.L 1975.
ch. 711, § 1, and a new provision, 23 M.RLS.A. § 3026, gave the municipali-
ties the power to discontinue "town ways" defined by the new provision 23
M.R.S.A. § 3021(3)(B) to include "[a]il town or county ways not discontin-
ued or abandoned before July 29, 1976," the effective date of the new act.
Section 3026 further provided that when the municipality discontinued a
town way that "unless otherwise stated in the [discontinuance] order, a
public easement shall ... be retained ......
Id. at 1097.
23. The legal procedures required to extinguish a road are not simple. In Tovn
of Fayette v. Manter, 528 A.2d 887 (Me. 1987), the court said:
1996]
MAINE LAW REVIEW
quired is missing, the second step in determining the status of title is
to analyze the information within the context of the common law as
modified by statute.
1. Operative Records
The status of the title expressly described in the operative records
generally controls.' A practitioner should exercise care to locate
and use the operative records. In the past, practitioners who had
difficulty discerning the operative records often made assumptions
about the title, width, and allowable use of various roads, utilities,
and other corridors of use. The assumptions, right or wrong, were
documented, often without clear explanation, and now the informa-
tion appears in the records to be factual.
2. Common Law
Under the common law, nearly all private roads such as those
shown on subdivision plans and public roads that were conveyed,
dedicated,2 5 or condemned were taken as easements. 26 However,
Chapter 79, § 35 directed the Commissioners in the event of a discontinuance
to "state in their return when it is to be done, the names of the persons to whom
damages are allowed, the amount allowed to each, and when to be paid." Par-
ties aggrieved by the Commissioners' decision had statutory rights of appeal to
the Superior court with respect to both an order of discontinuance (Ch. 79,
§§ 56, 57) and of damages (Ch. 79 §§ 36, 39). An appeal from an order of dis-
continuance had to be prosecuted "at any time after it [the order of discontinu-
ance] has been placed on file and before the next term of superior court in said
county.. ." R.S. 1944 Ch. 79 § 56. An appeal from the estimate of damages by
the Commissioners had to be taken
at any time before the 3rd day of the regular term succeeding that
at which the Commissioners' return is made, to the term of the
superior court, first held in the county where the land is situated,
more than 30 days after the expiration of the time within which
such appeal may be taken, excluding the 1st day of its session ...
R.S. 1944, Ch. 79 § 39. If no notice of appeal from the estimate of damages
was filed in a timely manner the proceedings were to "be closed, recorded,
and become effectual; all claims for damages not allowed by them be for-
ever barred..." R.S. 1944, Ch. 79, § 36.
Id at 889.
24. Title 23, § 3031(3), (4) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
25. Dedication is a conveyance to the public through a gift or for a nominal sum
resulting in an appropriation by a pubic entity for public use. For a more detailed
discussion of dedication, see infra notes 238-252 and accompanying text.
26. See City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 382, 384 (Me. 1970) (" 'The owner
of land over which a highway is laid retains his right in the soil for all purposes which
are consistent with the full enjoyment of the easement acquired by the public.'"
(quoting Burr v. Stevens, 90 Me. 500, 503, 38 A. 547, 548 (1897))).
In Lamb v. Euclid Ambler Assocs., 563 A.2d 365 (Me. 1989), the court said:
Under the common law, at least presumptively, the owner of land abut-
ting a public way owned the fee under the way. "[Tihe common law rule is
that the public acquires only an easement in land taken for the establish-
[Vol. 48:197
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the legislature reversed the common law for public roads. All dedi-
cated roads created after December 31, 1976. are taken in fee simple
unless the municipality accepting the dedication specifically pro-
vides otherwise. 7 However, the developer or other person record-
ing a plan in the registry may dedicate rights of lesser extent,
provided that the subdivision plan is recorded and the extent of
those rights is described on the face of the subdivision plan or any
conveyance of land (including a reservation of the fee to the devel-
oper).2 Similarly, after December 31, 1976, all roads taken by emi-
nent domain are taken in fee simple unless the order of
condemnation specifically provides otherwise or the property or in-
terests to be taken include the land or right-of-way of a railroad
corporation or a public utility.29 The post-December 1976 changes
in the common law were not retroactive, and therefore do not affect
the status of existing roads. 30 Additionally, the statutory changes
have no effect on the status of roads obtained by prescription or the
common law status of roads created by conveyances between pri-
vate parties.
3. Range-Ways and Range-Roads
Range-ways and range-roads present special problems for deter-
mining the status of title. In laying out conveyances, the original
proprietors of land frequently placed what are known as "range-
ways"-strips of land, sometimes eight or more rods3 in width 3 -
along all or parts of the lots laid OUt. 33 Range-ways are thought of
in a general sense as "paper streets" because they exist only on pa-
per, in the description of the conveyance.
The purpose of range-ways appears to have been to provide po-
tential access from the various proprietors' lots to the roads and riv-
ers used for commerce. A range-way that is or has been used for
travel is referred to as a "range-road." For purposes of determining
ment of the highway except as the rule has been changed by statute in
some states."
Id. at 367 (quoting City of Rockland v. Johnson. 267 A.2d 382, 384 (Me. 1970)). See
also Brooks v. Bess, 135 Me. 290, 291, 195 A. 361. 361 (1937) (presumptively, the
adjoining landowner owns the soil to the center of a public way).
27. Title 23, § 3025 (Vest 1992).
28. Id. § 3031. The statutory language appears to set up a conditional estate
whereby the owner adjoining a road to be dedicated has title by implication subject
to divestiture of his title when the municipality accepts the inchoate dedication.
29. Id. § 3023.
30. City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d at 382.
31. A "rod" is defined as "a lineal measure of sixteen feet and a half, otherwise
called a 'perch.'" BL.AcK's LAw DICONARY (4th ed. 1951).
32. See, e.g., Howard v. Hutchinson, 10 Me. 335, 335 (1833).
33. The term "range-ways" probably derives from the fact that the strips appear
as ways along the "range" of lots laid out by the proprietors.
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title, range-roads are treated like other roads and normally are sub-
ject to the common law as modified by statute. 34
While some range-ways presently are used as public and private
range-roads, many never have been appropriated for such purposes,
and the title of these strips of land remains unclear. The practitioner
frequently encounters them when researching title or surveying lots
that were laid out on or along rangeways according to the original
records. 35 (Often, however, the most recent records fail to show the
range-ways.) In many cases, range-ways are owned in fee by the
municipality or the heirs of the original proprietors. However, this
can be determined only by examining the original conveyance, re-
lated documents (for example, an allotment plan), and subsequent
conveyances for language evidencing exclusion of the fee or an ease-
ment by reservation, dedication, implication, or similar method.
When a public road is established on a range-way, the width of
the public road is not necessarily the width of the range-way. If the
width of the road, established at the road's creation,36 is less than




- -road right-of-way --.--- - - -
Title in E Pbi Prvtubli-cPropnetor's ' " asph.l .Easement
heirs 37 R 1_ Easemenen
heir - -road right-of-way .-- -- -- - - -
rangeway boundary-
Purport 5 Purport 6
The figure shows the situation not uncommon in Maine where a range-way is cre-
ated in fee. The width of the range-way is different from the width of the public
easement. Also, both a public easement and private easement burden the range-
way.
Locating the range-way is done in the same manner as locating
any other property (albeit the range-way may be only a few rods
wide and several miles long). The location and width of the ease-
ment is then fixed within or on the range-way.
34. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text.
35. Practitioners have taken an interest in range-ways due in part to their rela-
tively large width and their frequency, especially in the southern part of the state.
36. The record ordinarily states the width. If the width is not stated or the
records are lost, the practitioner should refer to title 23, § 2103 (West 1992) (author-
izing municipality to use and control for highway purposes one and one-half rods on
each side of the center of the traveled portion of a highway survey).
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Practitioners must be wary of range-ways. Any lots along or in
range-ways require a complete research of all relevant documents
back to the original conveyance out of the proprietors. A significant
proportion of range-ways are encumbered with private and inchoate
or incipient public easements. Failure to research properly the
records on or near the range-ways increases the risk of problems
being overlooked. In the absence of thorough research, the practi-
tioner must warn his client of the increased risk of imperfect title
and of improvements within the confines of the range-way.37
B. Title Within the Easement
Many people fail to understand or forget that the easement is not
a possessory title-it is an encumbrance on the fee simple title.3s
The easement is similar to a blanket on the ground. The blanket
may be used by one or more persons, but the ground beneath the
blanket is owned by some other person. In real estate practice, the
person who can use the blanket often is identified, but the person
owning the ground upon which the blanket lies may be ignored.39
In the case of a buried gas line easement crossing property there is
seldom an omission in identifying the servient owner since the land
frequently is cultivated or used by the owner, much as the owner
would without the existence of the easement.40
37. If the survey practitioner is unable or unwilling to perform a complete search
of the records, the practitioner should agree with the client to exclude the research
and otherwise comply with the rules promulgated by the Board of Licensure for
Professional Land Surveyors:
These standards shall apply to every land boundary survey in the State of
Maine, except that the Surveyor and the client may agree to exclude any
land surveying work from these standards.
Such land surveying work excluded from the requirements of these stan-
dards shall not be monumented in the field nor shall it be used as a basis
for a description for a conveyance, unless the map or report and descrip-
tion shall clearly set forth the particulars in which the survey departs from
these standards.
RuLEs OF BOARD OF LICENSURE FOR PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS ch. 6. § 9
(1985).
38. Shepherd Co. v. Shibles, 100 Me. 314, 318. 61 A. 700, 702 (1905) ("An ease-
ment is an entirely different thing from the fee. 'The fee in the land is to be re-
garded as distinct from an easement in the same. The fee may be in one, the
easement in another ... ' (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Morrison, 88 Me. 162. 163
(1895))). See also Marshall v. Walker, 93 Me. 532, 540, 45 A. 497, 499 (1900).
39. For a good example, look at any subdivision plan and see if it clearly indicates
who has title in the streets.
40. In Kuhn v. Farnsworth, 69 Me. 404 (1879), the court stated:
When we speak of a road or way, there are two distinct rights and inter-
ests which naturally present themselves to the mind-the fee in the land
itself, and the easement or use (public or private) which may be made of it
for the purposes of travel and transportation. The owner of the fee may
put the land to any use not inconsistent with the enjoyment of the ease-
ment that exists in it.
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However, in the case of a public road easement, the status of the
"underlying" fee simple title is almost always ignored by surveyors
and attorneys since the servient owner can exercise little dominion
and control over the road area without interfering with the domi-
nant tenement's rights.41 Nevertheless, the abutting owner fre-
quently owns to the center of a public road easement or beyond.41
The owner of the fee can use the area within the road easement in
any manner not inconsistent with the public's easement.43 A practi-
tioner should define the extent and limitations of ownership within
an easement in order to provide quality services to a client.
C. Multiple Uses/Easements
Easements can be and frequently are co-located (see Figure 3).44
A utility easement may co-exist with a drainage easement. A pri-
vate access easement may exist within the public road of a subdivi-
sion. There is nothing improper about this situation so long as the
servient estate does not interfere with the dominant tenement, the
junior use does not interfere with the senior use, and the co-users
are reasonable with their use. All users of the easement are respon-
sible for the easement's maintenance.45
Il at 406.
41. See Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 411, 152 A. 413, 415 (1930) ("[T]he grantor
should not be presumed to retain for himself that which is of distinct benefit to his
grantee in connection with the proper use and enjoyment of the estate conveyed.").
42. Brooks v. Bess, 135 Me. 290, 291, 195 A. 361, 361 (1937) ("It is well-estab-
lished law that presumptively the adjoining landowner owns the soil to the center of
the way. Subject to the easement of passage, he may cultivate the soil and take the
herbage growing thereon."); Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me. 80, 82 (1850) ("In this
State a grant of land bounded on a highway carries the fee to the centre of it, if there
be no words to show a contrary intent.").
43. See City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 382 (Me. 1970).
44. With respect to utility easements, the municipality can grant a location permit
to the utility even though the municipality does not own the fee simple title since
utility easements can "piggyback" highway easements by virtue of title 35-A, § 2301-
2311 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996).
45. Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 564, 33 A. 174, 178 (1895) ("It is a rule of law that
the one who enjoys the benefit of an easement in the premises of another must be at
the expense of maintaining it. Easements impose no obligation, as a general rule,
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Often within a confined area there exist multiple improvements based on one or
more co-located easements that are all imposed on the fee simple owner.
The problem that often arises in these situations is not a conflict
between the easements; rather, upon the extinguishment of one
easement the servient estate assumes that all rights are removed.
This situation frequently arises where the town has discontinued a
public road in a subdivision and the lot owners are unaware that one
or more private easements remain. Also, the discontinuance of a
town way' usually leaves a public easement for access.47 The elimi-
nation of one easement does not necessarily cause the elimination of
all easements.
D. Correlative Rights and Appurtenances
Once it has been determined that an amenity, such as a road, is an
easement, and the location of the easement relative to the owner-
ship of fee simple title is fixed, the rights and appurtenances should
be determined. Again, the best and most reliable source for the
rights and appurtenances is the operative records. If the operative
records are missing or the information vague, the rules of construc-
tion as modified by statute are applied.
1. Express or Clearly Intended
An easement may be used for the purpose expressed or, when not
expressly stated, use may be determined by reference to the actual
or obvious intent of the parties at the time the grant is made.' Ref-
46. See supra note 17.
47. Title 23, § 3026 (West 1992).
48. Saltonstall v. Cumming, 538 A.2d 289, 290 (Me. 1988).
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erence may be made to the circumstances surrounding the convey-
ance to help determine the intent. 49  Furthermore, the courts
frequently give great weight to the reasonable use to which the dom-
inant estate may be devoted or which may evolve over time, or what
becomes necessary to constitute full enjoyment of the premises.50
2. Implied Rights and Limitations
As a general rule of interpretation, and in addition to those rights
enumerated in the easement grant, the dominant estate may take
any action reasonably necessary to realize the full enjoyment of the
right.5 When a grantee receives property he likewise receives such
means as are necessary to attain the property.5 2 Specifically, all
rights necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the easement im-
pliedly pass with the easement.53 Therefore, the extent of the use
varies with the circumstances surrounding the conveyance barring
limiting words to the contrary.54 Even rights not known at the time
of the easement grant frequently are allowed as technology devel-
ops, in the absence of words to the contrary.55 Therefore, "cattle,
teams and foot passengers" would not be construed by the terms
alone to exclude the use of motor vehicles if the words were written
before the technology was available.5 6
49. Id.
50. See Lyon v. Lea, 84 Me. 254, 258. 24 A. 844. 845 (1892) ("Easements are of
flexible adaptation.... Circumstances must govern the right and expediency of such
location.").
51. Peavey v. Calais R.R., 30 Me. 498. 500 (1849) ("[A] grant of a thing includes
the means necessary to attain it.").
52. See Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 563, 33 A. 174, 178 (1895); Dority v. Dun-
ning, 78 Me. 381, 389, 6 A. 6, 10 (1886).
53. Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d 818, 822 (Me. 1991) ("In general, a person who
possesses an easement over another's property can exercise his right only in a rea-
sonable manner.").
54. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37, 47, 68 A. 527,531 (1907) ("The
circumstances of each case are to be considered in determining the use which indi-
viduals may make of the public highways, and the same rule prevails in limiting the
extent of the right over waters as over the land.").
55. In Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 152 A. 413 (1930), the court stated:
It is true that the grant of this easement carried with it all the incidents
necessary to make the enjoyment of the public right effective, not only with
reference to the amount and methods of travel in vogue at the time of the
grant, but with respect to such as an advancing civilization might indicate
were reasonable and proper.
Id. at 410, 152 A. at 414.
56. The court in Stevens v. Anderson, 393 A.2d 158 (Me. 1978), stated:
Though motor vehicles were becoming rapidly more common in 1915 as a
means of private transportation, they had not yet become so prevalent in
rural areas that we can infer their exclusion in this case from the fact that
they were not expressly mentioned in the language of the reservation in
[the] deed. Similar language was still routinely used by many conveyancers
to refer to all modes of private transportation normal at the time.








A grant of the private road easement before 1990 would allow utilities to be in-
stalled within the easement by reasonable implication. A grant of the same ease-
ment after 1990 would deny the legal installation of the utilitites. (See ME. Rev.
STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 458 (West Supp. 1995-1996)).
Since the rights frequently depend on the relationship of the par-
ties litigating the rights, a brief summary is appropriate at this point.
There are ordinarily three situations where conflict arises regarding
the extent and use of an easement: (1) conflict between a stranger
and the dominant or servient tenement; (2) conflict between domi-
nant tenements; and (3) conflict between the servient and dominant
tenements.57
Between a stranger and the dominant or servient tenement, there
are no rights recognized in the stranger"8 unless founded upon pre-
scription 9 or equity.
Id. at 159.
57. In Hultzen v. Witham, 146 Me. 118, 78 A.2d 342 (1951). the court said:
It must be remembered that in these cases we are dealing only with the
respective rights of co-owners of an easement. Their respective rights as
between themselves are relative, not absolute. That which might constitute
an invasion or obstruction of an easement by an absolute stranger to the
title, that is, by one without scintilla of legal right, in the easement, or in the
fee, may well be within the right of a co-owner of the easement to make
and maintain. As against the stranger, the right of every owner of the ease-
ment to repel invasion thereof is absolute. As between co-owners, the
rights to repair and improve, and the right to object to repairs and im-
provements, are only relative. Neither co-owner can interfere with the rea-
sonable use of the way by any other for a purpose to which the same is or
may be made susceptible.
Id at 126-27, 78 A.2d at 346.
58. Id
59. See part IH.D.2.d. for a discussion of prescriptive easements.
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As between various parties with rights in the same easement (or
easement location), their respective rights are defined in the first
instance according to the express language in their conveyance.
Thereafter, there may be a senior versus junior relationship among
the dominant estates in the event that there was sequential convey-
ancing of easements (for example, a grant of an easement to a natu-
ral gas company, then later to an electrical company in the same
corridor). It stands to reason that a servient owner cannot grant to
others that which she has no right to exercise herself. Where there
have been simultaneous conveyances of an easement creating equal
co-tenants, such as a road in a subdivision plan or an appurtenant
easement, 60 the exercise of contemporaneous rights must not in-
fringe on the lawful and reasonable use and enjoyment of the ease-
ment by other holders.6 ' Furthermore, each dominant estate may
act independently of the other-complete agreement among co-ten-
ants is not necessary so long as there is no infringement or unrea-
sonable inconvenience to other co-tenants.62 In the case of public
highways, the use by any person must not be unreasonable in time
or place. 63 The use by one person may of necessity dispossess an-
other person of some rights-no two automobiles may occupy the
same space at the same time-so long as the use is reasonable.' As
a general rule, no person can use the public easement for his own
benefit without legislative permission.65 In some cases the legisla-
ture, and in lesser matters the courts, have abrogated the rights in
60. See Cleaves v. Braman, 103 Me. 154, 68 A. 857 (1907).
61. Hultzen v. Witham, 146 Me. at 127, 78 A.2d at 346. See also Poire v.
Manchester, 506 A.2d 1160, 1162 (Me. 1986) ("Each easement holder's right may
only be asserted to the point where its exercise does not infringe the reasonable use
and enjoyment of the beach by other holders of an identical easement.").
62. Rotch v. Livingston, 91 Me. 461. 475, 40 A. 426, 432 (1898).
63. Cf. Bearce v. Dudley, 88 Me. 410, 417-18, 34 A. 260, 261 (1896) (holding
defendants liable for unreasonably blocking public waterway); McPheters v. Moose
River Log Driving Co., 78 Me. 329, 333-34, 5 A. 270, 271-72 (1886) (temporary de-
lays and rests in public waterway must not be unreasonable).
64. See Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 458-60, 10 A. 321, 322-23 (1887).
65. The early case of Burr v. Stevens, 90 Me. 500, 38 A. 547 (1897), provides a
good example where private use of the public easement will amount to a trespass.
In Burr, the court stated:
The parties are owners of adjoining lots of land, both upon the highway.
For the purpose of passing between his lot and the highway, the defendant
constructed a driveway by making excavations and piling up rocks and re-
fuse across the plaintiff's land, within the limits of the highway as located,
but outside of the wrought or traveled portion thereof....
... [W]hatever his rights may be in regard to passing over the land of the
plaintiff, he clearly had no right to make excavations or pile up rocks on
the plaintiff's land, even if this was reasonably necessary in making the
driveway used by him safe and convenient.
Id. at 503, 38 A. at 548. See also title 35-A §§ 3501-3505 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-
1996) (permitting individuals to use public utility easements for their own benefit).
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one or more persons for the good of all in a balance between con-
venience and inconvenience. 66
The last conflict scenario, between the servient and dominant ten-
ement, is more likely, as evidenced by the number of historical
cases. The dominant estate must confine its use of the easement
according to the terms or intent of the easement grant in a reason-
able manner.67 As a general rule, the servient estate may not inter-
fere with or impair the reasonable use of the easement by the
dominant party unless expressly allowed by the grant.' Neverthe-
less, this estate may exercise dominion over the easement so long as
the reasonable use of the easement is not infringed.69 The servient
estate may use the easement in the same or similar manner as the
dominant estate or use the area in a manner not incompatible with
the dominant estate's use.70 Furthermore, although the servient
owner may grant the use of the easement to others or extend the
rights in the easement to one or more dominant parties,7" she may
not grant rights to use the easement that she herself cannot exercise
unless the grant is to a bona-fide purchaser where there was no no-
tice of the former conveyance.' In addition, the grant of an ease-
ment does not deny the servient owner the right to use her land in
such a manner as to diminish the need or desirability of the ease-
ment.73 For example, a person who grants access to a private pond
is not thereby compelled to maintain the same water level in the
pond.
In the case of public roads, the conflict between the dominant
(public) and servient tenements often centers on the municipality's
right to increase the width of the traveled portion within the ease-
ment. Specifically, conflict arises where the municipality enters the
easement to remove trees and occupy the space within the bounds
66. Burr v. Stevens, 90 Me. 500, 38 A. 547.
67. Kaler v. Beaman, 49 Me. 207 (1860).
68. Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222,227 (Me. 1979) ("The owner of an estate that is
servient to an easement may not make a use of the servient land which impairs
effective use of the easement within the bounds of the easement .... ").
69. Morgan v. Boyes, 65 Me. 124, 125 (1876) ("Such a right does not carry with it
a right to the exclusive possession of the land. The owner may still use it for any
purpose which does not materially impair, nor unreasonably interfere with its use as
a way.").
70. See, e.g., Ricker v. Barry, 34 Me. 116, 121 (1852) ("The grantor would con-
tinue to be the owner of the land subject to the servitude, and he would be also
entitled to use the way.").
71. Title deficiencies may occur where the dominant estate rather than the servi-
ent estate has attempted to convey or extend the rights in the easement to the own-
ers of other non-appurtenant parcels. See, eg., Lyon v. Lea, 84 Me. 254, 258, 24 A.
844, 845 (1892) ("[An easement] may be laid out under, over or across another.");
Morgan v. Boyes, 65 Me. at 125 ("He may use it as a way himself, or permit others
so to use it.").
72. See title 33, §§ 201 to 201-B (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996).
73. Badger v. Hill, 404 A.2d 222, 227 (Me. 1979).
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of the easement-space that was previously used or occupied by the
servient estate. The dominant estate generally may use the full and
reasonable width of the easement for the purposes stated in the op-
erative document.74 However, when the municipality begins remov-
ing the herbage, trees, and other improvements75 to expand the
width of the traveled way or to make room for ditches or other
amenities, the municipality is obligated to pay the landowner for the
1oss.76
"Reasonableness" is often a deciding factor in determining
whether a municipality or dominant owner will be permitted to in-
crease the width of the traveled portion within the easement. De-
pending on the circumstances, the reasonableness of the use is
determined by one of the following two tests: (1) overburdening
analysis or (2) reasonable in comparison. 77 The overburdening
analysis evaluates whether it is reasonable to conclude that a partic-
ular use was within the contemplation of the parties to the convey-
ance and, in that context, whether the contested use made of the
servient estate by the dominant estate exceeds the rights granted to
the user. The "reasonable in comparison" test determines whether
the actual use by one user unreasonably interferes with the reason-
able exercise of the other's rights.78 Regardless of the analysis, the
74. Cf Parsons v. Clark, 76 Me. 476 (1884).
75. From a practical standpoint, wild, natural vegetation with no real market
value will not trigger claims for damages against the municipality, but cultivated
plants, public shade trees, and trees with commercial value should be paid for if
taken by the town. Good practice would require the municipality to put the land-
owner on notice of pending roadwork allowing the landowner to remove trees for
his own use or sale. If the landowner fails to remove the trees, the municipality
would cut the trees and leave the cut wood for the landowner. Cf. title 30-A, § 3291
(West Supp. 1995-1996) (dealing with cutting and removal of trees and brush).
76. As the Law Court noted:
"Generally they" (meaning trees by the roadside) "are the property of the
adjoining landowner. In the absence of evidence transferring the title out
of him, it is to be assumed such trees are his property. In him is vested the
right of property and of beneficial enjoyment. The public has no right to
the trees or to use them, even if necessarily removed, to construct or main-
tain the way. For any interference with his possession or right of posses-
sion in such trees the adjoining owner has his action."
"As to everything except the public right of passage and the incidents
thereto, the land was the property of the plaintiffs .... They have a right to
recover for the defendants' trespass thereon and to be paid the value of the
trees he cut and carried away."
Brooks v. Bess, 135 Me. 290, 292, 195 A. 361, 362 (1937) (quoting McCaffery v.
Concord Elec., 114 A. 395,396 (N.H. 1921); Baldwin v. Wallace, 146 A. 90, 90 (N.H.
1929)).
77. Cf Poire v. Manchester, 506 A.2d 1160, 1162-63 (Me. 1986) ("Accordingly,
the correlative rights of the parties are determined by applying a reasonableness
test. Such a test has been applied in somewhat analogous cases involving the recip-
rocal rights of riparian owners to stream flowage.").
78. Id. at 1163.
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practitioner should be mindful that implied rights are not limitless
and that certain exceptions exist.
a. Utilities in Private Road Easements
Before January 1, 1990, the dominant estate generally had the
right to install utilities in a private access easement. 79 However, on
and after January 1, 1990, the dominant estate no longer has this
right unless the operative instrument expressly grants those rights.s"
This would not affect easements created before January 2. 1990.
b. Utilities in Public Roads
Under the common law, a public easement could be occupied
only by uses that were necessary and reasonably beneficial to the
public's health, safety, and welfare.81 For roads, the public use was
generally limited to travel, with any delay or other use deemed a
trespass upon the servient estate.82 Therefore, in the past, occupa-
tion of the public road easement generally was limited to travel and
possibly water and sewage. Other uses such as telegraph, telephone,
cable, gas, and electricity were not considered absolute necessities.
In many cases the occupation of the public easement by private utili-
ties was prohibited since the occupation only benefited private cor-
porations offering services to private citizens. In an attempt to
clarify who may occupy the public road easement, the Maine Legis-
lature passed several statutes allowing telegraph, telephone, televi-
sion,' common carrier pipeline transmission,84 water utilitiess gas
utilities,8 6 and electric corporations 7 to make improvements in,
along, and under public easements, so long as the easements are
used for travel by motor vehicles.s The effective date of these stat-
utes was July 1, 1987. Due to an earlier legislative enactment in
1977, public easements in discontinued public roads were deemed to
include an easement for public utilities.8 9 This enactment, however,
was not effective until October 24, 1977; therefore, public roads dis-
79. See Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1099 (Me. 1989); Saltonstall v. Cumming, 538
A.2d 289 (Me. 1988); Ware v. Public Serv. Co. of N.H., 412 A.2d 84 (Me. 1980).
80. Title 33, § 458 (West Supp. 1995-1996).
81. City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 382, 385 (Me. 1970) ("No new servi-
tude, not in the nature of public travel, can be imposed upon the land, against the
consent of the landowner, without a further condemnation of his land under the
right of eminent domain, and the award of adequate compensation therefor.'"
(quoting Hartford v. Town of Oilmenton 146 A.2d 851)).
82. Stinson v. Gardiner, 42 Me. 248 (1856).
83. Title 35-A, § 2301 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996).
84. Id- § 2302.
85. Id. § 2303.
86. Id. § 2304.
87. Id. § 2305.
88. 1d. § 2308.
89. P.L. 1977, ch. 301, § 1.
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continued between September 3, 1965 (the effective date of legisla-
tion providing for the retainment of a public easement in
discontinued public roads), 9° and October 24, 1977, are not deemed
to contain a utility easement, and permission of the fee owner must
be obtained for the installation of utilities. There is also a question
whether the 1977 enactment applies to public roads opened prior to
the enactment of the statute or roads that may be acquired at any
time by prescription.9' Furthermore, statutory law allows utilities to
be installed in discontinued public easements (not private ease-
ments) only if they continue in use for travel by motor vehicles.' In
accordance with Maine statutory law, previously existing utility
easements in the public way also may be subject to relocation in
connection with development projects.93
c. Obstructions
Generally, obstructions that prevent or limit the reasonable use of
the easement are not permitted. However, the courts have permit-
ted the placement of temporary obstructions when reasonable under
the circumstances.94 Consequently, the courts have allowed block-
ing an easement to effectuate repairs, temporarily rest, or unload
supplies or products so long as the obstruction is temporary and rea-
sonable under the circumstances.95 In private easements, the courts
have often allowed the use of gates and bars across the easement.
The slight burden on the dominant estate of opening the gates is
balanced against the need of the servient owner to keep cattle from
wandering or to protect her property.96
d. Prescriptive Easements
Prescriptive easements are construed narrowly and may be uti-
lized only in the manner or character of the burden imposed during
90. Title 23, § 3026, amended by P.L. 1965, ch. 270, § 1.
91. Arguably the law does apply to previously created roads on the basis that the
status of the road is already fixed and cannot be altered retroactively.
92. Id.
93. Title 30-A, § 5301 (West Supp. 1995-1996).
94. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co., 103 Me. 37, 47, 68 A. 527, 532 (1907)
("Temporary obstructions are unavoidable and are incident to the legitimate pur-
poses of travel and transportation, and if continued within reasonable limits they do
not create a nuisance. But if the encroachment upon the public highway is unrea-
sonable in extent or duration, it is unjustifiable.").
95. See, e.g., Davis v. Winslow, 51 Me. 264, 291-96 (1863).
96. Ames v. Shaw, 82 Me. 379, 19 A. 856 (1890):
[W]hether created by grant or adverse user, [the easement] may properly
be subjected to gates and bars not unreasonably established. The way may
be gained without being so obstructed at all, but it is nevertheless a way for
a particular use; and in the enjoyment of that use, unreasonable obstruc-
tions only are prohibited.
Id at 382, 19 A. at 856.
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the prescriptive period.97 Further limitations may be placed upon
prescriptive easements by the court in fashioning equitable relief.9"
However, once the character of the use is established, the amount or
quantity of use is flexible and may increase without overburdening
the easement.99 Courts have upheld an increase in the amount of
traffic on a prescriptive access easement beyond that specifically au-
thorized during the prescriptive period. 100 As the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland noted in Mahoney v. Devonshire, Inc.:' m
Even though the common and ordinary use which establishes
the prescriptive right also limits and qualifies it, as one court
aptly observed, "the use made during the prescriptive period
does not fix the scope of the easement eternally." One com-
mentator in this field states that "if the above announced rule
were applied with absolute strictness, the right acquired would
frequently be of no utility whatsoever. A right-of-way. for in-
stance, would, as has been judicially remarked... be available
for use only by the people and the vehicles which have passed
during the prescriptive period."
... "It appears that one who has a prescriptive easement has
the privilege to do such acts as are reasonably necessary to
97. Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d 818, 822 (Me. 1991) ("Unlike an express ease-
ment, whose terms can usually be ascertained from the creating instrument, the per-
missible uses of an easement acquired by prescription are necessarily defined by the
use of the servient land during the prescriptive period."); Pace v. Carter, 390 A.2d
505, 508 (Me. 1978) ("[W]hen an easement is obtained by adverse use alone, its
extent must be measured by its use."); Burnham v. Burnham, 132 Me. 113, 115. 167
A. 693, 693 (1933) ("Since prescription presupposes a grant which is lost, the proof
of the nature of the grant is to be found in use, and the extent of the right acquired is
fixed and determined by the user in which it originated.").
The Court in Ames v. Shaw, 82 Me. 379, 19 A. 856 (1890). said:
It is true that a way gained by adverse use gives rights commensurate with
the adverse use. But, if the use be for agricultural purposes only. then the
way becomes a way for that use-a use to be exercised in a reasonable
manner, and reasonable use of a way for agricultural purposes .... The
nature of the easement gained determines its character, and not the partic-
ular manner of the use that created the right.
Id at 382, 19 A. at 856.
98. See, eg., Martin v. Burnham, 631 A.2d 1239 (Me. 1993).
99. In Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d 818. the court stated:
In order to remain useful to the dominant estate it serves, a prescriptive
right of way must encompass some flexibility of use, and adapt to natural
and foreseeable developments in the use of the surrounding land. When
presented with an alleged overburdening of a prescriptive easement, the
factfinder must balance the prior use of the right of way established during
the prescriptive period against any later changes in the method of use that
unreasonably or unforeseeably interfere with the enjoyment of the servient
estate by its current owner.
Id at 822-23.
100. IaL
101. Mahoney v. Devonshire Inc., 587 A.2d 1146 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
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make effective enjoyment of the easement unless the burden
on the servient tenement is thereby increased."'l
e. Exclude the Obvious
On the other hand, it must be presumed that when a deed specifi-
cally mentions certain uses, other uses are excluded. Therefore,
"cattle, teams and foot passengers" would be construed to exclude
the use of motor vehicles if the words were first employed in 1960,
since new technologies such as automobiles and electricity were
known, reasonable, understood, and widespread at the time. 10 3 The
omission of reasonable and widespread technologies when other
uses are specifically mentioned is strong evidence that excluded uses
are not included in the terms of the easement.
f. Increased Traffic Not Speed
An increase in the volume of traffic ordinarily is not an overbur-
dening of the easement such that the servient estate may maintain
an actionable trespass.' 04 However, surfacing that increases the
speed of the traffic may be an overburdening because it represents a
qualitative rather than quantitative change in use.' °
5
g. Subdivision of the Appurtenant Parcel
Many times land is sold in conjunction with an appurtenant ease-
ment. At the time of sale, the land may have been used for a farm
or field. There was no thought at that time that burgeoning popula-
tions would look to that land as a site for future construction of
additional residences or multiple commercial enterprises. The
courts have held that if the increased or modified use is reasonable,
the division of the appurtenant parcel is reasonable even if it in-
creases the use.' °6 Each parcel created in the division shares equal
right, access, and use of the appurtenant easement.10 7
h. Accessing Non-Appurtenant Parcels
Although the Maine Law Court has not specifically addressed this
issue, under the common law generally recognized by most states an
easement holder may use an appurtenant easement only for the
benefit of the appurtenant parcel.' °8 The easement holder may not
102. Id. at 1149 (quoting Kuras v. Kope, 533 A.2d 1202, 1207-08 (Conn. 1987)).
103. Stevens v. Anderson, 393 A.2d 158, 159 (Me. 1978).
104. Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d 818 (Me. 1991).
105. Davis v. Bruk, 411 A.2d 660, 666 (Me. 1980).
106. Herrick v. Marshall, 66 Me. 435, 439 (1877).
107. See, e.g., Cleaves v. Braman, 103 Me. 154, 161, 68 A. 857, 860 (1907).
108. The issue was addressed once at the superior court level and decided accord-
ing to the common law. See Adam v. Reiche, CV-89-1413, (Me. Super. Ct. Cum.
Cty., Feb. 28, 1995) (Brennan, J.).
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use the appurtenant easement indiscriminately to serve non-appur-
tenant parcels. Unless there is express wording to the contrary, ap-
purtenant easements may not be used to serve property not
appurtenant to the easement.10 9 Any use of the appurtenant ease-
ment to enjoy another parcel, even by the owner of the appurtenant
property (dominant estate) attempting to reach another adjacent
(but non-appurtenant) parcel, is a trespass on the servient estate. 110
This restriction has led to problems since many landowners incor-
rectly assume they can use an easement appurtenant to one of their
parcels for the benefit of another contiguous parcel they own.
FIGURE 5
Parcel C
1889 Maele to Castro
1943 Castro Heirs to Jacobs
Parcel B 7
1867 Greeb to Miller
1900 Miller to Smith
1943 Smith Heirs to Jacobs
867 Greebto Mil er
Parcel A 903 iller to Jo ison
956 Johnson to V eek
.......... . '-: . . ' i- _-
Consider the figure and accompanying information. In this case, the common owner
of parcels "C" and "B" may not use the easement to reach parcel "C." If there is no
other way to access parcel "C," parcel -C" is considered landlocked or must look to
the grantor's remaining land for an easement (easement by necessity).
The courts have cited at least two situations in which the use of an
appurtenant easement is limited strictly to benefit the appurtenant
parcel. In one such situation, the original grantor has not contem-
109. In Kanefsky v. Dratch Constr. Co., 101 A.2d 923 (Pa. 1954) the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court said:
It is elementary law that an easement cannot be extended by the owner of
the dominant tenement to other land owned by him adjacent to or beyond
the land to which it is appurtenant. for such an extension would constitute
an unreasonable increase of the burden of the servient tenement.
Id. at 926 (footnote omitted); Cooper v. Sawyer, 405 P.2d 394, 401 (Haw. 1965)
("The principles of law involved are well settled and do not appear to be disputed.
The owner of the dominant tenement ... may not subject the servient tenement...
to servitude or use in connection with other premises to which the easement is not
appurtenant."). See also Kiser v. Warner Robins Air Park Estates, 228 SE.2d 795,
797 (Ga. 1976); Curtin v. Franchetti, 242 A.2d 725, 727 (Conn. 1969). But see Na-
tional Lead Co. v. Kanawha Block Co., 409 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1969).
110. Wetmore v. Ladies of Loretto, Wheaton, 220 N.E.2d 491, 496 (I11. App. Ct.
1966); College Inns of Am. v. Cully, 460 P.2d 360 (Or. 1969); Bickler v. Bickler, 403
S.W.2d 354 (Tex. 1966). But see National Lead Co. v. Kanawha Block Co., 409 F.2d
at 1310 (the landowner was deprived of his access and had to use an easement serv-
ing one parcel to reach the other).
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plated the unlimited and indiscreet extension of the easement to
other parcels."' In the second situation, the use, however slight, of
an appurtenant easement to benefit other non-appurtenant parcels
places an additional burden on the servient estate."12 Extending the
appurtenant easement to non-appurtenant parcels would make it
impossible to estimate the future use and burden placed upon the
servient estate. Limitation of the use of an easement to the appurte-
nant property allows the prospective buyer of the servient property
to examine the records and with some confidence estimate the bur-
den he will suffer as a result of the easement. To allow an easement
to benefit property as yet undefined and dependent on the
purchases of the future owner of the dominant estate would impose
an unfair burden and risk on the owner of the servient property." 3
Furthermore, absurd consequences could follow depending on sub-
sequent conveyances. By allowing the extension of appurtenant
easements to non-appurtenant parcels in common ownership, the
court would have to recognize a right in the dominant estate to as-
sign rights in the easement to future owners of the non-appurtenant
parcels. 1 4 Therefore, absent a specific agreement to the contrary,
the courts will not extend the benefits of an easement to other
parcels.
One possible exception to the common law rule is based on estop-
pel. The exception arises where the owner of non-appurtenant par-
cels subsequently purchases the dominant .parcel with the
appurtenant easement. Under this circumstance, it may be reason-
able to assume that the owner of the servient estate has notice that
the easement will be extended to the parcels previously purchased.
In such a case, the easement would appear in the parcel's chain of
title.
IV. CREATION
Private easements may be created in a number of different ways,
including grant, reservation, implication, estoppel, and prescription.
A private way (also known as a public easement) may be created by
town officials." 5 However, courts have held such use unconstitu-
tional if the private way benefits only a private individual." 6 A
111. Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 158 A.2d 319, 323 (Md. 1960).
112. Plunkett v. Weddington, 318 S.W.2d 885,888 (Ky. Ct. App. 1958); Nielson v.
Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943).
113. Buckler v. Davis Sand & Gravel Corp., 158 A.2d at 322-23.
114. The alternative is that the non-appurtenant parcels remain landlocked.
115. Title 23, § 3022 (West 1964 & Supp. 1995-1996). See also Brown v.
Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984), for a discussion of the provisions of the
former title 23, §§ 3001-3012.
116. In Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026, the court noted:
[When] laying out... [a] private way it was necessary that it be found that
the establishment of the private way was required by common convenience
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public need must be shown. There are three methods by which pub-
lic easements may be created: (1) prescription; (2) statute; and (3)
dedication." 7
A. Grant
An easement is created by an express grant when a person (gran-
tor or testator) burdens his land with an easement and conveys or
devises that easement to some other person (grantee or devisee)."'
B. Reservation
An easement by reservation is created when the grantor retains
an easement over land that she conveys to another party.119 In
many cases, the deed from grantor to grantee is somewhat unclear
with respect to the reserved easement, creating problems that arise
immediately or at a later date. 2 ' The following are two of the most
common problems associated with reservations:
1. Exception Used
"Reserving" an easement refers to designating an easement to re-
main in favor of the grantor.' 2 ' However, in a few cases grantors
incorrectly will use the term "excepting" to designate an easement
that the grantor wishes to retain.'2 An exception is properly used
to retain fee title whereas a reservation creates a right, not existing
and necessity. We answer that such requirement is necessitated under the
Constitution of the State of Maine and under the statutory law existing at
the time of the laying-out process.
Id. at 1029.
117. Vachon v. Inhabitants of the Town of Lisbon, 295 A.2d 255, 259 (Me. 1972)
("We conceive the law in Maine to recognize three methods by which public ways
may be created; namely, 1) by prescriptive use. 2) by the statutory method of laying
out and accepting a way, and 3) by dedication and acceptance.") (footnote omitted).
See also Avaunt v. Town of Gray, 634 A.2d 1258 (Me. 1993); Town of Manchester v.
Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124 (Me. 1984).
118. See e.g., O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1042 (Me. 1987).
119. Id.
120. See eg., First Nat'l Bank of Skowhegan v. Morrison, 88 Me. 162, 163, 33 A.
784, 785 (1895).
121. S.E. & H.L. Shepherd Co. v. Shibles, 100 Me. 314, 317, 61 A. 700, 701-02
(1905).
122. State v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9 (1856). In the later case of Ring v. Walker, 87 Me.
550, 33 A. 174, the court stated:
[I]n giving constructions to instruments in writing, the intention of the par-
ties is to be effectuated, and if a deed cannot effect the design of them in
one mode known to the law, their purpose may be accomplished in an-
other, provided no rule of law is violated. Hence, the distinction between
an exception and a reservation is so obscure in many cases, that it has not
been observed; but that which in terms is a reservation in a deed is often
construed to be a good exception, in order that the object designed to be
secured may not be lost.
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previously, in the form of an easement.' 23 The court in Engel v.
Ayer 24 attempted to explain the difference.
A "reservation" is said to vest in the grantor some new right
or interest not before existing in him, operating by way of an
implied grant .... The operation of an exception on the other
hand, is to retain in the grantor some portion of his former
estate, and whatever is thus excepted or taken out of the grant
remains in him as his former title. An exception is always of a
part of the thing granted and of a thing in being.... But the
two principles so frequently blend, and the distinction be-
tween them is so often found to be uncertain and obscure, that
the two expressions have to a great extent been interchangea-
bly employed. A reservation is often construed as an excep-
tion in order that the obvious intention of the parties may not
be defeated. 125
2. Subject To/Together With
Once the grantor creates an easement in favor of his remaining
lands by a reservation, the servient parcel is "subject to" the ease-
ment. The deed for the appurtenant parcel should drop the word
"reserving" and introduce the easement with the words "together
with" to indicate the additional right or title already in existence
Id at 560-61, 33 A. at 177 (quoting Winthrop v. Fairbanks, 41 Me. 307, 311-12
(1856)).
123. Brown v. Allen, 43 Me. 590, 599 (1857) ("An exception in a deed must be a
portion of the thing granted, or described as granted, and can be nothing else.").
Also consider the case Worcester v. Smith, 117 Me. 168, 103 A. 65 (1918), where the
court said:
An "exception" is a part of the thing granted and of a thing in being at the
time of the grant. A "reservation" vests in the grantor some new right or
interest that did not exist in him before, and operates by way of an implied
grant.
.. "The distinction between an 'exception' and a 'reservation' is fre-
quently obscure and uncertain, and has not always been observed, and the
two expressions have to a great extent been indiscriminately employed.
Moreover, a reservation is often construed as an exception in order that the
obvious intention of the parties may be subserved. Whether a particular
provision is intended to operate as an exception or reservation is to be
determined by the character, rather than by the particular words used."
Id. at 169, 103 A. at 65 (quoting Ring v. Walker. 87 Me. at 559, 33 A. at 176) (cita-
tions omitted). See also, Shackford & Gooch, Inc. v. B & B Coastal Enterprises,
Inc., 479 A.2d 1312, 1314 n.3 (Me. 1984) ("Technically, a 'reservation' is a newly
created right, but 'reservation' is frequently used interchangeably with 'exception.'
The intention of the parties, not the words in the deed, is controlling.") (citations
omitted).
124. 85 Me. 448, 27 A. 352 (1893).
125. Id. at 453-54, 27 A. at 354 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 48:197
ROADS AND EASEMENTS
that is being conveyed with that appurtenant parcel. However, the
failure to mention the easement does not extinguish it.126
C. Implication
Implied easements arise from inferences and circumstances sur-
rounding the division and conveyance of land. The Law Court has
recognized that certain easements, not specifically described and
granted in the instruments of conveyance, may be implied by the
circumstances attending the conveyance of the property.'27 Ease-
ments by implication are based on a presumed grant," arising from
an inferred understanding of the parties and flowing from circum-
stances present at the time of the conveyance. 129 These circum-
126. The legislature codified the common law by stating, "In a conveyance of real
estate all rights, easements, privileges and appurtenances belonging to the granted
estate shall be included in the conveyance, unless the contrary shall be stated in the
deed." Title 33, § 773 (West 1988).
127. The court held in Hoskins v. Brawn, 76 Me. 68 (1884):
It is undoubtedly true that an easement on land other than that which is
conveyed is not to be created by implication unless the easement is neces-
sary to the beneficial use and enjoyment of that which is conveyed. But the
authorities go far to show that easements already created, and in actual use
at the time of a conveyance, will often pass, although convenient only, and
not absolutely necessary.
Id. at 70.
128. In the early case of Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 78 A. 456 (1910). the
court said:
The basis of a right of way of necessity is the presumption of a grant arising
from the circumstances of the case. Necessity does not of itself create a
right of way but it is evidence of the grantor's intention to convey one.
"Necessity is only a circumstance resorted to for the purpose of showing
the intention of the parties and raising an implication of a grant. And the
deed of the grantor as much creates the way of necessity as it does the way
by grant, the only difference between the two is that the one is granted in
express words and the other only by implication." ... "This species of right
of way, in the absence of anything to the contrary contained in the deed.
becomes an incident to the grant indicative of the intention of the parties."
The presumption, however, is one of fact and whether or not the grant is
to be implied in a given case depends upon the terms of the deed and the
facts in that case.
Id. at 354, 78A. at 458 (citations omitted). See also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me.
299, 302, 128 A. 285, 287 (1925) ("[I]t should also be observed that every right of
way of necessity is founded on a presumed grant .... ).
129. In LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984 (Me. 1979) the court stated:
In determining whether the grantor impliedly reserved an easement over
the conveyed land, the focus is properly upon the probable intent of the
parties. The understanding of the parties to the conveyance giving rise to
the implied easement, therefore, is relevant. Also probative of the intent
of the parties are the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Certain
circumstances that evidence an intent to create an easement have become
known as elements of an implied easement. The so-called elements of an
implied reservation of an easement are (1) apparent and open use of the
quasi-easement, (2) severance of unity of title in the dominant and servient
1996]
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stances must support the inference that the parties' intent was to
create an easement (irrespective of verbal assertions of the true in-
tent). 3 ' The equitable basis of implied easements lies in the princi-
ple that the grant of a thing includes the necessary means to attain,
possess, and use it.' 3 ' In some cases, the theory of estoppel will pro-
hibit the grantor from denying an easement. 132 In effect, a person
by her acts may imply an easement for the benefit of another (usu-
ally the grantee), 33 and by so doing, that person subsequently may
be estopped from denying the existence of the easement.
The four circumstances most frequently causing implied ease-
ments are: (1) strict necessity existing at the time of the grant; (2)
quasi easements existing on the land prior to division and convey-
ance; (3) amenities shown on a subdivision plan used to convey one
or more lots; and (4) the grantor's private road is used as a bound-
ary in a description provided to the grantee.
1. Strict Necessity
If a landowner divides a tract of land in such a way that one of the
resulting parcels is completely inaccessible (for example, it does not
have access to and from a public highway), the law will imply an
easement out of strict necessity for that parcel.134 An easement by
portions, and (3) the strict necessity of the servitude to the enjoyment of
the dominant estate.
Id. at 987-88 (citations omitted) (footnote omitted). See also York v. Golder, 128
Me. 252,255, 147 A. 41,42 (1929); Watson v. French, 112 Me. 371.374-75, 92 A. 290.
291-92 (1914).
130. Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d 387, 389 (Me. 1990)
("Because of the strict necessity of having access to the landlocked parcel, an ease-
ment over the grantor's remaining land benefiting the landlocked lot is implied as a
matter of law irrespective of the true intent of the common grantor."); LeMay v.
Anderson, 397 A.2d at 987 (To determine whether an easement has been impliedly
created the proper focus is "upon the probable intent of the parties," which may be
inferred from the circumstances of the transaction.).
131. Watson v. French, 112 Me. at 374-75, 92 A. at 291; Oakland Woolen Co. v.
Union Gas & Elec. Co., 101 Me. 198, 207, 63 A. 915, 919 (1906) ("The good sense of
the doctrine on this subject is that under the grant of a thing, whatever is parcel of it,
or of the essence of it, or necessary to its beneficial use and enjoyment, or in com-
mon intendment is included in it, passes to the grantee.") (citation omitted). Twenty
years earlier in Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me. 381, 6 A. 6 (1886), the court said, "It is an
ancient maxim that when a person grants a thing, he is supposed also tacitly to grant
such means of his own as are necessary thereby to attain the thing granted." Id. at
389, 6 A. at 10.
132. Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me. 80, 83 (1850) ("[T]he grantee acquired a right
of way in the street by implication or estoppel.").
133. Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d at 389. See also Le-
May v. Anderson, 397 A.2d at 987-88.
134. In Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d 387, the court said:
We have recognized two kinds of implied easements . . . . The first is an
easement created by strict necessity, arising when a grantor conveys a lot of
land from a larger parcel, and that conveyed lot is "landlocked" by the
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strict necessity arises when: (1) there is a conveyance of a lot out of
a larger, divided parcel; (2) the conveyed lot is denied essential ac-
cess (most often the parcel is "landlocked" in that it cannot be ac-
cessed by water or roadway at the time of the conveyance); and (3)
relief in the form of an easement may be had on, across, or burden-
ing what is or was the remaining land of the grantor. 3 '
As a rule, strict necessity, and not mere convenience, is re-
quired. 136 In early cases the court held that an easement by neces-
sity would not be implied where the tract of land conveyed had
frontage on navigable waters but otherwise was landlocked.137 In
more recent years the court has looked at the parties' intention in
grantor's surrounding land and cannot be accessed by a road or highway.
Because of the strict necessity of having access to the landlocked parcel, an
easement over the grantor's remaining land benefiting the landlocked lot is
implied as a matter of law irrespective of the true intent of the common
grantor.
Id. at 389. See also, Trask v. Patterson, 29 Me. 499, 503 (1849) ("Where one conveys
to another a tract of land wholly surrounded by his own land, or inaccessible except
through his own land, he has been considered as granting by implication a right of
way to and from it."); Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 27, 71 A.2d 55. 57 (1950) ("It was
early decided in Maine that where one conveys to another a tract of land surrounded
by the grantor's own land, or inaccessible except through the grantor's own land, he
is considered to have granted by implication a right of way to and from it.").
135. Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Me. 1993) ("An easement by neces-
sity, an easement implied in the law, may be created when a 'grantor conveys a lot of
land from a larger parcel and that conveyed lot is 'landlocked' by the grantor's sur-
rounding land and cannot be accessed from a road or highway.' "). See also
O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1042-43 (Me. 1987).
136. In Stillwell v. Foster, 80 Me. 333, 14 A. 731 (1888), the court noted:
In this state, the rule is now so well established, that the test to be applied
in such cases is, whether the way is one of strict necessity, that it is too late
to change it. Nor do we think it desirable, for it seems to be founded not
only upon a preponderance of authority but upon sound principle. It has
the recommendation of simplicity and certainty, is easily applied, and
works no injustice; for, the purchaser knows, or should know, what he is
buying before his deed is accepted.
Id at 344, 14 A. at 732. See also Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573
A.2d at 389; Ouellette v. Bolduc, 440 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Me. 1982).
137. In Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 71 A.2d 55, the court stated:
No right of way from necessity exists across the remaining land of the gran-
tor, where the land to which such right of way is claimed borders on the
sea. It must be necessity and not mere convenience. If free access to the
land over a public navigable water exists, a way by necessity cannot be
implied.
Id. at 28, 71A.2d at 57 (citation omitted). See also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me.
299, 301, 128 A. 285,286-87 (1925); Kingsley v. Gouldsborough Land Improvement
Co., 86 Me. 279,281-82,29 A. 1074, 1075 (1894). In the most recent case of Morrell
v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156 the court stated: "It is true that a showing of access to land
across navigable water could in some circumstances defeat a claim of an easement
by necessity." However, the court also stated: "We have not reexamined in recent
years, in light of the changed conditions of transportation based on the ascendancy
of the automobile, the extent to which water access would still preclude an easement
by necessity." Id. at 1156 n.4.
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light of present circumstances. It has held that in certain circum-
stances an overland easement by necessity would be implied even
when property had frontage on the ocean or a lake suitable for
navigation. 138
The Law Court construes strict necessity to mean absolute neces-
sity without recourse to other lawful means.139 Necessity requires
that an actionable trespass would have to occur in order for a land-
owner to exercise an essential and necessary use. If an alternative
means or method (although burdensome) would give the landowner
relief, thus rendering actionable trespass unnecessary, requirements
of strict necessity are not met. Expense is not typically a considera-
tion unless it is clearly excessive or unreasonable. 140
The creation of an easement by necessity does not depend on the
preexisting use of the land or what the grantor later may claim was
her true intent at the time of conveyance. 4' Additionally, the ease-
ment by necessity is not limited to the necessary use required at the
time of its creation.' 42 However, the necessity itself must exist at
138. See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987-88 (Me. 1979) (court found im-
plied reservation of easement by conveyance even though the property abutted a
lake); Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d at 1158-59 (stating that where landlocked or inac-
cessible land is part of a simultaneous conveyance by a common grantor. an ease-
ment by necessity can be implied).
139. Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276, 289 (1866); cf. Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d
606 (Me. 1989).
140. Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. at 28, 71 A.2d at 57 ("An easement of necessity is
sometimes recognized ... where the expense to be incurred in creating or using
another way is excessive.") (citing Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299. 128 A. 285
(1925)). But see O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1042 n.5 (Me. 1987) (stating
that expense does not affect the requirement of strict necessity for obtaining an
easement by necessity).
141. In Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156 (Me. 1993), the court stated:
The scope of use of the easement, however, is not determined solely in
reference to the time of its creation. Rather, the better rule is that the
scope should be defined with reference to the reasonable enjoyment of the
land and all lawful uses to which it may be put.
Id. at 1160. See also Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d at 609. ("The creation of an
easement by necessity, exemplified by the case of a 'landlocked' lot conveyed out of
a larger parcel, does not depend on any preexisting quasi-easement, or even on the
intent of the grantor."); Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d 387,
389 (Me. 1990) ("Because of the strict necessity of having access to the landlocked
parcel, an easement over the grantor's remaining land benefitting the landlocked lot
is implied as a matter of law irrespective of the true intent of the common grantor.").
142. In Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156 the court wrote:
The rule is stated that a way of necessity is not limited to those purposes
connected with the use of the dominant tenement existing at the time the
easement was created, but is available for any and all purposes for which
the dominant tenement may be adapted. The enjoyment of such a way is
said to be limited only by the necessity for its use in connection with all
lawful uses of the land to which it is appurtenant. In other words, a way of
necessity is held to be coextensive with the reasonable needs, present and
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the time of the conveyance. 143 For example, if a lot was not land-
locked at the time of conveyance and only became landlocked by
later circumstances through no fault of the grantor or his predeces-
sor, no easement by necessity will exist.'
Easements by necessity are not limited to roads. The Law Court
has held that easements by necessity may arise for drainage, chim-
neys, maintenance rights, and other uses. 145
An easement by necessity never will be recognized over the land
of an adjoining owner who is a stranger to the operative convey-
ance.14 6 The easement must burden those lands of the grantor re-
maining at the time of the conveyance even though a more
convenient way could be forced upon the neighbor.1 47 To hold
otherwise would create numerous problems by allowing acts and
future, of the dominant estate; it varies with the necessity, insofar as may
be consistent with the full reasonable enjoyment of the servient estate.
Id. at 1160 (quoting 25 Am. JUR. 2D Easements & Licenses § 83 at 489 (1966)).
143. See id. ("Whether an implied easement exists is determined by examining
the circumstances existing at the time the landlocked parcel is severed from the par-
cel with access."); Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d at 389 ("At
the time of the original conveyance ... [the] land was bounded by a town road and
was neither landlocked nor inaccessible. In the absence of strict necessity for an
easement... at the time of the severance of unity of title, the law will not imply
one.").
144. In Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs.. Inc., a parcel of land was subdi-
vided with access provided along a town road. Years later the town road was discon-
tinued (without a public easement remaining), and the parcel became landlocked.
Id. 573 A.2d at 388. The owner of the landlocked parcel argued that they should
have an easement by necessity through the grantor's remaining land. Id. at 389. The
Law Court held that the parcel was not landlocked at the time of its creation and
therefore, there was no necessity. Id The parcel. in effect, was left without means
of access.
145. See York v. Golder, 129 Me. 300, 301, 151 A. 558, 558 (1930) ("The law
recognizes that an easement of necessity, in the nature of a drain, may be reserved
by implication in the conveyance of a servient estate."). See also Watson v. French,
112 Me. 371, 375, 92 A. 290, 292 (1914) (citing cases where easement by necessity
existed regarding stairways, drains, and chimneys); Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 563,
33 A. 174, 178 (1895) ("So where the use of a thing is granted, everything essential to
that use is granted also, and there is an implied authority to do all that is necessary
to secure the enjoyment of such easement.").
146. Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299, 302, 128 A. 285, 287 (1925) ("[E]very
right of way of necessity is founded on a presumed grant, hence none can be pre-
sumed over a stranger's land and none can be thus acquired.") (citing Whitehouse v.
Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 97, 21 A. 743, 745 (1890). However, having assumed the
burden imposed by the omission of her predecessor in title, a successor to the gran-
tor's remaining lands, who is otherwise a stranger to the original conveyance, may be
burdened with an easement.
147. Cf. Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156, 1158 (Me. 1993) ("An easement by ne-
cessity also may be created when there are simultaneous conveyances by a common
grantor, and one of the conveyed lots is landlocked and inaccessible. In such a case,
an easement over the other simultaneously conveyed lot to benefit the inaccessible
lot may be implied.") (citing Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606, 609 (Me. 1989));
Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d at 387.
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mistaken omissions between two parties to bind and burden a stran-
ger to the transaction. Where, however, the land conveyed to the
grantee borders other lands owned by the grantee, which provide
access to the newly conveyed land, the courts will require the
grantee to go through the grantee's other land and will refuse to








c. 1984 c. 1989
The time sequence of figures shows the route the owner of Parcel B3 has to use
when relying upon an easement by necessity through the grantor's remaining lands.
When an easement by necessity arises, the owner of the servient
estate has the right in the first instance to locate a reasonable way.
If the servient owner fails to locate a reasonable way, the dominant
owner may locate one. 149 The parties may agree to the location in
writing, verbally, or by their conduct150 and may agree to alter the
location at a later time.' 5 ' The Law Court has held that the location
148. See Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 355, 78 A. 456, 458-59 (1910).
149. In Rumill v. Robbins, 77 Me. 193, 194 (1885), the Law Court stated: "In
such cases [where a right of way exists by virtue of necessity], the owner of the
servient estate has the first right to locate the way, and if he refuse [sic] to do so
upon request, the owner of the dominant estate may locate the way." (citations
omitted).
150. Id. ("The parties may agree to a location, and can change any location by
mutual agreement. Such arrangement, need not be in writing, but can be inferred
from the words or conduct of the parties .... ").
151. Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28,71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950) ("The location of ways
arising from necessity may be changed by the concurrence of the parties. Such loca-
tion or change need not be in writing nor formally agreed to. It may be inferred
from the acts or acquiescence of the parties.").
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must be reasonable."5 In instances where the location of the way
changes, its status remains that of an easement by necessity.1 53
However, once the necessity terminates, the easement terminates asw .154
well.'
2. Quasi Easements
The term "quasi easement" is derived from the fact that the im-
plied easement begins before an easement legally can exist-it is in
a "quasi" state. A quasi easement begins as a use across a parcel
under one ownership that continues on one or more divisions after
the parcel has been subdivided.' 55
Quasi easements are implied easements that arise when: (1) there
is a division of a parcel into two or more parcels (at least two
properties formerly unified in title); (2) a use for the benefit of one
parcel had occurred prior to separation on what is now the other
parcel; (3) the use was open, apparent, and observable to persons
familiar with the property; (4) the retention and continuation of the
use clearly would benefit the land; (5) the owner of the land (domi-
nant estate) continues to use the easement as if it were a true ease-
ment; and (6) the easement is not denied by express language or
acts.
15 6
152. Rumill v. Robbins, 77 Me. at 194.
153. lId ("However the way may be located, the right remains one of necessity
only.").
154. LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 989 (Me. 1979) ("The recognized rule in
Maine with respect to ways of necessity is that termination of the necessity extin-
guishes the easement.") (citing Whitehouse v. Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 99, 21 A. 743,
745 (1890); 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements § 106). In Tibbetts v. Penley, 83 Me. 118, 21
A. 838 (1890) the court stated:
If the plaintiff's passage-way were one of necessity simply, the location of
the street along the western line of the plaintiff's land, would operate a
discontinuance of it across the defendant's land, on the well-settled doc-
trine that the necessity from which the way resulted having ceased, the
right of way ceased.
Id. at 123, 21A. at 840.
155. See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d at 988 n.3 ("To distinguish, however, the
case in which an existing use is made of the servient portion to benefit the dominant
portion from the situation in which there is no existing use at the time of severance
of title, the existing use is referred to as a quasi-easement."); Brown v. Dickey, 106
Me. 97, 101, 75 A. 382, 384 (1909) ("An implied grant of an easement in favor of a
grantee arises from circumstances where at the time of the conveyance the grantor
was the owner of land constituting both the dominant and servient estates.").
156. See Sprague Corp. v. Sprague, 855 F. Supp. 423,431-32 (D. Me. 1994); Fred-
erick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., 573 A.2d 387, 389-90 (Me. 1990); 3 HERBEirT T.
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c. 1995 c. 1996
As the figures show, a division line is created across the existing septic field giving
rise to a quasi easement.
Unlike other forms of implied easements, a quasi easement gener-
ally is founded upon a previous use.'5 7 A common example of a
quasi easement is when a large house is subdivided with part of the
house conveyed as a separate dwelling (for example, a town house).
The party wall between the two units is a quasi easement arising
from the conveyance.
At one time the court required that an implied easement arising
from a quasi easement be based upon strict necessity. 158 At present
the court has relaxed that position and no longer requires strict ne-
cessity.' 59 The court relies primarily on the intent of the parties as
evidenced by surrounding circumstances.' 60 Necessity of use is a
circumstance that may prove the supposed grantor's intent to create
157. See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d at 989.
158. Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276 (1866). In wisdom that is particularly appropri-
ate at the present time, when courts are apt to create new law, the court in Warren
stated:
If we adopt any other rule than that of strict necessity, we open a door to
doubt and uncertainty, to the disturbance and questioning of titles, and to
controversies as to matters of fact, outside of the language or boundaries of
the deed. If an estate, fully granted without exception or reservation, can
be encumbered forever by an easement, or right of use by a third party, by
the finding of a jury that such use would be highly convenient, or that it
was exercised by a former owner, or was notorious, or any other ground
short of strict necessity, the sanctity and security of titles by deeds, exact
and precise in their terms, would be seriously shaken and impaired.
Id. at 289. See also York v. Golder, 128 Me. 252,254, 147 A. 41,42 (1929); Watson v.
French, 112 Me. 371, 375, 92 A. 290, 291-92 (1914).
159. See 3 RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 411(2) (ed. 1985
& Supp. 1988); Bowers v. Andrews 557 A.2d 606, 609 (Me. 1989).
160. In Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606, the court said:
But the law must also respect the interest of the owner of the allegedly
servient estate. An analysis based strictly on "reasonable reliance" is con-
clusory, begging the question of who would be acting reasonably: the party
relying on historical physical conditions or the party relying on record title.
"The vital question," as we have consistently recognized, "is, did the parties




a quasi easement. 16 1 Prior use and the physical adaptation of the
premises to continue the use are important considerations in deter-
mining the existence of a quasi easement.1 62
3. Subdivision and Sale
When land has been divided into lots with at least one lot con-
veyed according to a subdivision plan showing streets and other
beneficial amenities, appurtenant rights in these amenities attach to
the lots for the use and enjoyment of the lot owners. 63 The roads
and other amenities are appurtenant easements provided that: (1)
the amenities are shown on a recorded subdivision plan (or one
given to the lot owner prior to or at the time of conveyance) 16 and
(2) restrictions that would exclude an implied easement are not
noted on the face of the subdivision plan nor on any conveyance of
land to the lot owner or his predecessors in title."' 5
Accordingly, the lot owner may acquire rights in streets, parks,
squares, recreational areas, boat launching sites, and light and air
over open areas, provided that these areas are shown on the survey
plan that is referenced in the operative deed of conveyance. 66
These amenities are implied with the conveyance of any lot shown
on the subdivision plan.' 67 They attach to the conveyed property
161. Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A2d 387, 389 (Me. 1990);
Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606, 608 (Me. 1989).
162. See Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d at 608.
163. See Bartlett v. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460 (1878). The court there said:
When the owner of land within or near to a growing village or city di-
vides it into streets and building lots, and makes a plan of the land thus
divided, and then sells one or more of the lots, by reference to the plan, he
thereby annexes to each lot sold a right of way in the streets, which neither
he nor his successors in title can afterwards interrupt or destroy.... Plat-
ting alone will have no such effect; but platting and selling will.
Id. at 464-65. See also Sprague Corp. v. Sprague, 855 F. Supp. 423. 431-32 (D. Me.
1994).
164. For lot owners to have an implied easement there must have been notice
that the roads existed at the time of conveyance. Cf. Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me.
80 (1850).
165. See title 23, § 3031(3) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
166. See Arnold v. Boulay, 147 Me. 116, 121, 83 A.2d 574, 577 (1951); Brown v.
Dickey, 106 Me. 97, 101-02, 75 A. 382, 384 (1909).
167. See Sutherland v. Jackson, 32 Me. 80, where the court held:
[A] street is laid down on the plan adjoining the plaintiff's land, and the
conveyance is according to the plan. The fair construction of the deed must
be, that the proprietor intended the street for the use of the grantee, and
those who might purchase land adjoining it. He exhibited to the purchaser
the advantages attendant upon the grant, and not only sold him the land,
but the land as it is described upon the plan, where there appears to be a
street, in which it would not have been unreasonable for him to have un-
derstood, that he was to have an easement.... [A] grant of land bounded
on a street, the soil of which belonged to the grantor, though it did not
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regardless of whether they actually abut the lot in question.1 68 Con-
sequently, lot owners within a subdivision generally have an implied
right to use the roads and other common areas shown on the subdi-
vision plan as private easements appurtenant to their lots.169
If the grantor (developer) depicts property with certain amenities
on a plan shown to the grantee (purchaser) or referenced in the
deed, the grantor is estopped from asserting that those amenities
were not implied in the conveyance to that grantee. It is presumed
that the grantee was induced to buy the lot in part because of the
amenities displayed on the plan that was shown to him.17 ° Under
the common law, if a grantor sells a lot by metes and bounds de-
scription without the grantee's seeing a plan, the grantee obtains no
implied rights in the streets other than those for immediate access to
his lots since there could be no inducement that such streets would
be available for the grantee's use.' 7 ' In Maine, the attempt at codi-
fication of the common law does not address this requirement in
such specific language'172-seeming to imply that actual notice is
present from the recording of the plan. If the entire subdivision is
completed in phases (phased development) where the overall subdi-
vision plan is not specifically referenced in the deed of conveyance,
the purchaser of a lot ordinarily would acquire only implied rights or
easements in those aspects of the partial plan (phase) which was
convey the fee in the street by the terms of the grant, yet the grantee ac-
quired a right of way in the street by implication or estoppel....
The fee of the street remains in the vendor, but subject to the easement.
and the value of his fee is but nominal. The plaintiff must be considered as
entitled to a right of way in the street delineated on the plan as adjoining
his land.
Id at 83-84 (citations omitted). See also Callahan v. Ganneston Park Dev. Corp.,
245 A.2d 274, 278-79 (Me. 1968).
168. See Bartlett v. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460,467 (1878) ("And where one sells
building lots by reference to a plan, the purchasers obtain an interest in all the
streets marked upon it, and the right to have them converted into public streets as
soon as the public authorities can be induced to do so." (emphasis added)).
169. See Callahan v. Ganneston Park Dev. Corp., 245 A.2d at 278; Arnold v.
Boulay, 147 Me. at 121-22, 83 A.2d at 577.
170. Arnold v. Boulay, 147 Me. at 121-22, 83 A.2d at 577. See also Stillwell v.
Foster, 80 Me. 333, 14 A. 731 (1888). where the court held that prior case law asserts
the following principle:
[B]y a reference to the plan that becomes a part of the description and
carries the right of way by an express grant, or as when bounded upon a
way upon the grantor's land, it is such a representation of the existence of a
way material to the value of the land, as to estop the grantor from denying
its truth.
Id at 344, 14A. at 732.
171. Although Maine has not dealt with the issue, some states have held that if
the first purchaser buys the lot when the streets have been accepted as public roads,
there is no implied private easement. See, e.g., Cohen v. Simpson Real Estate Corp.,
123 A.2d 715, 717 (Pa. 1956).
172. See title 23, § 3031(2) (West 1988).
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referenced in the deed. 73 Of course, the grantor always may deny
expressly implied easements in the streets. 74
Once a lot has been conveyed and easements are implied to a
purchaser, the grantor (developer) may not be allowed to make
changes in the development that would be detrimental to the inter-
ests of the grantee. For example, a developer may not be allowed to
turn a cul-de-sac road into a through street or make substantial al-
terations to road locations or the size of designated parks after he
has conveyed one or more lots. 175 Should changes be contemplated,
the developer may need to obtain a release from all lot owners af-
fected by the changes, or else repurchase the lots sold in order to
eliminate or alter the easements. 76
Practitioners often encounter difficulties when lot owners have
made substantial improvements in vacated paper streets or discon-
tinued town roads. These lot owners fail to realize that the private
implied rights of the other lot owners exist independently of the
public rights. Consequently, the public's vacation or discontinuance
of such streets does not affect the implied rights of the lot owners in
the subdivision to use the street though the streets are discontinued
(much to the consternation of landowners who made improvements
in the former public roads). 17 7
4. Boundary in a Description
An implied easement often will arise in favor of the grantee's
property over the grantor's private road if the road is specified as
bounding the tract conveyed (see Figure 8).111 The implied ease-
ment will arise when: (1) the grantor creates and conveys a lot or
parcel; (2) the description of the lot calls for the private road along
173. See Young v. Brarnan, 105 Me. 494, 499, 75 A. 120, 121 (1909). ("The
[grantee's] rights ... are... based upon... the description in her own deed and so
much of that plan as is incorporated into and made a part of her deed.").
174. Bartlett v. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460,469 (1878) ("If such is not the inten-
tion of the grantor, it is no hardship to require him to say so in his deed.").
175. In Callahan v. Ganneston Park Dev. Corp., 245 A.2d 274 (Me. 1968), the
court said:
We are satisfied that where one sells lots by reference to a plan showing
streets and ways upon which the purchaser must rely for access to his prop-
erty and indeed for the very value of the property purchased, an attempted
reservation in the granting instrument which would empower the grantor
later to nullify all the proposals for streets and ways shown on his plan
contravenes public policy.
Id. at 278.
176. Bangor House Proprietary v. Brown, 33 Me. 309, 314 (1851) ("By a repur-
chase of that title, the former owner would be entitled to close up such way, as he
would also by obtaining a release of the right of way.").
177. See e.g., Bolduc v. Watson, 639 A.2d 629 (Me. 1994).
178. Young v. Braman, 105 Me. 494, 497, 75 A. 120, 121 (1909).
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the lot or parcel to be conveyed;'79 (3) the grantor has fee simple
title to the road at the time of the conveyance; 180 and (4) the grantor
does not expressly deny an easement over the private road. 8' This
form of implied easement differs from an implied easement created
by a subdivision plan with respect to the manner of creation and the
extent of the easement. The implied easement created by a descrip-
tion is limited to the road or other amenity called for as a boundary
in the description."
FIGURE 8
-- Right of Way-
-Right of Way - -- -----
In the above figure, a discription for the lot sold that says "thence along the private
drive" or similar words, would create an implied access easement for the lot sold in
the private drive.
The Law Court has allowed various "boundary calls" to result in
an implied easement. Terms such as cedar square, a passageway
thirty feet wide, street, avenue, lane, road, place, court, contem-
plated passageway, and driveway, all have been recognized as creat-
ing an implied easement. 183
179. Although the Law Court has not addressed the issue, it is conceivable that
an implied easement may arise if the description calls for other amenities such as a
swimming pool to be conveyed.
180. Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d 425, 428 (Me. 1980).
181. See Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., Inc., 573 A.2d 387, 389 (Me.
1990).
182. Id. at 390 n.4 ("Such an easement.., does not extend beyond the road or
street abutting the grantor's land .... ).
183. See Young v. Braman, 105 Me. 494, 498, 75 A. 120, 121 (1909): "'The ques-
tion is whether the thing intended as a boundary was in fact a way; if it was, it is
immaterial whether it is called a way, or a street, avenue, lane, road, place or
court.'" (quoting Franklin Ins. Co. v. Cousens, 127 Mass. 258 (1879)). The court in
Young explained:
The following are illustrations of the variety of terms employed, all of
which fall within the rule. "Contemplated passageway," "A forty foot
[Vol. 48:197
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An implied easement does not require necessity where the ease-
ment is created by calling for a road as a boundary in a descrip-
tion.'" In other words, the existence of the easement does not
depend on the grantee's need for, or the unavailability of, other ac-
cess."8 Therefore, an implied easement will be created even though
the parcel has frontage on a public road along some other boundary.
Only the omission of any reference to the road in the description or
express wording denying the grantee an easement will prevent an
implied easement. 186
5. Application and Comparison
When a division of land is made, easements by necessity and quasi
easements may benefit either the grantee or the grantor.1s7 The
right may accrue even though the grant was made with covenants of
warranty.las However, implied easements that ordinarily would
have arisen from a grant and benefited the grantee are favored over
those easements that ordinarily would have arisen by reservation.' 9
way," "A Proprietor's way," "A way twenty feet wide," "To a driveway,
thence easterly on said driveway." "The driveway to the Manor Inn"
would seem to properly belong in the same class as the foregoing.
Id (citations omitted).
184. Id
185. Id. at 498-99, 75 A. at 121 ("'The deed is operative by estoppel to create the
easement so far as the grantor's title will support it. Such a way is not a way of
necessity and the right exists even if there be other ways either public or private
leading to the land.'" (quoting N.E. Structural Co. v. Everett Distilling Co., 189
Mass. 145, 152, 75 N.E. 85, 86 (1906))).
186. See Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351. 78 A. 456 (1910). In Doten the court
said:
[NV]e can conceive of a case where the owner of the front lot would be
willing to convey the rear lot provided there should be no right of way over
the front lot and the grantee would be willing to take his chances of procur-
ing an outlet over some other adjoining land. Under such circumstances
the deed might convey the rear lot and distinctly recite that there was
granted no right of way of necessity or otherwise over the front lot. There
can be no doubt that in such a deed there would be no implied grant, and
the grantee would acquire simply what he had purchased, the lot without
the way.
Id. at 354-55, 78 A. at 458.
187. See Robinson v. Maine Cent. R.R., 623 A.2d 626,627 (Me. 1993) (%Vhile, in
[Frederick v. Consolidated Waste Servs., 573 A2d 387 (Me. 1990)], we dealt with an
implied easement that burdened the retained land, implied easements may also be
found when the burden is on the conveyed land."). See also York v. Golder, 129 Me.
300,301, 151 A. 558, 558 (1930) (holding that an easement over conveyed property,
in the nature of a drain, may be created by implication in favor of the grantor of the
servient estate).
188. See York v. Golder, 129 Me. at 301, 151 A. at 558 (quoting York v. Golder,
128 Me. 252,254-55, 147 A. 41, 42 (1929)); see also Holmes v. Danforth, 83 Me. 139,
142, 21 A. 845, 846 (1891).
189. See Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606, 609 (Me. 1989) ("[ljmplied grants of
easements are favored as compared with implied reservations .... ).
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The implied easement arising by reservation would favor the gran-
tor. The courts are reluctant to burden an innocent grantee by be-
stowing a benefit upon the grantor, the person who prepared the
deed, omitted the easement, and thus created the problem.190 Con-
sequently, favoring the grantee over the grantor recognizes that eq-
uity plays a part in implied easements. Also favored are implied
easements between grantees where there are simultaneous
conveyances. 191
The courts ordinarily do not favor easements by necessity and
quasi easements, 192 reasoning that it is a simple matter to create
easements by the language of the deed. Therefore, the general pre-
sumption is that if the deed is silent upon the matter, no easement is
conveyed.' 93 Historically, the court demonstrated its reluctance to
recognize certain implied easements by allowing easements by ne-
cessity and quasi easements only in cases of strict necessity. Mere
convenience, falling short of absolute necessity, was insufficient. 194
190. See LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 987 (Me. 1979) ("The traditional
rules of construction favoring the grantee against the interests of the grantor when
ambiguous language exists in the instrument of transfer necessitate... that ambigui-
ties with respect to whether an easement was impliedly reserved be resolved in favor
of the grantee.").
191. The court in Morrell v. Rice, 622 A.2d 1156 (Me. 1993), stated:
"It is ... important to consider whether [the easement] is claimed against a
simultaneous conveyee. Where the claim is thus made, the implication is
stronger than where the claim is made against the conveyor himself. It is
reasonable to infer that a conveyor who has divided his land among simul-
taneous conveyees intends that very considerable privileges of use shall ex-
ist between them. Commonly, in such cases, the conveyance constitutes a
family distribution, and, where this is true, the probability of a desire that
existing conveniences shall continue to be operative is greater than the
probability that a conveyor would desire them continued as against
himself."
IL at 1158 (quoting RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 476 cmt. f (1944)). The court
further explained:
It is true that when alternative road access across the common grantor's
land is available, the law will not imply an easement by necessity across the
land of one of the grantees. Moreover, it is the burden of the landowner
claiming an easement by necessity to demonstrate that an alternative land
route was not available.
IdJ at 1159 (citations omitted).
192. Regarding a right of way by necessity, the court held in Kingsley v. Gould-
sborough Land Improvement Co., 86 Me. 279, 29 A. 1074 (1894):[I]mplied grants of this character are looked upon with jealousy, construed
with strictness, and are not favored except in cases of strict necessity, and
not from mere convenience. The rule is now so well settled in this State
that a reference to the decided cases where this question has been fully
considered is all that is necessary.
l at 280, 29 A. at 1074.
193. Dolliff v. Boston & Me. R.R., 68 Me. 173, 176-77 (1878).
194. The court in Ouellette v. Bolduc, 440 A.2d 1042 (Me. 1982) stated:
Easements will not be implied in the construction of deeds, or contracts for
the purchase and sale of lands, unless the easement be one of strict neces-
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Contrary to easements by necessity and quasi easements, implied
easements arising from subdivision-and-sale or boundary-in-a-de-
scription do not require necessity,"9 5 reasonable enjoyment, or ex-
isting use at the time of conveyance. These classes of implied
easements arise by operation of law unless a contrary intent is
clearly expressed at the time of the operative conveyance.
In cases of implied easements by strict necessity and quasi ease-
ments, the party claiming an implied easement has the burden of
overcoming the general presumption that no easement was in-
tended.'96 The party claiming the implied easement, likewise, must
prove that the easement is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of
the property.'97 If the lot can be accessed and made usable at a
reasonable expense without the implied easement, no implied ease-
ment by strict necessity or quasi easement will be allowed."'9 Fur-
thermore, the servient estate may rebut any showing of an implied
easement by producing express language showing an agreement by
the parties or their predecessors in title that no implied easement
would exist. 199
With the exception of a quasi easement, implied easements are
not always evidenced by actual use prior to the division of the par-
sity. Mere convenience, however great. will not suffice. And the test of
necessity is whether the party claiming the easement can at reasonable cost
on his own estate create a substitute.
Id. at 1046. See also Littlefield v. Hubbard, 124 Me. 299.302, 128 A. 285.287 (1925)
("[I]t is distinctly stated as the rule of law in this State that a way of necessity must
be one of strict necessity and not one of mere convenience.") (citing Whitehouse v.
Cummings, 83 Me. 91, 98,21 A. 743, 745 (1890)); Trask v. Patterson, 29 Me. 499, 503
(1849) ("No implication of a grant of a right of way can arise from proof, that the
land granted could not be conveniently occupied without it. Its foundation rests in a
necessity for it, not in convenience.").
195. See supra note 175.
196. Dolliff v. Boston & Me. RtR., 68 Me. at 173.
197. The tendency against granting implied easements was discussed in Dolliff v.
Boston & Me. R.R, 68 Me. 173, where the court held:
[I]mplied grants are not to be favored. They should not be held to exist
except in cases of clear necessity. If it is intended that an easement shall
pass as one of the appurtenances of an estate, it is very easy to have this
intention expressed in the deed. If the deed is silent upon the subject, it is
no more than fair to the grantor to presume that he did not so intend; and
to overcome this presumption, to require of the party claiming the ease-
ment clear proof that it is necessary to the beneficial enjoyment of the es-
tate conveyed to him.
Id. at 176-77.
198. See Ouellette v. Bolduc, 440 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Me. 1982); (-[The test ... is
whether the party claiming the easement can at reasonable cost on his own estate
create a substitute."); Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 27, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950); York v.
Golder, 128 Me. 252, 255, 147 A. 41, 42 (1929). See also Dolliff v. Boston & Me.
R.R., 68 Me. 173 (1878).
199. Doten v. Bartlett, 107 Me. 351, 355-56, 78 A. 456, 459 (1910).
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cel.2° ° In many cases, the dominant estate will not use implied ease-
ments for some time thereafter, if ever. Nevertheless, implied
easements will continue to exist (see Figure 9). Such as often occurs
with a paper street, the easement will survive regardless of whether
the dominant owner attempts to use it.201 Therefore, with the ex-
ception of quasi easements, implied easements do not require the
grantor to construct or maintain improvements or actively use the
easement.2°2 Consider the circumstances depicted by the figure that
shows how an easement by necessity may exist long after it was cre-
ated and still not be evidenced by any use across the grantor's re-




Parcel B is subdivided without providing an easement for Parcel B-2. The owner of
Parcel B-2 trespasses upon Parcel A for a period of 10 years to access the closer
public road. Despite the continued trespass, the failure of the owner of Parcel A to
protest, and the lack of any physical use on Parcel B. there would likely be an im-
plied easement by necessity across Parcel B.
200. Bowers v. Andrews, 557 A.2d 606. 609 (Me. 1989) ("The creation of an ease-
ment by necessity, exemplified by the case of a 'landlocked' lot conveyed out of a
larger parcel, does not depend on any preexisting quasi easement, or even on the
intent of the grantor."); LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 988 n.3, 989 (Me. 1979)
("An easement may also be impliedly created without a pre-existing use when access
to the property conveyed requires trespass. Such an implied easement is referred to
as a way of necessity.... A way by necessity, however, is not premised upon a pre-
existing use or quasi-easement but upon a presumption that the parties intended the
owner of the dominant estate to have a way to his property without trespassing.").
201. The legislature, however, has put a time period on paper streets. See title 23,
§ 3031 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
202. See Bangor House v. Brown, 33 Me. 309 (1851), where the court held:
He does not by the conveyance of a lot bounded on such a way hold out
any intimation to the purchaser, that he is entitled to the use of a highway
to be kept in repair, not at his own, but at the public expense, for the com-
mon use of all. While he does by an implied covenant assure to him the use
of such designated way in the condition in which it may be found, or made





The doctrine of estoppel applies "because a man's own act stop-
peth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth."" Estoppel pre-
vents a person from benefiting from her own injurious conduct,
negligence, or misdeeds. 2' Certain circumstances must exist for the
doctrine of estoppel to apply.205 First, there must be an inducement
by one party (misleading party) through acts, words, or silence
amounting to fraud or impermissible negligence made toward an-
other party (reliant party) to take some action or forebear from
some act (inducement).2"6 Second, the inducement must be reason-
able to believe or accept under the circumstances.t 7 In other
words, the reliant party reasonably must believe the misleading per-
son had both the knowledge and right to make the inducement.
Third, the reliant party must rely upon the inducement in a manner
203. Martin v. Maine Cent. R.R., 83 Me. 100, 104. 21 A. 740. 741 (1890).
204. The court in Martin said:
"Equitable estoppel, in the modem sense, arises from the 'conduct' of a
party, using that word in its broadest meaning, as including his spoken or
written words, his positive acts, and his silence or negative omission to do
anything." Legal estoppels exclude evidence of the truth and the equity of
the particular case to support a strict rule of law on grounds of public pol-
icy. Equitable estoppels are admitted on exactly the opposite ground of
promoting the equity and justice of the individual case by preventing a
party from asserting his rights under a general technical rule of law, when
he has so conducted himself that it would be contrary to equity and good
conscience for him to allege and prove the truth.
Id. at 104, 21 A. at 741 (citation omitted).
205. Applying Maine law in the federal case of Sprague Corp. v. Sprague, 855 F.
Supp. 423 (D. Me. 1994), the federal court said:
Other jurisdictions that have recognized the theory of easement by estop-
pel put forward by Plaintiffs have required a showing (1) of a representa-
tion communicated to the promisee; (2) that the representation was
believed; and (3) that there was reliance upon such communication. Reli-
ance can be shown by an expenditure on the easement.
Id. at 434 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Schutzmaier, 537 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Civ. App.
1976)). See also Bathport Bldg., Inc. v. Berry, 490 A.2d 663 (Me. 1985); Webber v.
Barker Lumber Co., 121 Me. 259, 116 A. 586 (1922), where the court stated:
The general rule of law in regard to equitable estoppel ... is that -a party
will be concluded from denying his own acts or admissions, which were
expressly designed to influence the conduct of another, and did so influ-
ence it, and when such denial will operate to the injury of another... In
all the cases where an estoppel has been held to exist, it is believed that it
will appear, upon examination, that there was some evidence tending to
show that the party estopped had some knowledge of the rights, interests,
or intentions of the other party, or of his relations to the thing to which his
declarations or acts related, or that he had some intention of misleading the
other party into some action that might be prejudicial to him."
Id. at 269-70, 116 A. at 590 (quoting Piper v. Gilmore, 49 Me. 149, 153 (1861) (cita-
tion omitted)).




that is both reasonable and foreseeable by the misleading party. In
other words, the reliant party must rely upon the inducement in
good faith."' 8 Fourth, the inducement must provide some benefit to
the reliant party that would be unconscionable or unfair to deny. 0 9
The intent to deceive is not required."' The doctrine also applies to
heirs and assignees. 211
E. Prescription
The doctrine of prescription allows both public and private ease-
ments to be created by long-term use. 12 Prescription raises a legal
fiction that presumes a lost grant when there has been use beyond a
lengthy time period.21 3 Prescription is not a favored method of ac-
quiring a right because the burden to show that a right to title has
been created rests on the user. a4 The requirements to create an
208. See, e.g., Woods v. Libby, 635 A.2d 960 (Me. 1993); Martin v. Maine Cent.
R.R., 83 Me. at 104, 21 A. at 741-42.
209. In its discussion of the interpretation of an instrument, the court in Davis v.
Callahan, 78 Me. 313, 5 A. 73 (1886) said:
No person can avoid his own deed by which an estate has passed, by reason
of his own hand and his own seal in executing it. . . . "It is based on the
great principle of right that a man shall not be permitted to contradict what
he has solemnly affirmed under his hand and seal; nor shall he deny any act
done or statement made when he cannot do so without a fraud on his part
and injury to others."
Id at 320, 5 A. at 76-77 (quoting Foster v. Dwinel, 49 Me. 44. 48 (1861) (citing 1
HENRY M. HERMAN, LAW OF ESTOPPEL AND REs JUDICATA § 212 (1886): Sinclair v.
Jackson, 8 Cow. 586 (1826))).
210. Martin v. Maine Cent. R.R., 83 Me. at 105, 21 A. at 742 ("[I]t is not neces-
sary that the original conduct creating the estoppel should be characterized by an
actual intention to mislead and deceive.").
211. The court in Davis v. Callahan, 78 Me. 313.5 A. 73, discussed the applicabil-
ity of estoppel and stated:
[E]stoppels are not only binding upon parties, but upon privies, privies in
blood, as the heir; privies in estate, as the feoffee, lessee, etc.; privies in law,
as those upon whom the law casts the estate. They are not binding upon
strangers, nor upon those claiming by title paramount to the deed or instru-
ment creating the estoppel.
Id at 320-21, 5 A. at 77 (citations omitted).
212. Rowell v. Inhabitants of Montville, 4 Me. 270 (1826).
213. In Inhabitants of Pittsfield v. Cianchette, 279 A.2d 527 (Me. 1971), the court
held:
When there has been a continuous and uninterrupted invasion of the rights
of another in land for the requisite period, the law presumes the invasion
was in accordance with a grant from the owner. The presumption can only
arise when the enjoyment of the right has been inconsistent with or con-
trary to the interests of the owner and is of such a nature that it is difficult
or impossible to account for it except on the presumption of a grant from
him.
Id at 529. See also Burnham v. Burnham, 132 Me. 113, 115, 167 A. 693 (1933); State
v. Wilson, 42 Me. 9, 25-26 (1856). ("Long occupation and enjoyment, unexplained,
will raise a presumption of a grant . ... ").
214. Inhabitants of Pittsfield v. Cianchette, 279 A.2d at 529.
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easement by prescription are similar to the requirements for ob-
taining fee title by adverse possession.215 One major advantage of
prescription (until recent legislation affecting adverse possession)21 6
was that "adverse use under a claim of right" was presumed for pre-
scription where the other elements had been met.21 7 Furthermore,
prescription and adverse possession differ in that prescription gives
the user an easement without ousting the record owner from posses-
sion, while adverse possession removes the record owner from con-
structive possession.21 9 Prescription may be used to create a public
or private easement.21 9
215. Adverse possession gives title to a trespasser where there has been actual.
open, notorious, hostile, and continuous possession for the statutory period. See
Glover v. Graham, 459 A.2d 1080. 1084 n.9 (Me. 1983) (-The requirements for the
creation of a prescriptive easement are similar to the elements required in adverse
possession."). But see Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club. 477 A.2d 1124,
1130 (Me. 1984) ("Acquiescence by the owner to the use is essential, and, in this
regard, the acquisition of an easement by prescription differs from the acquisition of
title by adverse possession.").
216. A recent legislative enactment changed the presumption regarding intent by
stating:
If a person takes possession of land by mistake as to the location of the true
boundary line and possession of the land in dispute is open and notorious.
under claim of right, and continuous for the statutory period. the hostile
nature of the claim is established and no further evidence of the knowledge
or intention of the person in possession is required.
Title 14, § 810-A (West Supp. 1995-1996).
217. Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858, 862 (Me. 1981) (- [)Vlhere there has
been unmolested, open and continuous use of a way for twenty years or more, with
the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient estate, the use will be
presumed to have been adverse and under a claim of right ....') (alteration in
original) (quoting Jacobs v. Boomer, 267 A. 2d 376, 378 (Me. 1978) (quoting Burn-
ham v. Burnham, 130 Me. 409, 409, 156 A. 823, 823 (1931))).
218. Distinguishing between adverse possession and prescription, the court in
Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 98 A. 743 (1916) stated:
The distinction between the creation of an easement by adverse use and
the gaining of a title to land by adverse possession is not always borne in
mind .... "[Tihe creation of a prescriptive easement logically differs from
the acquisition of a title to real estate by adverse possession. In the former
the possession continues in the owner of the servient estate, and the pre-
scriptive right arises out of adverse use. In the latter, the owner is ousted
from possession, and the right or title arises out of adverse possession; and
nothing short of making entry, or legal action, will break the continuity of
possession."
Id. at 230,98 A. at 745 (quoting Rollins v. Blackden, 112 Me. 459,465, 92 A. 521,525
(1914)).
219. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A2d 1124, 1128 (Me.
1984) ("The doctrine that the public-at-large is capable of acquiring a non-posses-
sory interest in land has long been accepted in Maine."); Comber v. Inhabitants of
Dennistown, 398 A.2d 376 (Me. 1979); MacKenna v. Inhabitants of Searsmont, 349
A.2d 760,762 (Me. 1976) ("A town way may be created by prescription in the same
manner as a public way.").
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Prescription requires: (1) continuous use;" (2) for at least
twenty years (the statute of limitations),"' (3) under a claim of right
adverse to the owner,' either with (a) knowledge and acquies-
cence, 223 or (b) use so open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted
that knowledge and acquiescence will be presumed. 224 Acquies-
cence must be passive rather than active where permission is
given.225 Therefore, where permission has been given or rent has
been paid to use the way, there can be no prescription without repu-
220. Continuous use is to use the easement at the pleasure of the person making
claim and not, as sometimes supposed, all the time. Cf. Gutcheon v. Becton, 585
A.2d 818, 821-22 (Me. 1991); Glover v. Graham, 459 A.2d at 1084-85.
221. The appropriate statute governing prescriptive easements is the following:
"No person, class of persons or the public shall acquire a right-of-way or other ease-
ment through, in, upon or over the land of another by the adverse use and enjoy-
ment thereof, unless it is continued uninterruptedly for 20 years." Title 14, § 812
(West 1980). See also, Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d 818; Kornbluth v. Kalur, 577
A.2d 1194 (Me. 1990).
222. In Jewett v. Hussey, 70 Me. 433 (1879) the court said:
[The] question is, whether an easement can be acquired by a possession or
enjoyment that has its origin and continuance in parol license or consent.
We think it can. So a person may, by gift or sale, dispose of an easement by
parol, and the donee or vendee obtain a prescription thereby after the
lapse of sufficient time. It must appear that the privilege was not used
under a letting, or license, or in any way in subordination to the title of the
legal owner. The distinction is, whether I grant you a right over or upon
my property to use as your own or as my own-as an enjoyment and privi-
lege belonging to you or as belonging to me. The grantee or donee must
accept and enjoy the use of the premises as his own, and because he claims
it to be his own, and because the grantor sold or gave it to him to be his
own as a perpetual thing.... [Tlhe use of land originating in permission
will not prevent it becoming a right by prescription, if continued long
enough, if the permission was of a "perpetual or unlimited character."
Iad at 435-56 (quoting Arbuckle v. Ward, 29 Vt. 43, 44 (1856)). See also Ashley v.
Ashley, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 197 (1855); Ripley v. Bates, 110 Mass. 161 (1872).
223. Davis v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657,660 (Me. 1993); Maine Coast Heritage Trust
v. Brouillard, 606 A.2d 198, 200 (Me. 1992); Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858,
861-62 (Me. 1981) ("An essential element to the creation of a prescriptive easement
is that the use by the party asserting the prescriptive right must be under a claim of
right adverse to the owner, with the owner's knowledge and acquiescence.").
224. See Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d at 818; Kornbluth v. Kalur, 577 A.2d at
1195; Comber v. Inhabitants of Dennistown. 398 A.2d 376, 378 (Me. 1979) ("A pre-
scriptive easement is created only by a continuous use for at least twenty years
under a claim of right adverse to the owner, with his knowledge and acquiescence,
or by a use so open, notorious, visible and uninterrupted that knowledge and acqui-
escence will be presumed.") (quoting Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 230, 98 A.
743, 744 (1916)). See also Sprague Corp. v. Sprague, 855 F. Supp. 423, 431 (D. Me.
1994); Wood v. Kelley, 30 Me. 47 (1849) (uninterrupted and adverse use for twenty
years).
225. In Pace v. Carter, 390 A.2d 505 (Me. 1978) the court noted:
The owner's acquiescence in an adverse use is essential in Maine to the
establishment of a prescriptive easement. "Acquiescence" has been judi-
cially defined as passive assent or submission to the use, as distinguished
from the granting of a license or permission given with the intention that
(Vol. 48:197
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diating the permissive nature of the use.2 Furthermore, any act
that refutes acquiescence will prevent prescription. 7 Deeds, no-
tices, and words of repudiation all have been judged sufficient to
dispel acquiescence and to prevent a prescriptive easement.' z In
some cases a family relationship between the owners of the servient
and dominant estates has prevented a prescriptive easement. The
courts have presumed at the outset that the close family relationship
made permission, license, lease, or tenancy more probable than
not 229
As a rule, the adverse use must be in the same location, without
interruption.230 It must amount to an invasion of the owner's inter-
est, allowing an action for trespass.231 Therefore, a prescriptive
easement cannot arise where the user has a statutory or common
the licensee's use may continue only as long as the owner continues to con-
sent to it.
Id. at 507 (citations omitted). See also Jacobs v. Boomer, 267 A.2d 376. 378 (Me.
1970) ("Acquiescence, the Court said, means passive assent such as consent by si-
lence and does not encompass acquiescence in the active sense such as when a use is
acquiesced in by means of the positive grant of a license or permission."); Dartnell v.
Bidwell, 115 Me. 227,230.980 A. 743, 745 (1916) (-Acquiescence is used in its ordi-
nary sense. It does not mean license or permission in the active sense. It means
passive assent, or submission. It means quiescence. It is consent by silence.").
226. See Pace v. Carter, 390 A.2d 505 (Me. 1978); Jacobs v. Boomer, 267 A2d
376, 380 (Me. 1970) ("Where in its origin a use is shown to be by license or permis-
sion of the owner of the servient tenement, such as where rent is paid for its use, the
element of adverse user disappears and no prescriptive rights can arise therefrom.").
However, the Pace court also noted that a parol grant of an easement that is not
recognized as valid under the Statute of Frauds may provide a valid foundation for a
prescriptive easement:
A parol grant may manifest an intention on the part of the would-be gran-
tor that the grantee is to enter the property under a claim of right based on
the supposed grant, rather than pursuant to the grantor's permission or
license. Likewise the grantee's use of the land pursuant to a parol grant
may manifest a claim of right hostile to the grantor's full ownership of all
rights in the property. For purposes of proving a prescriptive easement,
evidence of an unenforceable parol grant of an easement tends to show the
landowner's acquiescence in the use that the grantee makes of the land
within the terms of the grant.
Id. at 507.
227. Dartnell v. Bidwell, 115 Me. 227, 231, 98 A. 743, 745 (1916).
228. Id. See also Noyes v. Levine, 130 Me. 151,152, 154 A. 78,79 (1931) (stating
that "absence of acquiescence on the part of the latter may be evidenced by verbal
protest alone").
229. See eg., Weinberg v. Shafler, 414 N.Y.S2d 61 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979); Burns
v. Plachecki, 223 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. 1974); Cope v. Cope, 493 P.2d 336 (Mont.
1971).
230. O'Connor v. Beale, 62 A.2d 870,873, 143 Me. 387,392 (1948) ("In order...
that the enjoyment of an easement in another's land may be conclusive of the right,
it must have been ... uninterrupted; and the burden of proving this is on the party
claiming the easement.") (quoting 2 GREENEF. ON EVIDENCE J 539).
231. Kennebunk Water Dist. v. Maine Turnpike Auth., 84 A.2d 433,437, 147 Me.
149, 155 (1951) (stating that "[a] prescriptive right cannot be acquired against one
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law right (for example, the right to cross uncultivated lands to access
great ponds)2 32 or there is an implied easement (for example, an
easement by necessity).
Many public road easements are founded upon long continuous
use by the public that presumes a grant.1 3 To create a public ease-
ment, there must be general use by members of the public."3 The
generality rather than the frequency of the use is the important fac-
tor. 35 Maine also imposes an additional requirement that public
recreation use in "wild and uncultivated lands" is presumed to be
permissive.236 To rebut the presumed permissive nature, an affirma-
tive act that shows a hostile character is necessary to obtain a pre-
scriptive easement in favor of the public.2 37  Therefore a
snowmobile trail across woodlands ordinarily would not be suscepti-
ble to a prescriptive easement.
Prescription may be defeated by showing that (1) the use started
by permission;238 (2) the use occurred on public property; or (3)
proper notice was given in the statutory time period preventing a
prescriptive easement.239 The notice may be made by: (1) posting
whose right is not invaded and who cannot bring an action for the invasion
thereof.").
232. See title 17, § 3860 (West 1964).
233. Smith v. Dickson, 225 A.2d 631, 635-36 (Me. 1967) ("Evidence to prove a
highway often consists in showing that the public have used and enjoyed the road;
and the uninterrupted use of it, for a considerable space of time, affords a strong
presumption of a grant.") (quoting Beardslee v. French, 7 Conn. 125).
234. Inhabitants of Town of Kennebunkport v. Forrester, 391 A.2d 831, 833 n.2
(Me. 1978) ("There is respected authority for the proposition that in order to create
a public easement ... the adverse use must be general and not limited to a few
specific individuals.").
235. Id. ("The test of a public use is not the frequency of the use, or the number
using the way, but its use by people who are not separable from the public
generally.").
236. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124. 1130 (Me.
1984).
237. Id. ("Maine stands with the minority, however, with regard to creation of
public recreation easements by prescription in wild and uncultivated land, applying
the rule that such open and continuous use raises a rebuttable presumption that the
use was permissive."). See also Inhabitants of Town of Kennebunkport v. Forrester,
391 A.2d 831, 833 (Me. 1978) ("In a consistent line of cases this court has declined to
hold that the mere use by the general public of wild and uncultivated land as a route
for hauling seaweed, for hunting, or for mere pleasure or recreation, is sufficient to
show the adverse user essential to create a prescriptive easement."). Cf. Benner v.
Sherman, 371 A.2d 420 (Me. 1977) (application of prescriptive easement doctrine to
roads).
238. Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858, 862 (Me. 1981) ("Permissive use by one
individual does not in and of itself prevent any other user from establishing an in-
dependent or individual claim of right.") (citing Thompson v. Bowes, 115 Me. 6, 9,
97 A. 1, 2 (1916)).
239. See title 14, § 812 (West 1964). However, the statute does not appear to
prevent a prescriptive easement once all the elements have been met and then, at
some later time, the notice is provided.
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and recording; (2) simply recording in an unorganized territory;24
or (3) service of process and/or posting and recording, which is ef-
fective against a particular person.241
Prescription provides relief and recognition not only for roads or
access easements, but for any amenable use meeting the require-
ments of prescription.242 However, prescription will not permit the
user to obtain the right to sunlight and air which is known as the
doctrine of "ancient lights. ' 24
3
As a general rule, tacking of successive periods by different per-
sons is allowed.244 Tacking provides for continuity of use to meet
the statutory period. Tacking adds successive periods of use by dif-
ferent persons when there is evidence of privity of title between the
successive users.245 Privity of title generally is shown by a deed
from one user to the next successive user, family nexus that com-
ports with the laws of intestacy, or a devise in a will.
A remedy limited to the servient property24 provides a means to
address the title of a prescriptive easement. An expedited proce-
dure to determine a prescriptive easement in abandoned ways was
240. In unorganized townships the notice expires after ten years so successive
recording is necessary. Title 14, § 812-B (West 1964). If one recording is sufficient
to break the chain, would a recording every twenty years suffice?
241. Title 14, § 812 (West 1964).
242. Hill v. Lord, 48 Me. 83, 89-90 (1861).
243. See O'Neill v. Brown, 609 N.E.2d 835, 839 (I11. App. Ct. 1993); see also
Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Deering Village Corp., 48 A.2d 715, 142 Me. 121 (1946).
[I]n England a covenant for quiet enjoyment is not construed as reaching
property lying outside the demised premises and is interpreted with refer-
ence to such premises as they existed when the lease was executed. These
decisions have particular force because of the common law principle of
English law relative to prescriptive rights in light and air. . . . The New
York court ... expressly declared that the English common law on the
point was not applicable under the changed conditions prevailing in this
country.
ld. at 128,48 A.2d at 718 (citations omitted). See also Pierre v. Fernald, 26 Me. 436.
442 (1847).
244. In Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858 (Me. 1981) the court held:
To establish an easement by prescription, a party must prove that the ele-
ments of prescriptive use have continued for a period of at least twenty
years. The general rule of law is that successive periods of use may be
added or 'tacked' together in order to satisfy the prescriptive period when
privity exists between the users.... Maine law recognizes the use of tack-
ing as a method to meet the twenty-year requirement of prescriptive use.
Id. at 860 (citations omitted). See also title 14, § 812 (West 1964).
245. Gutcheon v. Becton, 585 A.2d 818, 822 (Me. 1991) ("Continuity of use may
result from the 'tacking' of successive periods of use when there is evidence of priv-
ity of title between successive users."). See also Kornbluth v. Kalur, 577 A2d 1194
(Me. 1990).
246. See title 14, § 6652 (Vest 1980).
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available under former title 14, section 6663 of the Maine Revised
Statutes which was created and repealed in short order.2n7
F Dedication
Dedication is the conveyance to the public through a gift or for a
nominal sum, resulting in an appropriation by a public entity for
public use .24  Dedication may be in fee simple or in the form of an
easement. For dedication to be effective: (1) the land upon which
the use will lie must be owned by the person making the dedica-
tion;" 9 (2) there must be an offer; and (3) there must be an accept-
ance." 0 Until the public accepts the offer, the dedication is inchoate
or incipient.
247. The short-lived statute dealt with claims of prescriptive easements over
abandoned ways as follows:
2. Expedited procedure. An owner of landlocked property claiming a pre-
scriptive easement over an abandoned way under this chapter may initiate
a proceeding under this section. Except as otherwise provided in this sub-
section, if the owner of landlocked property claiming a prescriptive ease-
ment initiates a proceeding under this section, the expedited procedures of
this section must be completed before a party to the action may bring fur-
ther action under other applicable provisions of this chapter. The parties
to the proceeding initiated under this section may agree to forego comple-
tion of the action under this section. Any other claims by the parties re-
garding access to the landlocked property are not diminished by the
operation of this section but actions to enforce those claims are stayed until
a proceeding under this section is complete.
P.L. 1993, ch. 677, § 1 (repealed 1995).
248. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1129 (Me.
1984) ("Dedication is an appropriation of land to some public use, made by the
owner .... ); Comber v. Inhabitants of Plantation of Dennistown. 398 A.2d 376,378
(Me. 1979) ("We have previously defined 'dedication' as the 'intentional appropria-
tion of land by the owner to some proper public use, reserving to himself no rights
therein inconsistent with the full exercise and enjoyment of such use.' "). In Vachon
v. Inhabitants of Town of Lisbon, 295 A.2d 255 (Me. 1972). the court said:
Dedication is an appropriation of land to some public use, made by the
owner, and accepted for such use by or on behalf of the public. There must
be a clear intent to so dedicate. Mere acquiescence by the owner in occa-
sional and varying use by the public is not sufficient to establish dedication.
IdI at 259. See also Baker v. Petrin, 148 Me. 473, 479, 95 A.2d 806, 810 (1953).
249. Op. Me. Atty Gen. 80-113.
250. In Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124 (Me. 1984),
the court stated:
To prove dedication, two conditions must be shown: that the land in ques-
tion was "dedicated" by the grantor for a public purpose; that the public
"accepted" the dedication by some affirmative act .... Acts and circum-
stances may rebut evidence that may indicate the owner's intention, such as
.. * treating the land as his own.... maintaining a fence, etc.
Id at 1129. In addition, the court wrote:
The "affirmative act" required for acceptance has not been expressly de-
fined, but this Court has intimated " 'that actual enjoyment by the public of
the use for such a length of time that the public accommodation and pri-
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Generally the offer must be unequivocal and clear." 1 Permissive
use is not enough to show an offer.' Under Maine statutory law
the offer of dedication: (1) must be made in writing, describing the
property and location, and voluntarily transferring the right without
claim for damage, 3 or (2) may be inferred by showing ways pro-
posed on an approved subdivision plot plan filed in the appropriate
registry of deeds." 4 An implied offer arising from a plan of subdivi-
sion requires that the developer show streets, roads, or other ameni-
ties, and sell at least one lot according to a plan recorded in the
registry." s One act denying dedication often is sufficient to deny
that there is an implied offer 56 Implied offers can be prevented by
express wording on the plan disavowing an intent to dedicate. The
developer also can limit the time the offer may be accepted in order
to clarify the title in the event the municipality fails to accept the
incipient dedication within a reasonable time period. In certain
cases where long use with attenuating conditions presupposes an of-
fer of dedication, then both an offer and acceptance will be pre-
sumed." 7  This is known as dedication by custom. In the
unorganized territory, public notice will suffice to prevent dedica-
tion by custom. s8
vate rights would be materially affected by a denial or interruption of the
enjoyment'" may be sufficient.
Id. (quoting Northport Wesleyan Grove Campmeeting Ass'n. v. Andrewvs, 104 Me.
342, 347, 71 A. 1027, 1029 (1908)).
251. White v. Bradley, 66 Me. 254,259 (1876). See also Vachon v. Inhabitants of
Town of Lisbon, 295 A.2d at 259-60 ("The intention must be unequivocally and sat-
isfactorily shown. Acts and circumstances may rebut evidence that may indicate the
owner's intention, such as location, value, local conditions, treating the land as his
own, leasing, maintaining a fence, etc.").
252. Wooster v. Fiske, 115 Me. 161,164,98 A. 378, 379 (1916) ('Dedication exists
only when so intended by the party, and permissible use does not prove it.").
253. For Maine's statutory treatment of dedication and acceptance, see title 23,
§ 3025 (West 1992).
254. 1& §§ 3025, 3031 (dealing with common law and incipient dedication). See
also Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d at 1129 ("There must
be a clear intent to so dedicate. Mere acquiescence by the owner in occasional and
varying use by the public is not sufficient to establish dedication."). But cf. Baker v.
Petrin, 148 Me. 473, 480, 95 A.2d 806, 810 (1953) ("The defendants say the word
'Common' on the plan is evidence of the intent of the owner in 1882 to dedicate this
land to the general public. That is of course true, but it is only evidence.").
255. Bartlett v. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460, 464-65 (1878).
256. White v. Bradley, 66 Me. 254, 260 (1876) ("Of this animus dedicandi, the
user [sic] by the public is evidence, and no more; and a single act of interruption by
the owner is of much more weight upon a question of intention, than many acts of
enjoyment.").
257. Cole v. Sprowl, 35 Me. 161, 170 (1852).
258. See title 14, § 812-A (West 1964) for codification of notice to prevent dedi-




The owner or offeror may not revoke her offer of dedication if
one or more lots have been sold from a recorded plan.259 To revoke
the offer, no lot may have been sold and an amended subdivision
plan must have been approved and recorded.260
Acceptance must be shown by an affirmative vote or affirmative
act recognized in the common law.26' In some cases, reasonable use
by the public for a period may be sufficient to show acceptance. 62
A conditional acceptance is not allowed.
G. Covenants
A covenant is a promise respecting the use of land. In some cases,
covenants may give rise to easements-specifically negative ease-
ments.263 A covenant is a servitude upon the land that is equivalent
to a negative easement.2 " Where the promise results in an advan-
259. See title 23, § 3027(2) (West 1992).
260. IdL
261. The Law Court has said:
One obvious way to accept dedicated land, of course, is by an appropriate
article in a warrant for a town meeting affirmatively acted on. Without
expressly defining the required procedures therefor, our Court has left no
doubt that some affirmative act by a municipality in acceptance of a grant
for street purposes is required. The act must be, of course, indicative of
acceptance; Le., of agreeing to the terms of the dedication... [so) that the
actual enjoyment by the public of the use for such a length of time that the
public accommodation and private rights would be materially affected by a
denial or interruption of the enjoyment would be an adequate acceptance
of a dedication.
Vachon v. Inhabitants of Town of Lisbon, 295 A.2d 255, 260 (Me. 1972) (citations
omitted). See also Baker v. Petrin, 148 Me. 473, 479-80. 95 A.2d 806, 810 (1953).
262. Town of Manchester v. Augusta Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124. 1128-29 (Me.
1984).
263. It should be noted that not all covenants are easements.
264. In Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., Inc.. 338 U.S. 621 (1950), the
Supreme Court stated:
[Wlhen a right "consists in restraining the owner from doing that with, and
upon, his property which, but for the grant or covenant, he might lawfully
have done," it is an easement, sometimes called a negative easement, or an
amenity. "An equitable restriction," which prevents development of prop-
erty by building on it, has been said to be "an easement, or servitude in the
nature of an easement," a "right in the nature of an easement," and an
"interest in a contractual stipulation which is made for their common bene-
fit." Such "equitable restrictions" are real estate, part and parcel of the
land to which they are attached and pass by conveyance. A contractual
restriction which limits the use one may make of his own lands in favor of
another and his lands is "sometimes called a negative easement, which is
the right in the owner of the dominant tenement to restrict the owner of
the servient tenement in the exercise of general and natural rights of prop-
erty." It is an interest in lands which can pass only by deed and is in every
legal sense an incumbrance.
Id. at 626-27 (citations omitted). See also, Meredith v. Washoe County School Dis-
trict, 435 P.2d 750 (Nev. 1968).
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tage amounting to a right in one or more adjoining lots, it may be
construed fairly to be an appurtenant easement in favor of the other
lot(s) 265
H. Statutes
Various Maine statutes have been enacted to create or recognize a
variety of easements. Most of these statutes address roads and ac-
cess. Many of these statutes are outlined below.
1. Private Way (Public Easement)
Private ways, now commonly referred to as public easements
(versus private easement), may be created when: (1) municipal of-
ficers make petition on behalf of an occupant of land or owners who
have cultivated land;266 (2) the land is within the municipality:2 ? (3)
the road will connect with a town way or highway;2  and (4) there is
common convenience and public necessity.269
2. Easements Upon Discontinuance
Upon discontinuance of a town way or public road, a public ease-
ment remains unless expressly denied. 7 0 The public easement ordi-
narily27' includes a utility easement.2" Discontinuance of a public
road does not involve the elimination of an easement so much as the
reduction in the service provided by the public. Prior to September
3, 1965, a public easement did not remain in a town road unless it
was specifically called for.273 The discontinuance of a county road,
however, before and after 1965, continued to be controlled by com-
mon law, which did not allow a public easement to remain unless
specifically called for. After county roads reverted to town ways
they fell under the provisions for discontinuance thereof. Title 23,
265. See Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming Coal Co., Inc., 338 U.S. at 626; Mere-
dith v. Washoe County School District, 435 P.2d at 752.
266. See title 23, § 3022 (,Vest 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996) (providing that municipal
officers may alter or widen town ways).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. The Law Court in Brown v. Warchalowski, 471 A.2d 1026 (Me. 1984) held
that "[t]o avoid a constitutional violation, the establishment of any road or way [by
the government] ... must be for a public use and its requirement must be in re-
sponse to public exigencies." Id. at 1029.
270. See title 23, § 3026 (West 1992) (providing procedures for the discontinuance
of town ways).
271. Between 1965 and 1977, discontinuance left a public easement but not a
utility easement. The language in title 23, § 3026 (West 1992) allowing an easement
for public utility facilities to remain was added in 1977.
272. See title 35-A, § 2308 (West 1988) (providing that upon discontinuance of a
public way, an easement for public utility remains unless the discontinuance order
specifically provides otherwise).
273. Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d at 428.
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section 3004 of the Maine Revised Statutes was amended to provide:
"'The discontinuance of a town way shall be presumed to relegate
the town way to the status of a private way unless the town meeting
article shall specifically state otherwise.' ,274 Title 35 of the Maine
Revised Statutes was amended by adding section 2347-A, which
provides as follows:
In proceedings for the discontinuance of public ways, such
public ways may be discontinued in whole or in part. The dis-
continuance of a town way shall be presumed to relegate the
town way to the status of a private way unless the town meet-
ing article shall specifically state otherwise. Unless an order
discontinuing the same shall specifically otherwise provide, a
utility may continue to maintain, repair, and replace its instal-
lations within the limits of such way for aperiod not exceeding
3 years from the date of discontinuance.
3. Burial Grounds
Title 13, section 1142 of the Maine Revised Statutes codifies what
undoubtedly would be an implied easement under the common
law-the right to access a cemetery by the spouse, ancestors, and
descendants of the deceased . 7 6 The person who appropriated, re-
corded, and marked a burying ground can create a right for any
spouse, ancestor, or descendant to have access by a direct route
from the public road to the burying ground during reasonable walk-
ing hours.2 77 This right may be exercised provided: (1) the appro-
priated ground is less than one-quarter acre; (2) a description is
recorded by the town clerk or appropriating party; (3) the bounds
are marked or fenced; (4) the surrounding land is conveyed by the
appropriating person or their heir; and (5) the conveyance causes
the burying ground to be otherwise inaccessible.2 7 8
4. Condemnation or Conveyance
Condemnation is the "process by which property of a private
owner is taken for public use, without his consent, but on the award
and payment of just compensation .... Statutes provide that a
public road may be created by condemnation if: (1) municipal of-
ficers or person(s) make petition; (2) proper notice is provided; (3)
274. P.L. 1965, ch. 270, § 1 (effective September 3, 1965), repealed by P.L. 1975,
ch. 711, § 7 (effective July 29, 1976).
275. P.L. 1965, ch. 270, § 2 (effective September 3, 1965), repealed by P.L. 1987,
ch. 141, § A, 5 (effective July 1, 1987) (subject matter recodified at tit. 35-A, § 2308
(West 1988)).
276. See title 13, § 1142 (West Supp. 1995-1996) (providing "an easement for the
benefit of [family members] of any person interred in the burying ground").
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 364 (4th ed. 1951).
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the proposed road is within the municipality; and (4) the road will
connect with a town way or highway.z It should be noted that in
the past, the failure to create a town way would not have barred the
creation of a county way in the same location.28 1 There were, how-
ever, limitations on the location of town ways.' For example, town
ways could not be placed across navigable streams and tidal flats
without legislative approval since such an act would block the public
easement therein.3 Voluntary purchase and conveyance of the
easement is preferred, with condemnation used where agreement is
not reached. Even though the municipality in the past took only an
easement, compensation was to be provided unless a road already
existed in the same location, in which case only nominal payment
was made.284 At the present time, title is taken in fee unless an
easement is expressly stated.m
5. Intertidal Lands and Navigable Bodies of Water
The public has the right to use intertidal lands and navigable bod-
ies of water for fishing, fowling, and navigation.2 86 As a general
280. Under both the present statutory provisions, and their predecessors (which
were in effect until 1975), the municipality can only accept a town way by following
prescribed statutory procedures and recording the same in the Registry of Deeds.
Title 23, §§ 3021-3035 (Vest 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996). See title 23, §§ 3001-3003
(West 1965), repealed by P.L. 1975, ch. 711, § 7 (effective July 29, 1976). See also
State v. Beck, 389 A.2d 844, 847 (Me. 1978) (providing three methods for establish-
ing a public way).
281. Waterford v. County Commissioners of Oxford County, 59 Me. 450. 452-53
(1871).
282. In Chase v. Cochran, 102 Me. 431, 67 A. 320 (1907), the court stated:
"We do not believe there is any authority given by the statute to appropri-
ate the shores or flats of a navigable river to the use of the inhabitants of a
town in the form of a way or road. It cannot be wanted for any of the
common purposes of a road, and cannot be constructed so as to be used as
such without interrupting more or less the public right of passage up and
down the river. The whole river included within the high water mark on
each side is a public highway....
A public highway cannot be laid out across a navigable stream, except by
a license from the legislature. Why? Because it will destroy an existing
highway, the river itself, in which all the citizens have an interest. A town,
then, cannot lay a way on the shore between high and low water mark, for
though it may not entirely, it will essentially impair the public right."
Id. at 435, 67 A. at 321 (quoting Kean v. Stetson, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 492, 494-95
(1827)).
283. See Blaisdell v. Inhabitants of the Town of York, 110 Me. 500,501.87 A. 361,
363 (1913) ("The first step towards the laying out and construction of this way and
bridge was... [to petition] the Legislature for the passage of a special act authoriz-
ing the construction of a highway and bridge .... Such an act was necessary ....-).
284. See Boober v. Towne, 127 Me. 332, 334-35, 143 A. 176, 177 (1928) (deter-
mining just compensation for landowners).
285. Title 23, § 3023 (West 1992).
286. Title 12, § 573 (West 1994). Note that (1)(B) of this section speaks of the
public's right to use intertidal land for recreation. This right, however, has been
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rule, the public has an easement in all navigable bodies of water.
The easement for the above stated purposes begins in freshwater
bodies at the normal high-water mark on one side and extends to
the normal high-water mark on the other side.2s7 In tidal water, the
easement extends from the normal high tide out to sea.288
6. Blanket Utility Easements
Statutes generally give utility companies blanket easements in all
municipal roads with certain caveats. 9 Caveats include complying
with certain codes, maintenance, repair, etc.290
7 Conservation Easements
A conservation easement is an easement in gross for the benefit
of the government, nonprofit corporation, or charitable trust that
imposes limitations or affirmative obligations for several purposes,
including: (1) protecting or retaining natural, scenic, or open space
values on real property; (2) assuring that land is available for agri-
cultural, forest, recreational, or open space use; (3) protecting natu-
ral resources; or (4) maintaining and enhancing air and water quality
of real property.291 A conservation easement is a favored easement
and is valid even though the easement: (1) is not appurtenant; (2)
has been assigned to another holder; (3) is not recognized at com-
mon law; (4) is a negative burden; (5) requires affirmative obliga-
tions upon owner of burdened property; (6) does not benefit, touch,
or concern real property; (7) has no privity of estate or of contract;
or (8) does not run to successors or assigns.29
found not to exist in instances where private landowners have not been compen-
sated. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d 168,176-78 (Me. 1989). For a detailed expla-
nation of the public right to use intertidal land for recreation, see Brown v.
Chadbourne, 31 Me. 9 (1849). See also Montgomery v. Reed, 69 Me. 510.515 (1879)
(holding flats are subject to a public easement until they are occupied).
287. See Flood v. Earle, 145 Me. 24, 28, 71 A.2d 55, 57 (1950) (stating that the
state holds ponds, which exceed 10 acres in size, and the soil beneath them in trust
for the public); but see Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197, 198-99 (1884) (stating that, in
the absence of a clearly expressed intention to the contrary, lands bound by fresh
bodies of water are presumed to extend to the low-water mark); Wood v. Kelley, 30
Me. 47, 55 (1849) (stating there is a presumption that land bounded by a natural
pond, after it has been for a long time enlarged by artificial means, has its boundary
at the low-water mark).
288. Bell v. Town of Wells, 557 A.2d at 173.
289. See title 35-A, §§ 2301-2311 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996) (providing reg-
ulations and protections for utility facilities in the public way).
290. See, e.g., title 35-A, § 2305 (West Supp. 1995-1996).
291. Title 33, § 476 (West 1988).




The public has the right to acquire or accept scenic easements in
order to restrict development and preserve aesthetics.2 93 The term
of such easements must be for a ten-year period or more to be eligi-
ble for the benefit of "current use" property taxation 94
9. Constructive Easements
As of October 1, 1975, owners of all structures upon submerged
and intertidal lands shall be deemed to have been granted a con-
structive easement for a term of thirty years on the submerged land
directly underlying the structure. 95 Beginning on January 1, 1991,
and ending on December 31, 1995, Maine undertook a registration
program for all structures granted constructive easements.2 96 Con-
structive easements shall be subject to administrative and registra-
tion fees.297
10. Solar Easements
Solar easements provide a right to direct sunlight by imposing a
negative easement on the servient property. A negative easement
prevents the owners of the servient estate from performing acts that
they ordinarily would have the right to do. This differs from an af-
firmative easement which allows the owners of the dominant estate
the right to enter upon the servient estate. A solar easement is ap-
purtenant to the property meant to benefit from the solar access.
The easement is an interest in real property that may be acquired
and transferred. A solar easement must comply with certain re-
quirements to take effect. 298 For example, it "must be created in
writing." 299 It also must "be recorded and indexed in the same way
as other conveyances of real property interests. ''3 00 The instrument
creating the easement may include "[a] definite and certain descrip-
tion of the space affected by the easement [and] [a]ny terms or con-
ditions, or both, under which the solar easement is granted or va be
terminated."3 0' The easement may use or contain a map showing
the properties and the area affected by the easement. 3° 2 Contrary
to the common law, when there is an inconsistency between the
293. Title 36, § 1111 (West 1990).
294. Id. "Current use" property taxation means that the land which is the subject
of the scenic easement would be taxed to its owner based on the actual value of its
current use, rather than its potential future value.
295. Title 12, § 558-A(6) (West 1994).
296. Id.
297. Id. See also id. § 558-A(3) (providing fee amounts).
298. See title 33, § 1401 (West 1988).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. § 1402(1)(A), (B).
302. Id. § 1402(2).
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written easement and the map, the written easement shall control in
the interpretation of solar easement boundaries. 30 3
11. Access to Great Ponds
Under the Maine common law and its statutory codification, a
person may cross the lands of another person to gain access to a
great pond.3° Certain restrictions apply when exercising use of the
easement.30 5 For example, the person using the easement must be
on foot.30 6 Therefore, driving across the easement is not allowed.
In addition, the person cannot use the easement to cross improved
land. 307 Furthermore, land of a water company or a water district
cannot be crossed if the pond is used as a source for public water.30 8
The concern that people will be denied access to great ponds is so
great that the legislature has enacted penalties for anyone that de-
nies or prevents access.309
12. Navigable Water
It has long been recognized in Maine that the public enjoys rights
in certain natural waters within and surrounding the state. These
waters include all water influenced by the ebb and flow of the
tide,310 great ponds,31 ' and navigable rivers.312 As such, there is a
303. Id.
304. Title 17, § 3860 (West 1983).
305. See id.
306. Id.
307. Id. This rule was adopted by ordinance in Massachusetts, "'F]or great
ponds lying in common, though within the bounds of some town, it shall be free for
any man to fish and fowl there, and may pass and repass on foot through any man's
propriety [sic] for that end, so they trespass not upon any man's corn or meadow.'"
Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. 227,230,77 A. 938, 939 (1910) (quoting COLONIAL ORDI-
NANCE OF 1641-47). Although the Massachusetts ordinance did not apply to Maine,
it was "declared to be a part of the common law of th[e] State." Id.
308. Title 17, § 3860 (West 1983).
309. See id.
310. See title 1, §§ 2-3 (West 1989).
311. Conant v. Jordan, 107 Me. at 230, 77 A. at 939.
312. In Woodman v. Pitman, 79 Me. 456, 10 A. 321 (1887), the court stated:
[Tihe test of the floatability of a stream was held to be, whether fit for
valuable floatage and useful to important public interests .... [I]n order to
make a stream navigable, "there must be some commerce and navigation
upon it which is essentially valuable." Navigators must endure inconve-
niences for the greater general good .... [One justice] said, "But in order
to have this character it must be navigable to some purpose useful to trade
or agriculture." ... [T]his language is applied to the capacity of the stream
rather than to its uses.
Id. at 462-63, 10 A. at 324-25 (quoting Wethersfield v. Humphrey 20 Conn. 217;
Rowe v. Granite Bridge Co., 21 Pick. 344, 347) (citations omitted).
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public easement extending from the normal high-water line out to-
ward the water.313
13. Drainage
Maine recognizes that downstream owners maintain a limited
easement in natural water courses.3 14 In effect, the upstream owner
cannot stop or divert a water course to the injury of a downstream
owner.315 A downstream owner may prevent an unlawful or unrea-
sonable diminution or diversion of the natural floW. 3 1 6
L Problems Creating or Conveying Easements
Oftentimes the grantor inadvertently creates or conveys an ease-
ment in such a manner that the easement is unintentionally limited
or denied in what otherwise would appear to be a valid grant.
1. Grants by the Dominant Estate
In some cases, the dominant estate ineffectively attempts to ex-
tend the use of an appurtenant easement to other persons or prop-
erty. For example, an easement cannot be granted by the dominant
estate to benefit non-appurtenant parcels. The extension of the
easement to other persons or property requires the permission of
the servient estate.
2. Rule Against Perpetuities
The Rule Against Perpetuities states that an interest is not valid
unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest. While Maine has
modified the common law Rule Against Perpetuities by adopting a
"wait and see" modification, it has not eliminated the rule.3" 7 The
313. See Knud E. Hermansen & Donald R. Richards, Maine Principles of Owner-
ship Along Water Bodies, 47 Mn. L. REv. 35, 45 (1995).
314. In Card v. Nickerson, 150 Me. 89, 104 A.2d 427 (1954), the court stated:
There is a public or natural right in and to a water course which belongs
to all persons whose lands are benefited by it, and it cannot be stopped up,
or diverted, to the injury of other proprietors. To constitute a water course
as defined by the law, it must appear that the water in it usually flows in a
particular direction by a regular channel having a bed with banks and sides,
and usually discharging itself into some other body or stream of water. It
must have a well defined and substantial existence but need not flow con-
tinuously or never be dry.
Id. at 91, 104 A.2d at 429.
315. Johnson v. Whitten, 384 A.2d 698, 701 (Me. 1978).
316. Mullen v. Penobscot Log-Driving Co., 90 Me. 555, 568, 38 A. 557, 560-61
(1897). This is especially true where the water is required as a necessity such as for
drinking. See, eg., City of Auburn v. Union Water Power Co., 90 Me. 576, 586.38 A.
561, 565 (1897).
317. See title 33, §§ 101-106 (West 1988).
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rule applies to easements as well as fee simple title.", Simply
stated, if the servient estate, the appurtenant property, or the domi-
nant party cannot be identified with certainty at the time the ease-
ment is created, the easement is in danger of running afoul of the
Rule Against Perpetuities because it has not "vested." People often
violate the rule by conveying property and then attempting to re-
serve the right to create or extend an easement to other, as yet un-
determined, property.
3. No Title Interests
In some cases, a third party attempts to grant rights in an ease-
ment he does not have. At first impression this action would seem
to amount to intentional fraud. This situation, however, is not un-
common in the sequential and often haphazard development of a
tract of land.319 The figures depict that a landowner will often sell
off lots from a larger tract over a span of many years. The chance of
a problem often is increased by the use of different surveyors or
attorneys over the same time span. Where a grantor has sold a lot,
creating an appurtenant easement over the grantor's remaining
lands for the lot sold, and afterwards sells all or part of the land
encompassing the existing appurtenant easement, the grantor is
powerless to extend the existing easement to other lots because the
grantor has conveyed all of his remaining interest in the easement's
"underlying" title (servient estate).
318. Id. § 101.
319. In Dorman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 82 Me. 438, 19 A. 915 (1890), the court cited
approvingly a Massachusetts case:
[W]here the owner of land lays out a way through it, with lots on each side,
and then conveys one of these lots with a right of way over the whole of it,
and then conveys another lot together with the fee of the street in front of
it, and then conveys a third lot bounding it on the same street opposite to
the two lots before sold, the purchaser of the third lot gets no right of way
in that portion of the street, the fee of which had been conveyed to the
second purchaser; and for the reason that his grantor was then powerless to
place such an additional burden upon it; and the third purchaser could
claim no rights under the deed to the first, because to that deed he was a
stranger.




1 Lot Sold w. Easement 1
c.1! !
C. 1975
2 2n Lot Sold
3rd Lot Sold with attempt
xisting easement
The c. 1975 figure shows the out-conveyance of a lot with appurtenant easement.
The c. 1981 figure shows a sale of a second lot. The important point to note in
regard to the c. 1981 figure is that the grantor has conveyed all her title rights under-
lying the easement. The c. 1985 figure shows an attempt to extend the easement and
increase the burden upon lot 2, the servient estate. The attempt to convey an ease-
ment across lot two for the benefit of lot three would not be effective since the
grantor has no title rights remaining within the confines of lot 2
4. Inadequate Description
An easement by reservation should be described using a metes
and bounds description, reference to a plat, or some other means
that conveys a specific location and width. Failure to adequately de-
scribe the easement does not provide actual notice to subsequent
owners of the servient estate and will prevent recognition of an
easement over their land.320
5. Stranger to tie Deed
In some cases attempts have been made to reserve an easement in
favor of a person not a party to the transaction. These reservations
generally are void because the party is a stranger to the deed."2
320. 'itle 33, § 201-A(2) (West 1988).
321. Tripp v. Huff, 606 A.2d 792, 793 (Me. 1992) ("[U]nder our existing case law
.. an easement [to a stranger] convey[s] no property rights .... We are unper-
suaded that there is any compelling reason to depart from this well settled rule and
thus decline to do so.") (citation omitted); see also Town of Manchester v. Augusta
Country Club, 477 A.2d 1124, 1130-31 (Me. 1984) ("A mere reservation in favor of
one not a party to the deed cannot create any right in interest not previously ex-
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There are two situations where this problem frequently arises. The
first situation occurs when a person sells his remaining road frontage
and attempts to give an easement to neighbors, or to parcels previ-
ously sold at the same time, in the same deed. For example, con-
sider the following language: "Provided, however, there shall be
reserved for my son and daughter-in-law an easement extending
through the parcel herein conveyed to my son's lot to use as they
require."
The second situation often encountered concerns easements that
extend to the borders of a subdivision with the express or implied
purpose of providing access to the adjoining lands. Unless the ease-
ment is accepted as a public road, the use of the easement cannot




A partial plan where the developer has shown access from the development to the
adjoining lands. If the access does not become a public road, the depiction of the
access is ordinarily ineffective as a private easement for the neighboring property
without a deed to the neighbor conveying an easement during the time the devel-
oper still has title in the streets and cul-de-sac.
To prevent these problems from arising, the grantor can convey
the easement to the appropriate parties prior to the grantor's con-
veyance of the fee simple title in the servient estate, or the grantor
can retain the fee simple title in the road, allowing the grantor to
increase the burden on her title at a later time.
isting."); Dorman v. Bates Mfg. Co., 82 Me. 438, 19 A. 915. In Dorman the court
stated:
The whole extent of the doctrine in this class of cases is that, if land be
conveyed as bounded on a street, and the grantor at the time of the convey-
ance owns the land over which the supposed street passes, he and his suc-
cessors in title will be estopped to deny to the grantee and his successors in
title the use of it as a street. But each one claiming the benefit of such an
estoppel must rest his claim on his own-title deed, and not on the deed of
another, through which he has not derived his title.
Id. at 449, 19 A. at 916.
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Courts are reluctant to recognize transactions involving a stranger
to the deed for three reasons. First, the stranger to the deed convey-
ance does not allow for acceptance of the instrument by the would-
be dominant estate. While it is rare that a person would not wel-
come the benefits of an easement, unexpected taxes, potential litiga-
tion, environmental concerns, and other potential liability could
prevent a face-to-face transfer. A second, more pervasive reason, is
that the dominant estate is not afforded the opportunity to bargain
and reach agreement with the grantor over such important matters
as the location, width, extent of use, allowable use, and so on. It is
not surprising that many easements running afoul of the stranger to
the deed doctrine are vague and subject to various interpretations.
The third reason why the courts are reluctant to recognize the stran-
ger to the deed doctrine is founded upon the fact that the transac-
tion will not appear in the chain of title to the appurtenant parcel
and consequently will fail to provide notice to a bona-fide purchaser
that the land benefits from an easement. As a result of these defi-
ciencies, transactions involving a stranger to the deed potentially
give rise to litigation. 3"
V. Extinguishment
Easements may be extinguished by various methods. The meth-
ods may be categorized as follows: release, condition, nonuse, aban-
donment, merger of title, termination of necessity, foreclosure,
destruction, death of a party, and statutory.
A. Release
A release is a grant or conveyance from the dominant owners to
the servient owners releasing the dominant owners' rights in the
easement. 3' To be effective each of the dominant cotenants must
be a party to the release.
B. Condition or Event
Although parties may provide in writing for an easement to extin-
guish upon a certain condition or event, 2 ' unfortunately, this proce-
dure rarely is used. Nevertheless, some foresighted scriveners do
put in easements one or more conditions for termination. Some
conditions that often are written into easements are improper uses
of the easement, time period, specific date, nonuse for a specific pe-
riod, failure to perform a specific act (for example, improve road,
322. Repudiation of the stranger to the deed doctrine has been successful in
some jurisdictions based upon the theory of estoppel.
323. See e.g., Chapman v. Sheridan-Vyoming Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621 (1950).
324. See e.g., title 23, § 3031 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
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close gate, or erect a bridge), obsolescence of specific technology,
and so on. The following is an example of a condition clause:
If this easement is not used within a five-year period, the ease-
ment shall be extinguished and all outstanding rights and in-
terest shall revert to the servient estate.
1. Paper Streets32-5
Ordinarily public and private rights in streets terminate upon
either the failure to accept the offer of dedication in twenty years,
the failure to construct a way for the exercise of private rights within
twenty years, or the period stated in the plan. 32 6 Paper streets that
existed prior to September 29, 1987, will be deemed vacated on the
later of September 29, 1997, or fifteen years after the recording of
the plan.327
2. Vacation
A municipality may vacate public and private rights in paper
streets within a subdivision.3 28 For vacation to be effective, the mu-
nicipal officers themselves, or upon a petition by persons claiming a
property interest in the paper street must provide notice of the pro-
posed vacation to the lot owners.329 However, revocation of paper
streets shown on an approved subdivision plan, in which no lots
have been sold, may be done by the municipality. 330 Thereafter, a
decision will be made and an order of vacation entered if
appropriate.33'
C. Nonuse
Under the common law, an easement cannot be extinguished by
nonuse, regardless of how long the nonuse continues. 332 In fact, the
easement may never be used and still may survive.333
"A person who acquires title by deed to an easement appurte-
nant to land has the same right of property therein as he has in
325. For an explanation of paper streets, see supra text section entitled "Range-
ways & Range-roads."
326. Id.
327. Id. § 3032. It is unclear whether the deemed vacation vacates private rights
as well as public rights in paper streets.
328. Id. § 3027. Under title 23, § 3031 the vacation procedure appears to include
private rights.
329. Id. § 3027.
330. Id. § 3037(2).
331. Id.
332. See, e.g., Phillips v. Gregg, 628 A.2d 151 (Me. 1993); Canadian Nat'l Ry. v.
Sprague, 609 A.2d. 1175 (Me. 1992); Witt v. McKenna, 600 A.2d 105 (Me. 1991).
333. See Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361, 367, 84 A. 530, 532 (1912) ("It has
been held that a way, created by the necessity for its use, cannot be extinguished so
long as the necessity exists.").
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the land, and it is no more necessary that he should make use
of it to maintain his title than it is that he should actually oc-
cupy or cultivate the land. Hence his title is not affected by
non-user, and, unless there is shown against him some adverse
possession or loss of title in some of the ways recognized by
law, he may rely on the existence of his property with full as-
surance that, when occasion arises for its use and enjoyment,
he will find his rights therein absolute and unimpaired. ' 334
There are two exceptions to this common law rule that easements
cannot be extinguished by nonuse. One exception, known as com-
mon law abandonment, applies to public road easements. Under
the common law, a public road easement was considered abandoned
when a public way, originally created by use, was not kept passable
at the expense of the public for a period of twenty years or more.335
Common law abandonment also may be presumed within a few
years of the municipality's discontinuance of maintenance on the old
road as a result of the construction of a new replacement road.336
The second exception to the common law rule that easements
cannot be extinguished by nonuse applies to private easements
which are treated differently than public road easements.337 With
respect to private easements, the exception to the common law oc-
334. Id. at 366, 84 A. at 532 (quoting Welsh v. Taylor, 31 N.E. 896. 899 (1892)).
335. Lamb v. Town of New Sharon, 606 A.2d 1042 (Me. 1992).
336. Id. The Lamb court specifically noted:
Under the doctrine of abandonment, a presumption of a public intent to
abandon a road may be raised by evidence of nonuse for twenty years or
more, intentional and voluntary desertion of a road, or acquiescence, even
for a few years, in the discontinuance of an old road combined with use of a
new road.
Id. at 1046. Similarly, in Piper v. Voorhees, 130 Me. 305, 155 A. 556 (1931), the court
said:
[Tihe laying out of a new road near an old road does not necessarily oper-
ate a discontinuance of the latter. Still, voluntary and intentional desertion
of a highway, the acquirement of a new road in its place, its travel and
recognition by the public, may operate as an abandonment of the former.
Acquiescence for even a few years, in the discontinuance of an old road,
and the adoption of another, has been held sufficient to show the abandon-
ment of the old road in the absence of evidence of a contrary intention.
Id. at 309-10, 155 A. at 559 (citations omitted). See also Tibbetts v. Penley, 83 Me.
118, 123, 21 A. 838, 839-40 (1890) ("Undoubtedly, in straightening public ways by
alterations authorized by Rev. St., c. 18, such strips of land in an old location as are
not covered by the new, would become ipso facto discontinued. Such is the natural
and desired object sought by the proceeding.").
337. Under the common law abandonment exception, the presumption begins
with the concept that a private easement acquired by deed is never lost by nonuse.
This is true even in the situation where the owner of the dominant estate prefers to
ignore an earlier easement in favor of a new easement in another location. See Ad-
ams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361,365, 84 A. 530, 532 (1912) ("[A] right of way, whether
acquired by grant or prescription, is not extinguished by the habitual use by its
owner of another way, equally convenient, instead of it, unless there is intentional
abandonment of the former way.").
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curs in two situations. The first is where the dominant owner has
agreed with the servient owner to move the location of the way and
thereafter does not use the earlier location and does not protest the
servient owner's complete dominion over the former location. The
surrender of the former easement is presumed to have provided
consideration for the agreement in the new location.338
The second situation where the exception to the common law will
occur involves prescriptive easements. Continued use of property
under certain circumstances will create a prescriptive easement in
favor of the user. The use with attending conditions, though gener-
ally unmarketable, constitutes a form of title in favor of the user.
The prescriptive easement is said to be inchoate awaiting perfection
through recognition by the dominant tenement's owner who must
seek a deed or judgment. Until recognition occurs, the title is sup-
ported by continued use that constitutes notice to subsequent pur-
chasers of the servient tenement. The recognition of a prescriptive
easement and the requirements of notice are difficult burdens to
carry. Consequently, the former user or her heirs and assigns some-
times will stop adverse use. Under the common law, if a former
user, now a nonuser, has acquired an inchoate right and afterwards
fails to use or perfect the right (constructive possession), the former
user will be presumed to have abandoned the right.339 Abandon-
ment of a prescriptive public way or private easement arises when
there has been an unexplained cessation of use (nonuse) for twenty
338. In Tabbutt v. Grant, 94 Me. 371, 47 A. 899 (1900), the court noted:
[M]ere non-user of a definite right of way for any period does not of itself
extinguish the right.... Evidence shows an executed agreement for a sub-
stitution of the new path for the old one, by which the plaintiff acquired the
right to use the new path and in consideration thereof surrendered the
right to use the old path. Such an agreement may be made by parol, and.
when executed,-when, in pursuance thereof, the owner of the right of way
begins to use the new path, and the owner of the servient estate shuts up
the old path,-then the former acquires right to use the new path, and
effectually releases the right to use the old path. Such an agreement can be
shown by conduct as well as by words, but it must appear that there was an
agreement. If the conduct of the parties fails to show that, it does not
change their rights.
Il at 372-73, 47 A. at 900.
339. Smith v. Dickson, 225 A.2d 631, 636 (Me. 1967) (quoting Piper v. Voorhees,
130 Me. at 309, 155 A. at 558-59 (1931)) ("While the nonuser of a prescriptive ease-
ment, for a period sufficient to create an easement by prescription, is evidence of an
intention to abandon the easement, it is open to explanation, and may be controlled
by proof that such intention did not exist."); Farrar v. Cooper, 34 Me. 394, 400
(1852) ("A non user of twenty years is regarded as presumptive evidence of an aban-
donment and extinction of the right. This presumption may be rebutted by proof of
facts inconsistent with such a conclusion. The rule is not applicable to rights or in-
corporeal hereditaments, secured by a deed of conveyance.").
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years.4 Where all evidence of the former use has disappeared so
that a purchaser takes title without notice of adverse rights, a recog-
nition of a prescriptive easement would be unjust. It is presumed
that the former right has been extinguished in favor of some other
adverse right, or, where no such adverse right appears, that the for-
mer has been surrendered, or that it never existed.4
D. Abandonment
An easement is abandoned when it is relinquished or given up
without a delivery of a deed.4 2 While in limited cases nonuse may
presume abandonment, nonuse alone ordinarily is insufficient to
constitute abandonment. 343 In Maine abandonment generally re-
quires affirmative acts. '
It has been stated that the only way in which an easement can
be extinguished by the act of the parties interested is by re-
lease, actual or presumed; that abandonment will not have
that effect unless a release can be presumed from that and the
surrounding circumstances; that when an easement is spoken
of as having been lost by abandonment, it is intended that the
circumstances are such that a release can be presumed.
4 5
Extinguishment by abandonment requires intentional acts (or fail-
ure to act in some cases) on the part of the owner of the right-of-
way that are decisive and conclusive, indicating a clear intent to stop
340. Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. at 364, 84 A. at 531 ("[O]ne acquired by pre-
scription, may be extinguished among other modes, by abandonment, so called, or
non-user and adverse possession for twenty years.").
341. Wooster v. Fiske, 115 Me. 161, 164-65, 98 A. 378. 379 (1916).
342. Doherty v. Russell, 116 Me. 269, 272-73, 101 A. 305, 306 (1917) (quoting
Middle Creek Ditch Co. v. Henry, 39 P. 1054, 1058 (1895)) ("Abandonment is the
relinquishment of a right, the giving up of something to which one is entitled-it
must be by the owner-without being pressed by any duty, necessity, or utility to
himself, but simply because he desires no longer to possess the thing.") (alterations
in original).
343. In explaining abandonment versus nonuse the court in Adams v. Hodgkins.
109 Me. 361, said:
Abandonment necessarily implies nonuser, but nonuser does not create
abandonment no matter how long it continues, and an easement proved by
grant or reservation is not lost by nonuser alone. It has been said that an
easement acquired by grant cannot be lost by mere nonuser, though it may
be by nonuser coupled with an intention of abandonment.
Il at 365-66, 84 A. at 432 (citations omitted). See also Doherty v. Russell, 116 Me.
at 273, 101 A. at 301 (nonuse alone is insufficient without intention to abandon.)
344. Phillips v. Gregg, 628 A.2d 151, 152-53 (Me. 1993); Chase v. Eastman, 563
A.2d 1099, 1102 (Me. 1989) ("Although mere nonuse is not enough, an easement
created by deed or grant may be extinguished by abandonment."); Adams v. Hodg-
kins, 109 Me. at 365, 84 A. at 532. ("Abandonment necessarily implies nonuser but
nonuser does not create abandonment no matter how long it continues.").
345. Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. at 367, 84 A. at 532.
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using the easement for its intended purpose. 46 In the alternative,
the act or acts may be carried out by the owner of the servient tene-
ment for the statutory period, adverse to the dominant owner's in-
terest. 47  This alternative, sometimes referred to as reverse
prescription, also would require that the servient owner not give to
the adverse user valid notice denying extinguishment of the ease-
ment 34 and would not apply to wild lands (unimproved lands). 34 9
Ordinarily, the adverse act would have to be maintained for the stat-
utory period. However, the Law Court has recognized a shorter pe-
riod when the improvements were permanent or substantial and
coupled with conditions suggesting laches or estoppel.35 °
As can be seen, mere nonuse of an easement would not be suffi-
cient to extinguish a private easement by abandonment.351 Further-
more, the acts must be unequivocal and amount to clear and
convincing evidence that the use is being abandoned perma-
nently.352 The fact that the easement is no longer necessary or is no
longer required for its intended purpose is not sufficient cause to
show abandonment.353 It also is irrelevant that the easement has
never been exercised, as in the case of paper streets shown on a
346. Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Me. 1992); Doherty v.
Russell, 116 Me. at 273, 101 A. at 306-07 (1917) ("To constitute an abandonment of
a right there must be a clear unequivocal and decisive act of the party, showing a
determination not to have the benefit intended.") (quoting Banks v. Banks, 77 N.C.
186 (1877) ("There must be not only an intention to abandon but an actual abandon-
ment.") (quoting Stevens v. Town of Norfolk, 42 Conn. 377 (1875))). See also Chase
v. Eastman, 563 A.2d at 1103 (an easement holder's intention to abandon an ease-
ment may be shown from his failure to object to the erection of a permanent struc-
ture that prevents the enjoyment of the rights granted by the easement); McLellan v.
McFadden, 114 Me. 242, 249-50, 95 A. 1025, 1029 (1915) (intention to abandon may
be inferred, but mere lapse of time or nonuse is not sufficient evidence of
abandonment).
347. Phillips v. Gregg, 628 A.2d at 151; Witt v. McKenna, 600 A.2d 105 (Me.
1991). See also Ballard v. Butler, 30 Me. 94, 99 (1849) ("[A] party to whom a servi-
tude is due may effect its extinguishment by suffering erections of a permanent kind,
which would prevent its use .... ").
348. Title 14, § 813 (West 1980) (dealing with preventing a prescriptive easement
by interruption).
349. Id. § 814.
350. Bolduc v. Watson, 639 A.2d 629, 630 (Me. 1994) ("The history of nonuse,
coupled with the intention to abandon demonstrated by the Bolducs' failure to ob-
ject to the garage when it was built, are sufficient to establish abandonment."); Fitz-
patrick v. Boston and Me. R.R., 84 Me. 33, 24 A. 432 (1891); Ballard v. Butler, 30
Me. at 94.
351. See Chase v. Eastman, 563 A.2d 1099, 1102 (Me. 1989).
352. See Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me. 1992); Witt v. Mc-
Kenna, 600 A.2d 105 (Me. 1991). See also Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361, 364, 84
A. 530, 531 (1912) ("[T]he denial of the right to an easement or a declaration of
relinquishment of it coupled with acts on the part of the declarant in furtherance of
and conformity to the denial or declaration are evidence of abandonment and ad-
verse possession.") (citations omitted).
353. Witt v. McKenna, 600 A.2d at 105.
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subdivision plan,354 or has only been exercised in part, such as a cul-
de-sac.355 Where the servient owner erects permanent structures or
barriers across the easement, abandonment by the dominant owner
will be deemed to exist.35 6 Any actions by the servient or dominant
owner which prevent the dominant owner from permanently exer-
cising the easement will be sufficient to constitute abandonment. 35 7
In the past, the removal of railroad tracks and the cessation of
railroad service was enough to constitute abandonment. However,
legislation by the U.S. Congress known as "Rails to Trails," has at-
tempted to set up a legal fiction" s to prevent the abandonment and
reversion of railroad corridors and allow the use of the former rail-
road corridors for public recreation activities. 359 Some federal dis-
trict courts have declared the law unconstitutional while others have
upheld it.360 It has not been reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court. The question of abandonment has no relevance to track cor-
ridors owned in fee simple. Maine also has a law that gives the
354. In Bartlett v. City of Bangor, 67 Me. 460 (1878), the court said:
It is seldom within the contemplation of the parties that all the streets
marked upon a plan of a considerable extent of territory, or that the whole
of any one of them, if of considerable length. shall be at once opened.
And, until such as the growth of the place requires them to be opened. the
owner has a right to use the land for any of these temporary purposes.
And such a use is not adverse, but according to strict right. It will not.
therefore, bar the rights of the grantees, or the public, to have the streets
opened, whenever, in the opinion of the public authorities, they are
needed.
Id. at 466.
355. Id. at 467.
356. Bolduc v. Watson, 639 A.2d 629, 630 (Me. 1994).
357. Speaking about adverse use. the court in Bartlett v. City of Bangor. 67 Me.
460, said:
An adverse use, such as placing upon the land buildings or other perma-
nent obstructions to all possible travel over it, if acquiesced in for a suffi-
dent length of time, might have that effect. But using the land for
pasturage, or the growth of crops, or other purpose, which does not indi-
cate an intention that it shall never be used as a street, will not have that
effect. Such a use of the land is not adverse. It is seldom within the con-
templation of the parties that all the streets marked upon a plan of a con-
siderable extent of territory, or that the whole of any one of them, if of
considerable length, shall be at once opened.
Id. at 466.
358. See Burnier v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 611 A.2d 1366, 1368 (Pa.
Commw. 1992) ("[Ihe National Act specifically provides that interim trail use is not
an abandonment of a railroad right-of-way.").
359. National Trails System Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d) (1985). See also 49 C.F.R.
§§ 1152.29(a), (d) (1994).
360. The courts have upheld the National Trails System Act in Burnier v. Depart-
ment of Envtl. Resources, 611 A.2d at 1366, Washington Wildlife Preservation, Inc.




Maine Department of Transportation first opportunity to purchase
rail lines intended for discontinuance.361
E. Merger of Title (Unity of Title)
When the servient and dominant estates combine or come to-
gether, the easement will cease.362 Where the easement had been
used adversely, the prescriptive period is suspended.363 However,
the title of the dominant estate and servient estate must be co-exten-
sive, equal in validity, quality, and all other circumstances. 364 For
example, a lease on one and title to the other, or a mortgage on one
and unencumbered title to the other, will suspend the easement but
not extinguish it.365 In another example, ownership of the dominant
estate and a half interest in the servient estate will not result in unity
of title. Once the easement has been extinguished, a subsequent
separation ordinarily will not revive the easement except by
implication.366
F. Termination of Necessity
In the case of easements created by necessity, circumstances or
conditions that subsequently arise that remove the necessity will ex-
361. Title 23, § 7105 (West 1992).
362. Smith v. Dickson, 225 A.2d 631, 636 (Me. 1967); Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me.
381, 387, 6 A. 6, 9 (1886) ("That an easement will become extinguished by unity of
title and possession of the dominant and servient estates in the same person by the
same right, is a principle of law too general and elementary to be questioned.");
Warren v. Blake, 54 Me. 276, 281 (1866) ("When the possession of two closes is
united in one person all subordinate rights and easements are extinguished.") (quot-
ing Whalley v. Thompson, 1 B. & P., 373).
363. Glover v. Graham, 459 A.2d 1080, 1085 (Me. 1983) ("Common ownership of
the dominant and servient estates would also have interrupted acquisition of the
prescriptive easement.") (citations omitted). Some states would have viewed unity
of title as an extinguishment of the prescriptive rights and started the time over at
the separation.
364. In Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me. 381, 6 A. 6, the court said:
In order that unity of title to the two estates should operate to extinguish
an existing easement, the ownership of the two estates should be coexten-
sive, equal in validity, quality, and all other circumstances of right. If one is
held in severalty and the other only as to a fractional part thereof by the
same person, there will be no extinguishment of such easement. Thus it
was held ... in which case one estate was held in fee and the other for a
term of five hundred years, that unity of possession did not extinguish the
easement, but only suspended it during that unity of possession; and upon
parting with the premises to different parties, the right revived.
Id. at 387-88, 6 A. at 9-10 (citations omitted).
365. See, e.g., Bonney v. Greenwood, 96 Me. 335, 52 A. 786 (1902).
366. Cf. LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 988 n.3 (Me. 1979) ("Unity of title to
the dominant and servient estate, of course, extinguishes an easement."). See also




tinguish the easement.3 67 However, since necessity is not a condi-
tion for quasi easements, subsequent circumstances removing the
necessity do not necessarily extinguish other forms of implied ease-
ments, such as quasi easements.36
G. Foreclosure
In the event an easement is obtained subsequent to a mortgage
but prior to foreclosure, the easement will be extinguished for those
taking title under the mortgagee. Maine recently has enacted an
exception to the common law rule in regard to utilities and their
easements when the utilities were not notified or made a party to
the foreclosure proceedings. 369 As a result, the mortgagee now is
required to provide notice to the utility company before she can
convey the mortgaged property free and clear of easements that the
mortgagor may have created subsequent to the mortgage.
H. Destruction
An easement may be extinguished by the frustration of its pur-
pose 370 or the destruction of the servient or dominant tenement. 371
When nothing remains upon which the easement can operate, the
easement is extinguished. 372 Note, however, that extinguishment by
destruction requires complete destruction and not just a setback or
difficulty in using the easement.3"
L Death of the Party
In the case of easements in gross, the death of the dominant party
ordinarily will extinguish the easement.374 This common law rule
367. The court in Tibbetts v. Penley, 83 Me. 118, 21 A. 838 (1890), said:
If the plaintiff's passage-way were one of necessity simply, the location of
the street along the western line of the plaintiff's land, would operate a
discontinuance of it across the defendant's land, on the well-settled doc-
trine that the necessity from which the way resulted having ceased, the
right of way ceased.
Id. at 123, 21 A. at 840. See also LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 989 (Me. 1979)
("The recognized rule in Maine with respect to ways of necessity is that termination
of the necessity extinguishes the easement."); Adams v. Hodgkins, 109 Me. 361,367,
84 A. 530, 532 (1912) ("It has been held that a way, created by the necessity for its
use, cannot be extinguished so long as the necessity exists.").
368. LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d at 984.
369. Title 14, § 6321 (West Supp. 1995-1996).
370. Cf. Canadian Nat'l Ry. v. Sprague, 609 A.2d 1175 (Me. 1992).
371. Bonney v. Greenwood, 96 Me. 335, 52 A. 786 (1902).
372. Id. at 341, 786 A. at 789.
373. Id.
374. O'Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322,323 (Me. 1987) ("An easement in gross is
a purely personal right, is not assignable, and terminates upon the death of the indi-
vidual for whom it was created."). See also Reed v. A.C. McLoon & Co., 311 A.2d
548,551-52 (Me. 1973); Davis v. Briggs, 117 Me. 536,540, 105 A. 128, 129-30 (1918).
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was modified in the last century in regard to corporations such as
utilities and railroads where the corporations had merged, com-
bined, or been acquired by another similarly situated entity.37
J. Statutes
Extinguishment by statute mostly applies to public road ease-
ments. The common forms are the following:
1. Discontinuance
In Maine, discontinuance refers to extinguishing all or some of the
public rights by proclamation and procedure. For discontinuance to
be effective the following requirements must be met: (1) the road
must be an interest held for highway purposes, a town way, or public
easement; (2) notice must be given; and (3) an order of discontinu-
ance must be filed specifying: (a) location; (b) names of abutting
property owners; and (c) amount of damages.376 Consider the fol-
lowing example of an order of discontinuance:
Pursuant to 23 M.R.S.A. § 3026, having given best practicable
notice to all abutting property owners and to the Hampden
Planning Office, it is hereby ordered by the Hampden Town
Council that the public easement commonly referred to as the
Cox Road, as depicted on Exhibit A, be and hereby is discon-
tinued for highway purposes. Meaning and intending to dis-
continue that public easement, formerly known as a private
way, established by the passage of Article 8 at a town meeting
held on December 2, 1964. It is further ordered that no dam-
ages are to be paid to any abutter. A copy of this Order of
Discontinuance shall be filed with and maintained by the
Town Clerk. Town of Hampden Minutes (Sept. 8, 1992).
Unless otherwise stated in the order, a public easement will be
retained.377 Therefore, the discontinuance of a town way does not
375. Cf. Champaign Nat'l Bank v. Ill. Power Co.. 465 N.E.2d 1016 (I11. App. Ct.
1984); Sandy Island Corp. v. Ragsdale, 143 S.E.2d 803 (S.C. 1965).
376. See title 23, § 3026 (West 1964). See also City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267
A.2d 382 (Me. 1970). Note also that title 30, § 4801 provides for the discontinuance
of easements upon the adoption of urban development plans. For a discussion of
this procedure, see Lewiston Urban Renewal Auth. v. City of Lewiston, 349 A.2d
763, 766 (Me. 1976).
377. See title 23, § 3026. See also Jordan v. Town of Canton, 265 A.2d 96 (Me.
1970), where the court stated:
The statute is designed to permit a governmental entity to avoid the ex-
pense of maintaining and keeping certain designated roads open for travel
and free from dangerous defects. Its responsibility for accident caused by
such defects in a road so designated is removed. All this is accomplished
without technical discontinuance of the public way and without terminating
the public easement therein. No provision is made for compensation to




automatically terminate all public rights in the easement or allow
the former road bed to be ignored or obstructed. An order of dis-
continuance might not involve the elimination of the easement, but
might involve only the reduction in the service provided by the pub-
lic. The municipality may opt to remove the public easement, al-
lowing a reversion to the status before the public road easement was
imposed.
The presumption of a public easement (formerly called a "private
way") remaining in town roads arises from amendments taking ef-
fect on September 3, 1965. Prior to that time there was no presump-
tion of the existence of an easement, and all public rights were
discontinued unless expressly stated otherwise.378 County roads
that were discontinued had no such presumption until after July 29,
1976, when they became town roads and were thereafter
discontinued.379
The discontinuance of public roads where a public easement was
not provided often leaves property landlocked. In such situations
the law recognizes the deprivation of the landlocked owner's prop-
erty rights, thus mandating just compensation.380 In other cases,
when a public easement does remain, the property is not land-
locked, however, there may be substantial burdens imposed on the
landowner.38'
378. Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d 425 (Me. 1980).
379. Craig v. Davis, 649 A.2d 1096 (Me. 1994); Town of Fayette v. Manter. 528
A.2d 887 (Me. 1987). For a statement of the powers of county commissioners with
respect to the discontinuance of county roads prior to July 29. 1976, see title 23,
§ 2051.
380. In Jordan v. Town of Canton, 265 A.2d 96 (Me. 1970). the court noted:
The right of access to a public way is a property right in the nature of an
easement....
"Clearly, an owner of land abutting on a street or highway cannot consti-
tutionally be deprived of all access to his premises without compensation,
either by the vacation of the street or highway or its physical obstruction in
front of his premises, or its obstruction at another place so that the portion
of the street in front of his premises cannot be reached."
Id. at 98 (quoting 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 200).
381. In Jordan v. Town of Canton, 265 A.2d 96, the court said:
The fact that a "limited-user highway" continues to have a legal status as a
"public way" over which there continues to be a public easement of travel
is meaningless if there is no longer any public responsibility for mainte-
nance and repair. Without maintenance or repair, it is only a question of
time before a public road will become impassable or unsafe for travel. The
rigors of Maine weather, the action of frost and the erosion from rain and
melting snow will speed the process of disintegration. The ability to use the
road for vehicular travel and thus the abutter's easement of access to and





Under the common law, abandonment of public roads occurred
(1) with the creation of a new road and nonuse of a former road or
(2) after nonuse of the public road for a twenty-year period of
time.3 82 While statutes have expanded the common law, common
law abandonment still remains relevant in certain cases. 383 Accord-
ing to statutory language, for abandonment to be effective the road
must be a town or county way not kept passable for the use of motor
vehicles at the expense of the municipality or county for a period of
thirty years or more.3 4
There are several considerations in applying the statute that re-
lates to abandonment of roads. First, section 3028 refers to prima
facie evidence. This reference creates a rebuttable presumption, not
a fait accompli. Second, the statute raises the possibility that a pub-
lic easement may remain, since the statute provides that a "way that
has been abandoned under this section shall be relegated to the
same status as it would have had after a discontinuance pursuant to
section 3026. "1385 This assumes a public easement for town roads
discontinued after September 3, 1965.386 In determining the effec-
tive time of abandonment, the Law Court has held that abandon-
ment takes effect at the end of the thirty-year period and not at the
beginning.38 Third, the statute provides that "at all times [a way's
status is] subject to an affirmative vote ... making that way an ease-
ment for recreational use. ' ,38  Fourth, this statute does not appear
382. Martin v. Burnham, 631 A.2d 1239 (Me. 1993). See also Lamb v. Town of
New Sharon, 606 A.2d 1042, 1046 (Me. 1992) ("A presumption of a public intent to
abandon a road may be raised by evidence of nonuse for twenty years or more,
intentional and voluntary desertion of a road, or acquiescence, even for a few years,
in the discontinuance of an old road combined with use of a new road."); City of
Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 382, 385 (Me. 1970) ("When that part [of the high-
way] was discontinued as a through highway and was relocated, there resulted an
abandonment. 'Establishing an alteration in a highway. is in law a discontinuance of
the part altered.' ") (quoting Commonwealth v. Inhabitants of Westborough, 3 Mass.
406 (1807)); Smith v. Dickson, 225 A.2d 631, 636 (Me. 1967) (" 'The desertion of a
public road for nearly a century, is strong presumptive evidence that the right of way
has been extinguished.' ") (quoting Beardslee v. French, 7 Conn. 125, 127 (1828)).
383. Town of South Berwick v. White. 412 A.2d 1225, 1227 (Me. 1980) ("Further-
more, the existence of section 3028's special presumption of abandonment does not
impair the availability of common law abandonment through public nonuser,
although the referee found that the requisite showing had not been made in the
instant case.").
384. See title 23, § 3028 (West 1964).
385. Title 23, § 3028(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
386. See supra note 357 and accompanying text.
387. Town of Cornville v. Gervais, 661 A.2d 1127, 1128 (Me. 1995) ("Because
abandonment pursuant to the statute does not occur until the end of the thirty-year
period, Gervais' argument that abandonment occurred in 1948 when the Town last
maintained the road is wrong.").
388. Title 23, § 3028(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
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to apply to state roads or state aid roads. Nor does the statute raise
a presumption that a public easement remains after September 3,
1965, in regard to county roads unless they were abandoned after
being recognized as town roads under authority of P.L. 1975, ch.
711.389
Subsequent additions to this statute make assertions of municipal
officers on the status of a town way or public easement "binding on
all persons." 3" These assertions may be subject to reversal by the
court.
3 9 1
In both discontinuance and abandonment it is important to em-
phasize that not all public rights may be extinguished. In some
cases, discontinuance or abandonment simply may indicate that the
character or intensity of public use has changed without an actual
denial of the public use, and the public easement remains. Also, if
the public road originally was created on a private easement, such as
a road shown on a plan of subdivision, the private easement will
remain.
3. Statute of Limitation or Conditional Period
In some cases statutes do not extinguish an easement; rather, the
statute extinguishes the right to create or claim an easement. Incipi-
ent or inchoate dedication (an offer made but not yet accepted) may
be nullified or void if an easement (a paper street) is: (1) laid out on
a plan; (2) not accepted in a reasonable manner (in the case of a
public road) or not constructed or utilized (in the case of a private
road); (3) within twenty years from the date of recording of the plan
or shorter time set on the face of the plan by the developer, munici-
pal reviewing authority, or person recording the plan. 3  Before en-
actment of title 23, section 3031(1) of the Maine Revised Statutes
(effective September 29, 1987), the time period within which a dedi-
cated road could be accepted was limited to a "reasonable" period
of time.39 3 In some states, a person does not acquire a private right
unless the person acquires title to the lot from the developer prior to
the acceptance of the road as a public road. The law as applied in
Maine seems to imply that the person acquires a private easement
regardless of the status of the road at the time of the original
conveyance.
389. Craig v. Davis, 649 Ald 1096, 1097 (Me. 1994).
390. itle 23, § 3028(2) (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).
391. 1d.
392. Id. § 3031.
393. Baker v. Petrin, 148 Me. 473,480, 95 A.2d 806,810 (1953) ("If there was an
intention to dedicate it must be accepted in a reasonable time."). See also Callahan
v. Ganneston Park Development Corp., 245 A.2d 274 (Me. 1968); Harris v. City of
South Portland, 118 Me. 356, 359, 108 A. 326, 328 (1919)).
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4. Vacation By Petition
Whereas public rights arise by the passage of time in title 23, sec-
tion 3031(1), section 3027 allows for vacation of paper streets at any
time. The street must be an unaccepted town way (in other words,
the subject of inchoate or incipient dedication) that is proposed and
described in a recorded subdivision plan where lots have been sold
with reference to the plan. Under these conditions, the municipal
officers or any person claiming a property interest in the proposed
way can petition to vacate the paper streets in whole or in part. 94
Section 3027 is unclear whether the purpose of its enactment was to
remove both the incipient dedication and the private rights or to
remove only the incipient dedication. However, section 3031 would
appear to indicate that the intent of the statutes is not to affect pri-
vate rights, even if a municipality could do so.395 Furthermore, it
appears that the mere declaration of acceptance will suffice only for
a period limited to fifteen years unless the road is actually con-
structed or an extension to the ten-year time period is filed.3 96
5. Vacation Upon Condition
The vacation of paper streets may be implied where a proposed,
unaccepted way or portion of a proposed, unaccepted way lies in a
subdivision recorded prior to the effective date of title 23, section
3032 of the Maine Revised Statutes without having been used or
constructed as a highway and without having been accepted either
within ten years after the effective date of section 3032 or fifteen
years from recording.397 It does not appear that this statute applies
to any roads in subdivisions laid out subsequent to the effective date
of section 3032. These roads would fall under sections 3027 and
3027-A. Furthermore, by the wording of this statute, it does not
seem to apply to unrecorded plans.
6. Revocation of Dedication
In the case of incipient or inchoate dedication, the offer of dedica-
tion can be withdrawn under certain conditions. A dedication of
property or interest offered to the municipality may be revoked if:
(1) the dedication arises by a recorded subdivision plot plan; (2) no
lot has been sold with reference to the plan; and (3) an amended
subdivision plan has been approved by the municipal subdivision re-
view authority and recorded in the appropriate registry of deeds.
398
394. See City of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 382 (Me. 1970).
395. If title 23, § 3031 does apply to private rights, it is unclear what effect, if any,
the statute has on persons purchasing the lot from the developer after vacation has
occurred.
396. Title 23, § 3032 (West 1992).
397. Id.




Title to public roads may be obtained by private individuals
against the government by adverse use-in effect, extinguishing the
public rights for the portion adversely held.399 Private improve-
ments within a public easement (or any public area) may be main-
tained despite the public easement as long as the improvements
have existed for more than forty years and the public right or public
title has existed for more than forty years.400 If improvements were
located continuously within a proposed, unaccepted way laid out on
a subdivision plan recorded in the registry of deeds, where lots have
been sold according to the plan, then only twenty years is re-
quired."° Under the common law, once all the elements of adverse
possession have been met the inception of title relates back to the
date of first entry, suggesting that the date of entry, not the date
when the claim was perfected, establishes the relevant date.
K. Rights and Title Upon Conveyancing or Termination
The rights and title upon a conveyance are always determined in
the first instance by referring to the operative document. 0 2 A con-
veyance of land abutting a public road is assumed to convey all of
the grantor's interest in the portion of the public road which abuts
the land.' 3 Furthermore, all rights, easements, privileges, and ap-
399. The question arises whether the abutting landowner actually acquires title in
fee simple or only the right to continue the use of the land where the fence or build-
ing sits. The question is almost always irrelevant since the abutter ordinarily owns
the fee simple title in the road, or the practical aspects of the difference are nil.
400. Title 23, § 2952 (Vest 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996). However, only 20 years of
adverse possession is required if the possession occurred prior to 1885 but after
1841. See Phinney v. Gardner, 121 Me. 44, 115 A. 523 (1921).
401. Title 23, § 3034(1) (West 1992).
402. In limiting a grant, the court in Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9 (1858) said:
It is, however, competent for the grantor to limit his grant as he may
choose. He may exclude or include the entire monument, and run his line
on either side, or to the centre thereof, at his pleasure, by the use of apt
words to indicate his intention so to do. The intention of the party is al-
ways to be sought in the interpretation of deeds, as in other written instru-
ments. If the language leaves that intention at all doubtful, the instrument
should be examined and construed, when practicable, by the light of the
circumstances which surrounded and were connected with the execution of
the instrument.
Id at 13.
403. Title 33, §§ 460, 461, & 469-A(1) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996); Lamb v.
Euclid Ambler Assocs., 563 A.2d 365, 367-68 (Me. 1989). See also title 33, § 465
(West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996); Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d
218,223-24 (Me. 1981); Brooks v. Morrill, 92 Me. 172, 174,42 A. 357 (1898) (if the
land described in a deed is bounded on a highway, or its boundary line runs to a
highway, and thence by the highway, the grantee is presumed to take a fee to the




purtenances belonging to the dominant estate shall be included un-
less the document states otherwise.4° Prior to 1975 an instnment
may have been prepared reserving title and rights in the grantor.
The instrument must: (1) include an accurate description of the
road or way; (2) include the names of persons claiming title; (3)
show a reference to the operative conveyance that a claim is made;
and (4) be filed in the county registry where the road is located.40 5
VI. LOCATING EASEMENTS
In many cases easements must be identified at the site and lo-
cated.4 °6 In locating real property burdened by easements, a practi-
tioner must perform four major tasks. The practitioner must gather
information on the easement, determine the location of the ease-
ment, determine the boundaries of the easement, and determine the
fee simple title boundaries (if any) along or within the easement.
Each of these tasks can present formidable and often seemingly in-
surmountable obstacles.
A. Easement Information
The first task and often the most difficult task is to gather infor-
mation from appropriate records.4"7 Gathering information is nec-
essary to determine: (1) the quality of title (for example, fee simple,
easement, license); (2) the category of the easement (public or pri-
vate, appurtenant or in-gross); (3) how the easement was created
(grant, eminent domain, dedication); 4) the current status of the
easement (for example, discontinued, private way); (5) the former,
404. Title 33, § 773 (West 1988). See also LeMay v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 989
(Me. 1979); Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me. 381. 386, 6 A. 6. 9 (1886).
405. Title 33, § 463 (West 1988). In Lamb v. Euclid Ambler Assocs., 563 A.2d
365, 367 (Me. 1989) the court stated that title 33, §§ 462-469-A are merely codifica-
tions of the common law.
406. RULES OF BOARD OF LICENSURE FOR PROFESSIONAL LAND SURVEYORS, ch.
6, § 10.A.1 states:
A Standard Boundary Survey is defined as a sufficient investigation, study,
and evaluation of all factors affecting and influencing the location of the
boundaries, and including rights of way and easements of record within or
immediately surrounding a certain lot, parcel or quantity of real estate.
Such study and evaluation will culminate in the location or relocation on
the ground of the boundaries and the determination of areas of the certain
lot, parcel or quantity of real estate.
Id
407. See id. § 2 ("The Surveyor shall conduct a reasonable search to acquire data,
including but not limited to deeds, maps, certificates of title, abstracts of title, and
other boundary line information in the vicinity."); Avaunt v. Town of Gray, 634 A.2d
1258, 1260 (Me. 1993) ("The question of whether a town has accepted a road is a
matter of law that must be determined from the records of the laying out of the
road."). See also Chasse v. Town of Lyman, 580 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1990).
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present, and proper location for the easement; ° (6) width of the
easement; and (7) the proper use for the easement.
The practitioner should find and use the original record whenever
possible. The language used in the deed and description for the first
conveyances out of the grantor is critical to fix accurately the neces-
sary information." 9 Later conveyances often alter the language that
was first used in the original description of the conveyance. For ex-
ample, words such as "by," "along," or "with" often are used in the
present deed descriptions to describe the parcel boundary along a
public road easement.4 10 However, the language in many of the
original conveyances used words such as along the "easterly limit,"
"southerly side," or "edge. ' 4 1 1 Later alterations in the description
may reduce the limits of the title but cannot ordinarily enlarge the
title in contradiction to the intent of the original language. 1 The
subsequent owner can convey no better title than he obtained from
his grantor. Hence, the language used in the present deeds may be
misleading.
Gathering information on easements is often a tedious and time
consuming task. The difficulty involved with gathering information
often lies in locating the records themselves and the easement infor-
mation from within the records. The difficulties and ambiguities
often arise because many easements, such as public road easements,
were created long ago. The operative records are found only in the
earliest documents and in places not ordinarily examined by re-
searchers. For example, the existing town roads may predate the
existing town, requiring the practitioner to travel to a neighboring
town office which was the historical predecessor of the current town.
The researcher often arrives at the town office to discover the clerk
has no idea where road records are kept or where the ancient town
records are located. In many towns, unfortunately, the records, con-
sidered old and useless, were thrown away. Where the appropriate
records are found, the records often have fallen into disuse and dis-
array: pages are missing, ink smudged or faded, indices sparse or
non-existent, pages brittle to the touch, and maps referred to "for
more complete descriptions" lost or misplaced. Should the appro-
408. See supra note 386.
409. Northern Utilities, Inc. v. City of South Portland, 536 A.2d 1116, 1117 (Me.
1988) ("The intention of the parties, as expressed in the instrument, governs the
interpretation of a deed.").
410. Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A2d 218, 223 (Me. 1981); City
of Rockland v. Johnson, 267 A.2d 382 (Me. 1970).
411. Brooks v. Morrill, 92 Me. 172, 174,42 A. 357, 357 (1898) ("And ordinarily if
a boundary runs to or by the !ine of an object, the exterior limit of the object is
intended. 'So in common language, if one speaks of the line or lines of a street, the
exterior limits would be understood and intended.'" (quoting Hamlin v. Pairpoint
Mfg. Co., 141 Mass. 51 (1886); South v. Slocumb, 9 Gray 36 (1857))).




priate records be located, the easement more often than not is diffi-
cult to identify. Often the only identification for an easement is
something as brief as "a road leading from the bay pike at Brown's
Farm to Jorden's Mill." A trip to the courthouse to find county road
records can be just as frustrating.
Private easement records, while concentrated in the registry of
deeds, are not without difficulties. Often the deeds or plats evidenc-
ing their creation were recorded long ago. Their recording entry is
often beyond the period encompassed within a title search or search
for boundary information. Even though the discovery of the ease-
ment is unlikely without in-depth research, the easement's existence
and those rights exercised by others remain intact. Conceivably, the
necessary research may involve a search through the chain of title
from the present time to the time the original proprietors obtained
title from the sovereign.413
The problem often is compounded by the failure of prior re-
searchers to search titles forward and inadequate citation of the spe-
cific easement in later deeds, thereby not providing reasonable
notice in the records. Consequently, the specific easement informa-
tion is not always carried forward and evidenced in the present
deeds; rather, parties sometimes must rely only on general notice
clauses. An example of the typical language used in a deed to ap-
prise the buyer of the possible existence of easements is: "together
with all right, title, and appurtenances pertaining thereto."
Despite the apparent lack of notice in the present deeds, appurte-
nant easements, once created, ordinarily pass with the appurtenant
property without mention in the present deeds or the requisite of
necessity.414
413. State v. Beck, 389 A.2d 844, 847 (Me. 1978) ("If the street has been officially
laid out and accepted according to the statutory provision, this could have been
established from the official records of the Town.").
414. O'Neill v. Williams, 527 A.2d 322, 324 (Me. 1987) (use of the "technical
word 'heirs' " not necessary "to preserve an interest of perpetual duration"); LeMay
v. Anderson, 397 A.2d 984, 989 (Me. 1979) ("The right and burden relative to an
appurtenant easement respectively pass to grantees of the dominant and servient
estates, assuming the grantees of the servient portion have actual, constructive, or
implied notice of the servitude."). See also Dority v. Dunning, 78 Me. 381, 6 A. 6
(1886), where the court said:
But when an easement, although not originally belonging to an estate, has
become appurtenant to it, either by express or implied grant, or by pre-
scription which presupposes a grant, a conveyance of that estate will carry
with it such easement whether mentioned in the deed or not, although it
may not be necessary to the enjoyment of the estate by the grantee.
Id at 384, 6 A. at 7. Also consider title 33, § 773 (West 1988), which states: "In a
conveyance of real estate all rights, easements, privileges and appurtenances belong-
ing to the granted estate shall be included in the conveyance, unless the contrary
shall be stated in the deed."
[Vol. 48:197
ROADS AND EASEMENTS
In addition to the record information, the practitioner should
gather information at the records site to: (1) determine if easements
could exist that are not evident from the available records (prescrip-
tive and implied easements); (2) indicate whether the use may have
moved outside the easement or unreasonably increased over the
years; (3) determine the original location and use; and (4) determine
the existing location and use.
The possible existence of an implied easement presents special re-
search needs. To discover an implied easement a researcher must
examine the conditions at the site, determine the historical sequence
of conveyancing, and analyze the wording in the operative records.
To determine if an implied easement does or does not burden the
property, a researcher must research the title to the adjoining prop-
erty. Because of the burdens of time and cost, researchers rarely
investigate the adjoining title in a title search. Because all implied
easements arise at the time of subdivision, it is important for the
researcher to pay particular attention to the conditions at the time
of the original subdivision and the deeds and other documents com-
ing from a common grantor."'5 The practitioner should scrutinize
both the site conditions and the operative documents.
Researchers often will discover many problems after an analysis
of the information. In some cases the practitioner will be unable to
solve the problem for lack of reliable information. In other cases
the problem falls outside the scope of reasonable practice or agreed
services. In still other cases the client is unwilling or unable to pro-
vide the time, effort, or funds to solve the problem. Nevertheless
the practitioner must provide the client with an accurate appraisal of
the situation416 or warning of potential problems.4"
B. Easement Position
In a surveyor's attempt to locate easements, the actual position of
the easement upon a parcel can be a major problem. Nevertheless,
the general position of the easement often is easier to determine
415. O'Connell v. Larkin, 532 A.2d 1039, 1042 (Me. 1987) ("In order for such an
implied easement to be created there must be severance of unity of title between the
dominant estate (the property benefited by the easement) and the servient estate
(the property subject to the easement).").
416. RULES OF BOARD OF LICUNSURE FOR PROFESSIoNAL LAND SURVEYORS ch.
6, § 10.A.9.1, states: "When applicable, properties, water courses, rights-of-way and
easements surrounding, adjoining, penetrating or severing the surveyed site shall be
identified and labeled with the name of the owner and record reference." See also
id. at § 10.A.9.m ("If appropriate, original subdivision, survey or land grant lines
should be shown in proper location.").
417. The fact that other practitioners may have failed to report the problem or
reported it incorrectly will not relieve the practitioner of liability. Cf., Ivalis v. Cur-
tis, 496 N.W.2d 690 Vis. 1993) (upholding award of attorney's fees below for negli-
gence on part of attorney in accepting another surveyor's erroneous quarter line
location).
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than the boundaries of the easement, because in many instances
boundaries are dependent on the precise location of the easement's
center.
1. Monuments
Generally, one or both parties fix the easement's location at the
time of purchase, dedication, or reservation. In these cases the re-
mains of all or part of the valid monument, or evidence of its former
position, is the best evidence of the location of the easement.418
Therefore, in many situations the location of an easement can be
shown by the position of monuments cited in the deeds and plans or
by a determination of the original position of the monuments.
2. Directions and Distances
In the case where monuments were not used or have been dis-
placed, application of the directions and distances found in the origi-
nal conveyance document is usually the next best alternative to
locate the easement's position.419
In some cases a long, continuous use may legally fix the location
of the easement in a position different from the plan or descriptive
location.42 ° This is especially true for road easements, particularly
418. In speaking about the effectiveness of monuments in determining lines the
court in Wentworth v. LaPorte, 156 Me. 392, 165 A.2d 55 (1960), provided the fol-
lowing quotations from earlier Maine cases:
"If the locations of these monuments could be established and they indi-
cated a line varying from the one described by course, the monuments
would control, the course must yield." (quoting Whitcomb v. Dutton, 89
Me. 212, 218, 36 A. 67, 69 (1896)).
"And from their well known experience and legal knowledge we pre-
sume that to the facts as they found them evidenced by ancient marks upon
the face of the earth, they applied the well settled principle of law, that
where the line described in a deed or charter, and that indicated by monu-
ments established in the original survey and location of the tract or town-
ship, do not correspond, the latter, being the best evidence of the true line,
must govern, however they may differ." (quoting Inhabitants of Bethel v.
Inhabitants of Albany, 65 Me. 200, 202 (1876)).
"In construing a deed, the first inquiry is, what was the intention of the
parties? This is to be ascertained primarily from the language of the deed.
If this description is so clear, unambiguous, and certain, that it may be
readily traced upon the face of the earth from the monuments mentioned,
it must govern." (quoting Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. 172, 175 (1870)).
Id. at 400-01, 165 A.2d at 59-60.
419. Mayer v. Fuller, 248 A.2d 140, 141 (Me. 1968) ("Boundaries are established
in descending order of control by monuments, courses, distances and quantity.").
420. Compare Wentworth v. LaPorte, 156 Me. 392, 165 A.2d 55 (1960), where the
court noted:
[W]hen, from the courses, distances, or quantity of land given in a deed, it
is uncertain precisely where a particular line is located upon the face of the
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public road easements. Many times roads were not located as de-
cided on paper. There were many reasons for this situation, not the
least of which were builders who lacked training. Often the builders
were landowners building the road in lieu of paying taxes or to aid
their own access. Difficulties with construction before motorized
mechanical equipment and high speed travel often were alleviated
somewhat by building the road around swamps, boulders, trees, and
other obstacles rather than following the surveyor's stakes. In other
cases roads were brought closer or moved away from houses and
fields for the convenience or privacy of residents. As a result, the
roads constructed seldom are recognizable as the roads shown on
the paper plan.42'
In one Maine case, the Law Court deferred to the traveled way
over the plan measurements.422 A court's deference to the traveled
way over the plan measurements is known as the "beaten path"
rule. The rule prescribes that where the traveled surface, as origi-
nally constructed and used for twenty years, is not wholly within the
monumented right-of-way, the road's traveled way becomes the
monument to its location rather than the measurements stated in
the records.423
earth, the contemporaneous acts of the parties in anticipation of a deed to
be made in conformity therewith, or in delineating and establishing a line
given in a deed, are admissible to show what land was intended to be em-
braced in the deed. It is the tendency of recent decisions to give increased
weight to such acts, both on the ground that they are the direct index of the
intention of the parties in such cases, and, on the score of public policy, to
quiet titles.
Id. at 399-401, 165 A.2d at 60 (quoting Knowles v. Toothaker, 58 Me. at 175).
421. In Brooks v. Morrill, 92 Me. 172, 42 A. 357 (1898), the court stated:
[I]t appeared that for a distance of seventy-five or eighty rods... this road
had been built outside of and nearly four rods west of the original location
recorded in the town records in 1842 .... It appears from the evidence
that nearly one-half of the width of this location, within the limits of the
eighty rods mentioned, is at one point under a meeting-house, and at an-
other point under a dwelling-house; and that no attempt has ever been
made to build the road as located, and that it has never been opened or
used for public travel.
Id at 175, 42 A. at 358.
422. Id. at 176, 42 A. at 358.
423. In Smith v. Dickson, 225 A.2d 631 (Me. 1967), the court, in considering
whether the road was established by use, stated:
"It is the location de facto that by the lapse of time ripens into a location de
jure. To rest such a result on the presumption of regularity is to rest it on a
fiction; and to rest it on the presumption of a dedication would be equally
so. We think it would be better to avoid these unnecessary fictions, and let
the result rest on a positive rule of law, which, like all limitation la%%, has
the public good and the public convenience for a foundation. The rule of
law is this: that after the lapse of 20 years, accompanied by an adverse use,
a location de facto becomes a location de jure.... The location de facto, if
not in all particulars regular, had become by lapse of time and use, and the
acquiescence of all parties adversely interested, a location de jure."
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The "beaten path" rule is sometimes applied to roads in existence
for less than twenty years for which there are no valid monuments
(either presently existing or displaced) by which to fix the legal posi-
tion of the right-of-way (public or private). In such situations the
physical location of the road is the best evidence of its legal position.
To summarize the beaten path rule, where the beaten path of a
public road originally was constructed partially or wholly outside the
boundaries established by the municipality and use of the road
therefore would constitute a trespass, the location of the beaten
path will determine the legal location of the road after twenty years.
The beaten path rule implies that the center of the traveled way is
the center of the right-of-way. The legal assumption fixes the
beaten path as a physical monument whose center is the center of
the easement.





Rule Applies %* . :.:: -I
The figure shows the displacement of the easement boundary caused by the con-
struction of the traveled way outside of the legal easement boundaries coupled with
long use.
Many surveyors, whether due to neglect, laziness, or concerns
with cost, immediately adopt the beaten path rule to locate the
center of an easement. The beaten path rule should be used only
when other, better evidence cannot be found or when a field and
record search determines that a public road in existence more than
twenty years was originally laid outside the record boundaries. The
rule does not apply when the beaten path resides within the ease-
ment boundaries but does not coincide with the center of the
easement.
I&. at 634 (quoting Pillsbury v. Brown, 82 Me. 450, 454, 19 A. 858, 859 (1890)).
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3. Use and Occupancy
When an easement exists by virtue of prescription or a vague
grant, it may have been created without fixing the location in the
field. Consequently, there are neither monuments nor measure-
ments recited in the documents. In these cases, the improvements
made on, over, or under the surface will fix the easement's legal
location. In particular, the objects will fix the center of the ease-
ment. For example, the physical location of a sewer conduit, drain-
age ditch, utility pole or similar object fixes the center of the
easement. Furthermore, it is appropriate to use an object to fix the
center of an easement when the directions and distances contained
in the grant are so vague, incorrect, or imprecise that the location of
the objects necessarily becomes the best evidence of the original in-
tentions of the parties.
When use becomes the means of fixing the easement's location,
the use at the time of the original grant or conveyance will control
whether or not the present use is in the location of the original
use.42 4 Furthermore, where the easement boundaries are known,
improvements may occur anywhere within the easement's legal lim-
its and do not have to fall within the center of the easement. The
improvements do not always reside in or fix the center of the ease-
ment. Consequently, the following rules of construction generally
apply regarding improvements within an easement: (1) The im-
provement may occur anywhere within the legal limits of the ease-
ment; (2) when the improvement extends beyond the legal limits
there may be an encroachment or trespass;42 (3) when the limits of
the easement are not defined or certain (or in the case of the beaten
424. In Tebbetts v. Estes, 52 Me. 566 (1864), the court noted:
[T]he land is described as bounded at one point "on the road leading to
Little River."
It seems that several years before that time the road at this place had
been changed, and was not on the line of its location. And it is claimed
that the words in the conveyances are to be applied to the road as located,
and not to the road as existing. But there is no such rule of law. The ques-
tion is one of intention. And it is far more reasonable to suppose that the
appraisers, in viewing the premises upon which the execution was to be
extended, intended the road as they saw it, then existing, rather than any
other road, of which it does not appear that they had any knowledge.
Id at 568-69.
425. In Benton v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 161 Me. 541, 215 A.2d 83
(1965), the court stated:
[I]t must be concluded that owners of property adjacent to that highway
must have been aware of the entry upon, use, widening, if any, improve-
ment, if any, relocation, if any, over the years, and even though such entry
and use were not brought about by statutory condemnation, such entry and
occupation for public use constitutes a taking in a constitutional sense.
Seasonable action by the land owner would afford him a remedy in equity
by injunction, and in law by a real action to try title, or complaint in tres-
pass to his possession ....
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path rule, when they have been ignored), the location of the original
improvement fixes the center of the easement; (4) although the im-
provement may shift from time to time, the legal center of the ease-
ment nevertheless remains fixed at the location where the
improvement was first placed; (5) without credible evidence to the
contrary, the presumption is that the improvement's position has
not changed over time; and (6) in cases where it is apparent that the
improvement has shifted from its original position and strayed
outside the legal limits of the easement, the improvement should be
noted as a possible encroachment on the adjoining property.
FIGURE 13I
Easement Boundary
The traveled way should not be assumed to be in the center of the easement since
the traveled way may be located anywhere within the confines of the easement
boundary witout trespass.
4. Servient Estate-First Choice
In the event that neither documented nor physical evidence exists
to locate the position of the easement, the courts prefer that the
parties arrive at a mutual agreement. Barring a favorable "meeting
of the minds," the grantee has the first option to pick a "reasonable"
location for the easement. 26
C. Boundaries of the Easement
The easement boundary sometimes is described and defined by
monuments along the boundary. In such cases, the general rule is
that monuments control. However, another common way to desig-
nate easement limits is to recite dimensions relative to one side of
the easement or the center of the easement. In this situation, the
Ik. at 545, 215 A.2d at 85 (quoting Benton v. Maine State Highway Comm'n (Me.
Super. Ct., Yor. Cty., 1965)) (citations omitted).
426. Brewster v. Churchill, 148 Me. 8, 14,88 A.2d 585,588 (1952) ("The principle
is undoubted that instruments of conveyance should be construed most strongly
against grantors and in favor of grantees.").
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width of the easement, coupled with the location of one side or the
centerline, is used to determine the boundary. In particular, the
boundaries may be found by application of the dimensions given for
the width, placing one-half of the width on each side of the ease-
ment's center or extending the width dimension laterally on the ap-
propriate side of the easement boundary. All measurements are
applied in a radial or perpendicular direction to the centerline or
sidelines, as the case may be. Fixing the width of the easement is
often the biggest obstacle to determining its boundaries.
1. Grant or Intent
The preferred method of fixing the easement's width is to use the
operative records, such as subdivision plans, highway plans, road
dockets, and deeds. Using these records, practitioners should ex-
amine those documents that depict the width at the time of taking,
dedication, purchase, or conveyance to determine the easement's
width. In some cases, practitioners must resort to ancient docu-
ments, including early town lotting plans, survey records, fence line
records, and historical descriptions.
Although the width stated in the records often exceeds the width
taken by improvements, the width stated in the records nevertheless
controls (see Figure 14).427 This is true even where the recorded
width exceeds a reasonable width.4 1 The dominant estate may use
part of the width or all of the width for the purposes stated in the
easement grant.429
427. In Rotch v. Livingston, 91 Me. 461, 40 A.2d 426 (1898), the court held:
When a public road or way has been "laid out" of a specified width by
the proper authority, the public has the right to use the entire width of the
whole location to its outermost limits, though the town or other public
agency charged with the duty of making a road within the location need not
make a wider road than is safe and convenient for travelers.
Id at 471, 40 A.2d at 431.
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In the diagram the easement was assumed to be three rods when it was actually four
rods. The failure to identify the correct width of the easement results in the en-
croachment of improvements within the easement or mandatory building set back
line.
Perhaps more troublesome is the common practice of using the
statutory width of three rods for public road easements in all cir-
cumstances without consultation of the operative records. It is no
surprise to practitioners who make a habit of examining the records
that many, if not most, public road easements are not three rods.
Four rods is a more common width-although two or two and a half
rod widths are not uncommon. Consequently many property own-
ers in Maine undoubtedly have constructed improvements within
the easement area or zoning set back area (see Figure 14). In other
cases, gaps exist between the owner's property and the limit of the
public road easement. In these cases there may not be legal access
from the land to the public road easement without trespass.
2. Occupation and Possession Barriers
Easement records often do not exist, are missing, or do not state
with certainty the boundaries or width. If no valid monuments or
documented dimensions exist to fix the width or boundary of the
easement, the boundary should be determined from long-standing
occupation and barriers that clearly indicate the permissible (acqui-
esced) width.43° This rule follows the rules of construction applied
430. See Benton v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 161 Me. 541,548,215 A.2d 83,
86 (1965) ("It follows that it still remains to be determined where the easterly
boundary of the highway as it existed prior to 1958 had been established either by
lawful location or user."); Cleaves v. Braman, 103 Me. 154, 68 A. 857 (1907). In
Drummond v. Foster, 107 Me. 401, 78 A. 470 (1910), the court noted:
The deed does not fix or define the width of the way granted. But if the
grantee, at the time of the grant, practically located the way of a width of
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to contracts, namely that a party's intentions may be evidenced by
its prior, contemporaneous, or subsequent actions. 431
Barriers may include such fixtures as fences, walls, tree rows, and
other linear, possessory objects, provided that such objects allow a
reasonable use within the intent of the original grant. The rule that
barriers may determine easement width is founded on acquiescence
or estoppel. For public roads, the rule is codified by statute:
When buildings or fences have existed more than twenty years
fronting upon any way, street, lane or land appropriated to
public use, the bounds of which cannot be made certain by
records or monuments, such buildings or fences shall be
deemed the true bounds thereof. When the bounds can be so
made certain, no time less than forty years will justify their
continuance thereon, and on indictment and conviction they
may be removed.432
3. Adequate and Reasonable Width
If the grant or record does not recite information on the width
and no physical evidence can be found, the width normally will be
fixed according to the easement's intended use--a width adequate
and reasonable for the intended purpose of the easement. The law
will impose a width sufficient to carry out the intentions of the gran-
tor and the intended use of the easement by the dominant tenement
eighteen feet, and the grantors then and for a long time subsequent acqui-
esced in this location, the parties intending to fix the width, this would op-
erate as an assignment of the way, would show what the parties intended
by the deed, and would have the same legal effect as if this width had been
fixed by the deed.
Id. at 405-06, 78 A. at 474 (quoting George v. Cox, 114 Mass. 382 (1874)).
431. See Englishmans Bay Co. v. Jackson, 340 A.2d 198, 200 (Me. 1975) ("[H]e
was to ascertain the objectively manifested intention of the parties in light of circum-
stances in existence recently prior to the execution of the conveyance."); Northern
Utilities, Inc. v. South Portland, 536 A.2d 1116, 1117 (Me. 1988) ("We find the ease-
ment deed to be ambiguous; in order to ascertain the intent of the parties, we inter-
pret the deed's language in the context of the circumstances under which it was
drafted. In so doing, we draw reasonable inferences from the language employed.").
See also Saltonstall v. Cumming, 538 A.2d 289 (Me. 1988), where the court stated:
Our prior cases have established that when, as here, the purposes of an
express easement are not specifically provided, they are to be determined
by the presumed intent of the parties at the time the grant is made. The
parties' presumed intent must be determined "in light of the circumstances
surrounding and leading to the execution of the deed."
Id. at 290 (quoting Ware v. Public Serv. Co., 412 A.2d 84 (Me. 1980). See also
Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co. v. Deering Village Corp., 142 Me. 121, 48 A.2d 715 (1946),
where the court noted, "To give the word.., the meaning which reflects the inten-
tion of the parties to the contract we must go back to the day of its execution and
consider the position of those parties with reference to the properties involved. It is
in that manner that contracts should be construed." Id. at 131, 48 A.2d at 720.
432. Title 23, § 2952 (Vest 1992).
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as stated at the time of conveyance. 33 This principle was well stated
in Drummond v. Foster434:
It is well settled that when the grant of a right of way is
silent as to its width, it will be held to be of a width suitable
and convenient for the ordinary uses of free passage to and
from the grantee's land. And if the particular object of the
grant is stated, the width must be suitable and convenient,
with reference to that object. And this is merely construing
the grant in accordance with the presumed intentions of the
parties.435
In certain cases, a reasonable width is defined by statute. For
public roads, the legislature has determined that three rods is a rea-
sonable width.4 36 The same statute, however, continues to require
payment to abutting landowners for damages that occur outside the
existing improved portion of the public road but within the three-
rod width.437
In other cases, statutes or charters may have set a reasonable
width by fixing a minimum width, maximum width, or both when
land is taken. Early turnpike statutes, for example, sometimes
stated a minimum or maximum width that could be taken by con-
demnation. Similar statutes limit the maximum width for railroads
based upon conditions along the route.4 38
Consequently, in the absence of records or reasonable occupation
lines to the contrary, railroads are presumed to have taken the maxi-
mum easement width allowed. The location of the railroad bounda-
433. See Cleaves v. Braman, 103 Me. 154, 160-61, 68 A. 857, 859 (1907) ("If the
width of the way is not fixed by the deed nor determined by the parties, it will be
held to be a way of convenient width for all the ordinary uses of free passage.").
434. 107 Me. 401, 78 A. 470 (1910).
435. Id. at 404, 78 A. at 471 (citations omitted). An example of the principle of
adequate and reasonable width is that most ingress and egress easements will be
held to be of sufficient width to allow vehicles to enter and exit.
436. Title 23, § 2103 (West 1992). The statute states:
When a highway survey has not been properly recorded, preserved or the
termination and boundaries cannot be ascertained, the board of selectmen
or municipal officers of any municipality may use and control for highway
purposes 1 1/2 rods on each side of the center of the traveled portion of
such way.
Id
437. Id. The statute further states:
When any real estate is damaged by the use and control for highway pur-
poses of such land outside the existing improved portion and within the
limits of 1 1/2 rods on each side of the center of the traveled portion, they
shall award damages to the owner as provided in section 3005.
Id
438. Id. § 6001 ("Through woodland and forest the land so taken shall not exceed
6 rods in width unless necessary for excavation, embankment or materials and
through all land other than woodland and forest, the land so taken shall not exceed 4
rods in width unless necessary for excavation, embankment or materials.").
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ries is accomplished by first determining whether tree growth was
present at the time the railroad was constructed. Later wood
growth or clearing of woodland around the tracks does not increase
or decrease the width first obtained. According to the statute, in
areas of woodland the easement width is six rods, except when the
outer limits of excavation or embankment exceed this width (in
which case the outer edge of excavation or embankment control).
In areas that were not woodland, the width is four rods, except when
the outer limits of excavation or embankment exceed this width (in
which case the outer edge of excavation or embankment control).
This statute does not apply necessarily to railroad locations estab-
lished prior to its effective date.
4. Prescriptive Easements Width
Easements established by prescription are construed strictly. The
holder of the easement acquires rights only to the width actually
used during the statutory period of adverse use.4 3 9
5. Official Action
The boundaries of highways and town easements that are not rea-
sonably defined may be defined later by official procedures." 0 In
the case of public roads, municipal officers may petition the county
commissioners to mark the bounds of roads whose boundaries are
doubtful, uncertain, or lost. In response, the county commissioners
must: (1) provide notice as though a new way were being laid; (2)
hear the parties involved; (3) examine the road, (4) survey and mark
the road; and (5) make a return of their doings accompanied by an
439. See D. L. & L. Corp. v. Leonard, 435 A.2d 743, 745 (Me. 1981). For an
interesting elaboration of the definition of "use" of the width of an easement during
the prescriptive period, see Cunningham v. Otero County Electric Coop., Inc., 845
P.2d 833, 836-37 (N.M. 1992). In that case, the New Mexico Court held that electric
utility poles located on one property provided adequate notice and allowed the
width of a prescriptive easement to extend onto an adjoining property even without
an actual physical invasion of the latter.
440. Title 23, § 2101 (West 1992).
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accurate plan of the way.44' Failure to make a proper petition could
be fatal to the resulting proceedings.' 2
VII. PARCEL BOUNDARIES IN OR ALONG ROADS
The fee simple title boundaries for parcels often are found in or
along easements, especially road easements. In determining the lo-
cation of property boundaries along easements there are two situa-
tions in which a road easement may serve as a boundary. First, the
property boundary may have existed before the road easement. In
this situation, a property owner should recognize that the fee simple
title or any associated property boundary does not change simply by
conveying or creating an easement. An alteration in the fee simple
title or in any associated property boundary would require the gran-
tor to expressly change the boundary location. As the accompany-
ing figures show, the condemnation or conveyance to the
municipality of a four-rod-wide road easement along the side of one
parcel prior to 1977 would not alter the original property bounda-
ries." 3 The imposition of an easement on the property serves only
to restrict the landowner's enjoyment of her property within the
four-rod-wide area encompassing the easement. In the example,
one easement boundary coincides with the property boundary while
the other side of the easement is a separate easement boundary that
should not be confused with or thought of as a new property
boundary.
441. Elaborating on the need for municipal officers to comply with the require-
ments set forth in title 23, section 2101, the court in Benton v. Maine State Highway
Comm'n, 161 Me. 541, 215 A.2d 83 (1965), said:
The municipal officers of the City of Saco were the mayor and alder-
men.... No authority is suggested permitting a petition in their behalf to
be signed by the city clerk, or any persons other than themselves, or a ma-
jority of their number ....
... There is no statement either that the "location" of the boundaries is
"lost" or that the true boundaries "can only be established by user, are
doubtful, uncertain, or lost." No statutory reason is given to "locate, and
define its limits and boundaries."
Jurisdiction must appear in the petition ....
Id at 545, 215 A.2d at 85 (citations omitted).
442. See, e.g., Benton v. Maine State Highway Comm'n, 161 Me. 541,215 A.2d 83
(1965) (relocation of highway held to be void in subsequent land damage case for
failure to state essential jurisdictional facts in petition).
443. A pre-1977 conveyance could have expressly given fee simple title but this
would have been a rare event. After this date, the municipality would have acquired








The left-side figure shows a parcel and its boundaries prior to the citation of an
easemenL The right-side figure demonstrates how the placement of the road ease-
ment does not affect the parcel boundary.
The second situation in which a road easement may serve as a
boundary occurs when an easement is created simultaneously with
or prior to the respective property boundaries. A subdivision is a
common example of the simultaneous creation of easements and
property boundaries. Where a large parcel is astride the road and a
section of the parcel on one side is sold off an easement existed
prior to the respective property boundary. An example of this situa-
tion exists in the following testament: "I give, devise, and bequeath
my lands south of the Thomaston Road to my son, Joshua. The rest,
residue, and remainder of my real property, to include the home-
stead house, I give a life estate to my wife, Catherine, the remainder
to my daughter, Violet."
When an easement is created simultaneously with or prior to the
respective property boundaries, a property owner faces further com-
plication if the actual "beaten path" is not in the center of the ease-
ment or does not fall within the easement (see accompanying
figure). Where would the property boundary be located if the deed
description calls for the "center of the road"? Logically, if the title
was created when the road was a paper street and unopened, the
title would go to the center of the easement-there could be no
other definition of the "road" at the time of the paper location. On
the other hand, if, when created, the parcel boundary consisted of a
road that was actually opened and existed as a traveled way, the
term "road" meant the actual physical path as used. Therefore,
where the road has been opened and used prior to the date of the
operative description, the Law Court has determined that the physi-
cal location of the beaten path is the intended boundary.' The
physical road as opened will govern over the "paper" center of the
444. See Rounds v. Ham, 111 Me. 256, 88 A. 892 (1913), where the court stated:
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easement when determining the location of the parcel boundary
calling for the "road." 445
The question often arises regarding the exact location of the par-
cel boundaries along road easements. The simple answer is to say
the deed controls the location of the conveyance. However, seldom
does the deed say "[t]o the center of the road, thence by the center
of the road ...... or "[t]hence to the edge of the right of way. .. ."
Typically a deed contains words such as "by," "along," or "with." In
conjunction with the somewhat ambiguous terms, the property mea-
surements often fail to reach the center, but stop at or extend
slightly beyond the near side of the easement boundary. Conse-
quently, rules of construction that are dependent upon the facts and
situation at the time of the conveyance govern. Over the years, the
common law has become replete with cases citing rules of construc-
tion and their exceptions. In response to this confusion, the legisla-
ture has intervened with statutes attempting to codify the rules, yet
these efforts often make the rules more confusing. The Law Court
When a road is referred to in a deed as one of the boundaries of the land
conveyed, we should ordinarily suppose that something more than a mere
location was meant. A road is a way actually used in passing from one
place to another. A mere survey or location of a route for a road is not a
road.
IL at 259, 88 A. at 893-94. See also Brooks v. Morrill, 92 Me. 172, 42 A. 357 (1898),
where the court held:
The question is not free from difficulty, but it must be regarded as res judi-
cata in this state .... "A road is a way actually used in passing from one
place to another. A mere survey or location of a route for a road is not a
road. A mere location for a road falls short of a road as much as a house
lot falls short of a house. Can the proposition be maintained that an invisi-
ble and unwrought location answers such a call better than a visible
wrought road over which the public is passing daily? We think not."
Id at 176, 42 A. at 358 (quoting Sproul v. Foye, 55 Me. 162, 164-65 (1868)).
445. See Dees v. Pennington, 561 So. 2d 1065, 1068 (Ala. 1990) ("In the absence
of evidence to the contrary, where a street is named in a deed as a boundary line, it
must be taken that the parties intended the boundary to be the street as actually
opened up and in use."). See also Scott v. Hansen, 422 P.2d 525 (Utah 1966), where
the court noted:
One of [the rules of construction in determining a grantor's intent] is that
fixed monuments or markers of a permanent nature which can be definitely
identified and located take precedence over calls of courses or distances, or
plats, or amounts of acreage. This is so because it is reasonable to assume
that the parties are more apt to be familiar with such monuments or mark-
ers than with precise measurements, or with recorder's plats; consequently,
giving precedence to the call to such a monument or marker results in less
possibility of error and a greater likelihood of giving effect to the intent of
the parties.
[.. T]he reference [in this conveyance] was to the county road as it
actually existed and was observable by the parties involved, rather than to




in Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc." 6 noted that the legisla-
tive intent of the Roads and Ways Act" 7 was to codify the common
law." 8 In any event the Act may have created more confusion than
the legislation actually alleviated.
The following is the common law and statutory law as applied to
parcel boundaries within roads.
A. Public Road Easements
Public road easements include town, county, and state highways.
In the older records, one class of public road easements was referred
to as private ways. The term "private way" was used to define pub-
lic road easements that the municipality had disavowed any obliga-
tion to improve or maintain." 9
Generally, a landowner whose property abuts a public road ease-
ment is deemed to have title to the center of the easement.450 Be-
cause this is a rule of construction and not a rule of law,451 the
446. 438 A.2d 218 (Me. 1981).
447. Title 33, §§ 463-469-A (West 1988).
448. Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d at 223 (- 'The purpose of
th[e] [Roads & Ways] Act is to clarify ownership of the land which underlies the
public easement in roads and ways by giving statutory effect to the common law
presumption that an abutting owner owned to the centerline of the road.' ") (quot-
ing L.D. 983 (106th Legis. 1973)).
449. The Franklin court noted:
[The words "private way"] commonly mean ways of a special type laid out
by the public authority for the use of the public. Such - 'private ways' are
private only in name, but are in all other respects public...." The words
[also] may well mean or include defined ways for travel, not laid out by
public authority or dedicated to public use. that are wholly the subject of
private ownership of the land upon which they are laid out by the owner
thereof, or by reason of ownership of easements of way over land of an-
other person.
Id. at 221-22 (quoting Opinion of the Justices, 47 N.E.2d 260, 262-63 (Mass. 1943)).
The court further noted, "The term private way is used 'not because the easement is
the private right of the person benefited but rather to distinguish it from that class of
ways the cost of which is met entirely from public funds.'" I,' at 222 (quoting
Browne v. Connor, 138 Me. 63, 67, 21 A.2d 709, 710 (1941)).
450. See Coombs v. West, 115 Me. 489, 491, 99 A. 445, 445 (1916) ("And it is
undoubtedly true, that where a grant is bounded upon ... a highway.... such ...
way[s] ... are to be deemed monuments, located equally upon the land granted and
the adjoining land, and in all such cases, the grant extends to the center of such
monument." (quoting Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9, 13 (1858))); Franklin Property
Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.d 218, 223 (1981) ("Under Maine law, a conveyance to
or by the sideline of a public street gives rise to the rebuttable presumption that the
grantor intended to convey title to the center of the street unless a contrary intent is
indicated.").
451. In Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 152 A. 413 (1930), the court said:
"The rule by which the mention of a way as a boundary in a conveyance of
land is presumed to mean the middle of the way, if the way belongs to the
grantor, is not an absolute rule of law irrespective of manifest intention.
like the rule in Shelley's case, but is merely a principle of interpretation
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proper analogy to fix the extent of title and the boundary is the fol-
lowing: (1) The boundary should remain the original parcel bound-
aries before the road was taken, widened, or altered (see Figure
17);45 (2) a parcel boundary in a subsequent conveyance may be
stopped short of the original parcel boundary when expressly pro-
vided by the grantor;453 (3) the boundary will coincide with the
center of the traveled way if the original boundary is unknown and
the grantor's intent cannot be determined, provided that the grantor
owned to that extent.4' Therefore if the road is a public road ease-
ment title extends by implication to the center of the road or the
extent of the grantor's title, whichever is less, barring express words
to the contrary. 5 This principle holds even if the measurements
stop short of the center.456 Therefore if a property owner sells land
on one side of a public road while retaining the remainder on the
other side, ordinarily the boundary of the land sold will be in the
center of the public road. 57 Only clear and express words will stop
an adjoiner's title from going to the center of the road or to the
extent of the grantor's title, whichever is less.
adopted for the purpose of finding out the true meaning of the words
used."
l at 413 (quoting Crocker v. Cotting, 44 N.E. 214, 215 (Mass. 1896)).
452. Title 33, § 463 (West 1988).
453. Low v. Tibbetts, 72 Me. 92 (1881). In Low, the court noted:
The well settled doctrine in this State is, that a grant of land bounded on a
highway, carries the fee in the highway to the centre of it, if the grantor
owns to the centre, unless the terms of the conveyance clearly and dis-
tinctly exclude it, so as to control the ordinary presumption.
Id. at 94 (citing Oxton v. Groves, 68 Me. 371, 372 (1878)).
454. Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218, 223 (Me. 1981)
("Under Maine law, a conveyance to or by the sideline of a public street gives rise to
the rebuttable presumption that the grantor intended to convey title to the center of
the street unless a contrary intent is indicated."). See also title 33, §§ 460, 465 (West
1988 & Supp. 1995-1996). It should be noted that the courts have strictly construed
any wording by the grantor that may appear to prevent title going to the center.
Wellman v. Dickey, 78 Me. 29, 30, 2 A. 133, 133-34 (1885).
455. Brooks v. Morrill, 92 Me. 172, 174, 42 A. 357, 357 (1898).
456. Inhabitants of Warren v. Inhabitants of Thomaston, 75 Me. 329, 331 (1883).
457. In Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 9 (1858), the court stated:
[I]t is undoubtedly true, that where a grant is bounded upon a non-naviga-
ble fresh water stream, a highway, a ditch or party wall, or the like, such
stream, way, ditch or wall, are to be deemed monuments, located equally
upon land granted and the adjoining land, and in all such cases, the grant
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Public Road Condemned Before 1977
The original property line remains fixed as the property line in subsequent convey-
ances despite the fact the property line does not reside in the center of the road or
public easement.
The courts often have said that phrases such as "by the road,"
"along the road," and "with the road" do not stop the title at the
edge of the public road easement-the title continues to the center
of the public road easement.45 Ordinarily, "to," "with," "along,"
and similar words are words of exclusion." 9 Common meaning
would not place the boundary in the center.' 0 Nevertheless, when
used in reference to the boundary of a public road easement, ac-
cording to the rules of construction, these words would place the
parcel title and its boundary in the center of the public road (see
Figure 18). Four reasons often are cited for title going to the center
of a public road in all cases of doubt. First, little reason or benefit
exists for the grantor to retain title to a long narrow strip of land. 61
The strip would tend to benefit the grantee more than the grantor.
Second, the rules of construction, often based on equity, provide
that where a conveyance is ambiguous, as between the grantor and
458. See, eg., Hardison v. Jordan, 141 Me. 429, 433, 44 A.2d 892, 894 (1945)
("[W]hen there is nothing as here to indicate a different intention, the point of be-
ginning of a boundary being on a road must be taken as in the center of the way.").
See also title 33, § 461 (West 1988).
459. Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 420, 152 A. 413, 419 (1930) ("IThis court has
held that the words 'to,' 'from' and 'by' are words of exclusion.").
460. Should a parent expect her child to walk down the center of the road after
expressly telling the child to walk "along" the road?
461. Id. at 415, 152 A. at 417 ("[T]he rule is founded on considerations of expedi-
ency to prevent title to small remnants of land being left in remote grantors .... ").
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grantee, the grantee is favored over the grantor.462 The grantor who
prepared the deed presumably could have prevented the ambiguity
and therefore should not benefit from the ambiguity. Third, the pre-
sumption provides clarity to title within the road easement and pre-
vents stale claims from arising later.463 Fourth, the grantor should
not be presumed to withhold title that has a real and present advan-
tage to the grantee.46
462. Brewster v. Churchill, 148 Me. 8, 14, 88 A.2d 585, 588 (1952) ("The principle
is undoubted that instruments of conveyance should be construed most strongly
against grantors and in favor of grantees.").
463. In Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218 (Me. 1981), the
court states:
Since no specific landowner is particularly concerned about maintaining the
rights and limitations associated with the easement, the possibility is great
that the right to the underlying fee in a long established public street or
road may not explicitly appear in a recent record of title. In such instances,
the potential for conflicting or ancient claims to land arising to hinder the
marketability of land is manifest.
Id. at 225.
464. The Law Court has embraced this rationale. In Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407,
152 A. 413 (1930), the court noted:
[T]he grantor, if he retains the fee in such a way, may own a long narrow
strip of land which may not be of any great value to him .... In our
opinion it loses sight of the most important consideration of all-that the
presumption in the case of bounds on highways and streams is based, not
so much on the fact that the grantor does not intend to retain that which is
of no apparent benefit to himself, but rather on the assumption that he
does not intend to withhold that which has a real and present advantage to
his grantee. The views which we have here expressed appear to be sus-
tained by courts of high authority.




The sequence of figures show how historical circumstances leave the boundary unaf-
fected but not centered in the present traveled way.
It is worth repeating that title goes only to the center of a public
road easement when: (1) the boundary was not otherwise expressly
described at some other location; 5 (2) the grantor has title at least
to the center;4a6 (3) the land abuts the road; (4) the road is an ease-
ment; and (5) the road is a public or proposed public road.4 67 How-
465. See title 33, § 467 (West 1988) for a codification of the common law recog-
nizing that all abutting owners' title does not extend to the center.
466. Cf. Warchalowski v. Brown, 417 A.2d 425, 428 (Me. 1980).
467. See title 33, §§ 461, 465, 469-A (West 1988 & Supp. 1995-1996).
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ever, those rights accorded to owners of other lots in a subdivision
(implied, appurtenant rights) will not pass to the abutter.
In construing the intent of the grantor and applying the rules of
construction, the Law Court has recognized that when the grantor
explicitly denotes the boundary as the side of a public road or the
edge of the right of way, or uses similar words rather than placing
the boundary "along," "by," "with," or "in" the road itself (or simi-
lar words), title will not go to the center of the road.468 This com-
mon law interpretation seems to conflict with certain Maine
statutes.469
Despite the questionable effect of this statutory language on the
common law, it is important to recognize that often there is a differ-
ence between calling for the description to begin, end, or go to the
side of the road and for the boundary to go along, with, or by the
road.4 70 The former usually refers to a convenient point to begin or
terminate the surveying measurements, while the latter actually con-
trols the location and extent of title.47' However, when the descrip-
468. See Brooks v. Morrill, 92 Me. 172, 174, 42 A. 357, 357 (1898).
469. See title 33, §§ 460-61, 465, 469-A (West 1988). Title 33, § 469 (West 1988)
adds: "This subchapter shall be liberally construed to effect the legislative purpose
of clarifying the title to the land underlying roads and ways by eliminating the possi-
bility of ancient claims."
470. In Low v. Tibbetts, 72 Me. 92 (1881), the court states:
Is there enough in the language used, to exclude the street from the con-
veyance? The mere mention in the description of a fixed point on the side
of the road as the place of beginning or end of one or more of the lot lines,
does not seem to be of itself sufficient.... [N]or will similar language with,
reference to monuments standing on or near the bank of a stream, in lines
beginning or ending at such stream, prevent the grantee from holding ad
medium filum aquae.
Id. at 94 (citations omitted). See also Coombs v. West, 115 Me. 489, 491-92, 99 A.
445, 445 (1916).
471. In Smith v. Hadad, 314 N.E.2d 435 (Mass. 1974), the court stated:
"A majority of the court is of opinion, that it is a common method of mea-
surement in the country, where the boundary is a stream or way. to mea-
sure from the bank of the stream or the side of the way; and that there is a
reasonable presumption that the measurements were made in this way, un-
less something appears affirmatively in the deed to show that they began at
the centre line of the stream or way."
Id at 437-38 (quoting Dodd v. Witt, 29 N.E. 475,476 (Mass. 1885)). See also Haight
v. Hamor, 83 Me. 453, 22 A. 369 (1891), where the court stated:
In the case of Dodd v. Witt, after citing several cases in support of the
general rule that a boundary on a way includes the soil to the centre of the
way, the court add [sic]: "Not one of these cases, however, considers the
construction to be given to a deed in which a highway is a point of depar-
ture of a measured line. . .. The rule is well established when the road is
the terminus ad quem, but there is little authority when it is the terminus a
quo, and there is no monument at the other end of the line. A majority of
the court is of opinion that it is a common method of measurement in the
country where the boundary is a stream or way, to measure from the bank
of the stream or the side of the way, and that there is a reasonable pre-
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tion simply begins with "at the road" or a similar phrase, the
measurements are assumed to begin in the center of the road unless
a preponderance of evidence indicates otherwise.4 -
B. Private Easements
If the road is a private easement, title extends to the edge or mar-
gin of the road unless the words in the grant clearly indicate other-
wise.473 Contrary to the rules of construction for a public road
easement, words such as "by," "along," and "with" the road define
the boundary along the edge or margin of the private easement. As
long as the grantor had title to the road, he retains title to the under-
lying fee, while the grantee obtains an easement in the road.47
C. Paper Streets
A broad definition of a paper street is a road that has not been
improved or opened for public or private use. It exists on paper but
has not been created on the face of the earth as to allow any form of
reasonable physical use by vehicles. In this Article, paper streets are
roads that have been offered for dedication by the landowner or
developer but not accepted by the government or used by the pub-
lic. This condition is known as incipient or inchoate dedication. In
sumption that the measurements were made in this way unless something
appears affirmatively in the deed to show that they began at the centre line
of the stream or way."
Id at 460-61, 22 A. 372 (1891) (quoting Dodd v. Witt. 29 N.E. 475 (Mass. 1885))
(citation omitted).
472. See, eg., Coombs v. West, 115 Me. 489, 99 A. 445 (1916). The court there
noted:
"[lit is undoubtedly true, that where a grant is bounded upon a non-naviga-
ble fresh water stream, a highway, a ditch or a party wall, or the like, such
stream, way, ditch or wall are to be deemed monuments located equally
upon the land granted and the adjoining land, and in all such cases, the
grant extends to the center of such monument. It is, however, competent
for the grantor to limit his grant as he may choose."
Id at 491-92, 99 A. at 445 (quoting Bradford v. Cressey, 45 Me. 2, 13 (1858)). The
court also held that "'[w ]hen walls, fences, and the like are referred to as monu-
ments, if they are of considerable thickness or width, the boundary line is always in
the center of the monument, as has been seen in the case with streams and high-
ways.'" Id at 493, 99 A. at 446 (quoting TIEDtAN, REAL PROPE-RTY q 838).
473. See Winslow v. Reed, 89 Me. 67, 70, 35 A. 1017, 1017 (1896) (i[When land
is bounded on a private way, it extends only to the side line of the way."). See also
Bangor House Proprietary v. Brown, 33 Me. 309, 314 (1851).
474. In Franklin Property Trust v. Foresite, Inc., 438 A.2d 218 (Me. 1981), the
court stated:
Under Maine law, a conveyance to or by the sideline of a public street
gives rise to the rebuttable presumption that the grantor intended to con-
vey title to the center of the street unless a contrary intent is indicated.
This presumption, however, does not apply when the land is bounded by a
private way not dedicated to public use.
Id at 223 (citations omitted).
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most cases there is a private easement in the paper streets but no
public easement until acceptance. Maine, like many states, has cho-
sen to handle paper streets in the same manner as operational public
streets-the title is presumed to run to the center line of the
street.475
D. Former Public Streets
The discontinuation of public roads and the vacation of paper
streets are two common occurrences that affect parcel boundaries
within roads. In some of these cases a private easement may remain
effective after the discontinuation or vacation. In the event of an
ambiguous description, the question arises whether the title to the
property should go to the center or the edge of the road. The simple
solution is for the owner at the time of sale or conveyance (subse-
quent to the discontinuance of the public road easement or vacation
of the incipient dedication), to rewrite the ambiguous descriptions
clearly to include title to the center of the former public road. How-
ever, this foresight is seldom present and the grantor is more likely
to use the same vague description that she received from her prede-
cessor. The result is confusion as to ownership from the edge to the
center of the former public road or paper street. The Maine Law
Court has held that a discontinued public road is to be treated the
same as a public road-title is presumed to run to the center.476
475. The legislature in a series of statutes codified the common law in regard to
title underlying accepted and unaccepted roads. See, e.g., title 33, §§ 461, 469-A
(West 1988). But cf Bangor House v. Brown, 33 Me. 309 (1851), where the court
said:
As the law has been established in this State, when land conveyed is
bounded on a highway, it extends to the centre of the highway; where it is
bounded on a street or way existing only by designation on a plan, or as
marked upon the earth, it does not extend to the centre of such way.
There is no indication in such cases of an intention on the part of the
grantor to dispose of any more of his estate than is included by the descrip-
tion, with a right of way for its convenient use.
Id. at 314.
476. In speaking about the statute the court in Belfast Water Dist. v. Larrabee,
570 A.2d 828 (Me. 1990), wrote: "We hold that the same rule should apply to dis-
continued public ways because, as with conveyances of land bounded by public
ways, absent a contrary intent, the grantor should not be presumed to retain an
interest that is a distinct benefit to the grantee." Id. at 829-30 (Me. 1990).
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FIGURE 19
Es ement Boundary
The area between the easement boundary and center often is not clearly explained
or defined in the title documents.
E. Railroads
Contrary to title in a public road easement, the title underlying a
railroad easement is presumed to remain with or transfer to the rail-
road, depending on the circumstances.'~ The rights of the grantor
whose land abuts the railroad do not extend to the center of the
railroad easement. When doubt exists as to the title of the underly-
ing fee, the grantee's boundary is deemed to be at the edge of the
477. In Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. 407, 152 A. 413 (1930), the court noted:
When we consider the real origin of the highway rule, that it had its foun-
dation in the early customs of the people which gave to the abutting prop-
erty owner, having title to the fee in the highway, certain rights in the
highway of real advantage to him in the daily use of his adjoining land, we
can see very little analogy between his situation and that of the owner of
land bordering on a railroad right of way. The land owner beside the rail-
road has no use whatsoever of the railroad way. In fact he is absolutely
excluded from it. The use of it by the railroad is altogether inconsistent
with the idea that it could in any wvay be of advantage to his adjoining land.
It is quite true that a railroad way is often referred to as a public highway.
Ths designation has reference to the fact that it is open to the public for
travel under the restrictions imposed by law; but it has never been consid-
ered that, for this reason, it has the other incidents of a public highway....
"It follows that the easement in lands taken for the purpose of a railroad is
obviously vastly different from that in lands appropriated to the various
kinds of other public wvays." The court then indicates clearly what these
differences are, one of which is that the railroad must have the exclusive
occupation and control of its property without any interference by the ad-
joining land owner.
Id. at 417, 152 A. at 417-18 (quoting Hayden v. Skillings, 78 Me. 413,416, 6 A. 830,
831 (1886)).
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railroad right-of-way, consistent with the rules governing private
road easements.478 The Law Court has reasoned that while a
grantee may derive some value and use from a public road easement
fronting on his property, no comparable benefit accrues to the prop-
erty owner adjacent to a railroad right-of-way.479
VIII. Unresolved Issues
Unfortunately, there are many questions that have not been ad-
dressed by the Law Court or legislature. In some cases, the attempt
by the legislature to codify the common law has resulted in further
confusion of the law."s ° The following are samples of unanswered
questions regarding roads and easements in Maine.
A. Vacation, Abandonment, Discontinuance, etc.
Statutes addressing vacation, abandonment, discontinuance, and
other mechanisms that extinguish public rights in roads appear to
have been written with the assumption that roads are public ease-
ments where title reverts to the abutting owner. However, roads
developed more recently are owned by state or local governments in
fee simple. The termination of public title in these streets and trans-
fer to abutting property owners would appear to require a deed or
other recognized form of conveyance appropriate to fee simple title.
B. Lines of Occupation versus Three-Rod Width
Practitioners frequently face difficulties in ascertaining determin-
ing which statute to apply in determining the width of an otherwise
undefined public road easement. On the one hand the practitioner
has statutory authority for fixing the width as the actual dimension
between lines of occupation.481 However, another statute allows
practitioners to fix the width of undefined public roads at three
rods.4 1 Often the two statutes appear to conflict. It would seem
logical that where lines of occupancy exist, the lines of occupancy
should fix the road width rather than an arbitrary three-rod width.
The width of public road easements generally is determined by
either: (1) estoppel; (2) acquiescence; or (3) the theory that the
lines of occupation are the best evidence of the width marked at the
time of the original grant.
478. Id.
479. Id.
480. See, e.g., title 23, § 3026 (West 1992), which states "all remaining interests of
the municipality shall pass to the abutting property owners to the center of the way."
This is somewhat inconsistent if the abutting owner owns some portion more than
half-way but less than the whole when the road is discontinued.
481. Title 23, § 2952 (West 1992 & Supp. 1995-1996).






The results of using the improvements or a presumed width are often in conflict.
Practitioners face additional problems when no lines of occupancy
exist along a particular part of an easement, even though clearly de-
fined lines of occupation exist along the same road easement at a
different location. The question facing a practitioner is whether the
remote lines of occupation should be used to define the width for
the entire road. Under the theory that occupation lines are the best
evidence of the width intended by the original parties, remote occu-
pation would be relevant. Under this theory a practitioner must
drive along the entire length of the road to look for lines of occupa-
tion and use the dimension between these remote lines of occupa-
tion to fix the width for the entire public road easement.
To complicate matters further, in some cases the dimensions be-
tween lines of occupation vary along the length of the road ease-
ment, both on and off the part of the road in question (see Figure
21). Several questions arise in this situation. Should the practi-
tioner use the maximum, minimum, or average width? In using
either the maximum, minimum, or average width, should practition-
ers confine their measurements to the part of the easement on the
tract in question or survey all occupation lines along the entire ease-







The statute and case law are silent in the situation where the width between im-
provements varies.
C. New Road on Original Road
Other problems arise when a new public road is developed over
an existing road and the dimensions differ. Which dimensions con-
trol when there is no formal action to condemn extra land or discon-
tinue part of the old road?
D. Center or Far Side
As previously explained,48 3 the common law holds that by impli-
cation title goes to the center of a public road easement (see Figure
22). However, Maine statutory law states the following:
A conveyance of land which abuts a town or private way,
county road, highway or proposed, unaccepted way laid out on
a subdivision plan recorded in the registry of deeds shall be
deemed to convey all of the grantor's interest in the portion of
the road or way which abuts the land . .
(See Figures 22 and 23.)
The wording of the statute implies that the first lot sold in a subdi-
vision would gain all the grantor's title in the road easement.
Rather than stopping at the center, the first lot sold would gain fee-
simple title to the entire width of the road in front of the lot (see
483. See supra part VI, dealing with parcel boundaries in or along road
easements.
484. Title 33, § 460 (West 1988).
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Figures). This often leaves the status of the title in subdivision roads
uncertain and open to varying interpretations.





Common Law 33 M.R.S.A. § 460
Figure 22 shows the common law which generally presumes that the title goes to the
center of public roads. The wording of the statute appears to modify the common
law as show in Figure 23 and favors the earlier conveyances by conveying all the title
in the road.
E. Sidelines
Since title extends to the center of public road easements, the
question often arises as to how non-perpendicular parcel boundaries
extend between the side of the easement to the center of the ease-
ment. In particular, do the boundaries continue to extend in the
same direction or are they perpendicular to the center line of the
road?' 8 The choice is usually between projecting the boundary line
along its original course or striking a line perpendicular to the center
(shortest distance) as illustrated by the following figure.
485. Of course, the deed or other operative document will control if that docu-
ment specifically provides for projecting the sideline into the road easement accord-







The above figure illustrates the difference between the two methods of fixing the
side boundaries within the public road easement.
Often, practitioners automatically and uncritically choose to pro-
ject the property line along its original course into the right-of-way
because of the straight-forward simplicity of that approach (in other
words, continue the sideline boundary on a straight path to the
center of the road).486 Deeper reflection may lead to rejection of
this method in many cases, however, because it may produce inequi-
table or absurd results." Where a boundary comes to the road at
an angle oblique to the right-of-way boundary, the abutting parcel's
boundaries could converge short of the road's center, and thus the
abutting parcel owner's title would not extend to the center of the
right-of-way. In addition, the resulting road frontage could be re-
duced or enlarged to such an extent as to enrich unjustly one neigh-
bor while denying another almost all benefit of the area within the
easement.
486. "Extending the boundary" and similar terms often have been used loosely in
describing title extending to the limits of ownership. See, e.g., Cottle v. Young, 59
Me. 105, 110 (1871). However, when addressing the question directly, the courts
recognize that more equitable methods are to be employed when the grantor's in-
tent is not clear. See Proctor v. Hinkley, 462 A.2d 465 (Me. 1983), and in particular,
id. at 473 n.7.
487. Treat v. Chapman, 35 Me. 34 (1852).
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FIGURE 25
I I
In this example, extending the Lot C's boundaries causes them to intersect prior to
reaching the center of the road. This fails to provide equitable distribution and
leaves the common boundary between the adjoining lost of B and D uncertain.
The perpendicular method, also known as the right-angle and
shortest distance methods, fixes the boundary at the shortest dis-
tance between the edge of the easement and the center of the road.
The line fixed at the shortest distance always will be perpendicular
or radial to the center line of the road. This method always will
provide for an equitable apportionment of rights within the road
easement. The apportionment will bear direct relation to the front-
age along the right-of-way. Furthermore, the method is applied eas-
ily at the site by determining the shortest distance from the terminus
of the marked boundary to the center line of the road.
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FIGURE 26
In the above figure, a road crossed existing lot lines. Thereafter portions of the
original lot on each side of the road were sold with the road called for as a boundary.
To establish the boundaries within the road at right angles to the center where ex-
isting original lot line existed would cause gaps and overlaps.
Many courts select the perpendicular method for fixing property
lines into the public easement along streams and highways.4 8 There
are two reasons for this choice. First, the courts opt for an equitable
distribution of the area within the road easement. 89 Second, courts
prefer a method that can be applied in most situations rather than a
method that would require the court to revisit the question under
varying circumstances. Of course, this method would not apply
where the original lot lines were fixed and crossed the road at a
diagonal. The perpendicular method would apply only where the
grantor or her predecessor in title did not expressly indicate how the
lot lines should be projected into the road (see Figure 26).
While the Law Court does not appear to have addressed the issue
directly,491 it has adopted the perpendicular method for non-tidal
bodies of water491 and has on several occasions noted that rivers and
488. See Carlino v. Barton, 349 N.Y.S.2d 535, 541-42 (1973). This method has
been widely used in establishing boundaries between states and countries. See, e.g.,
Sang-Myon Rhee, Sea Boundary Delimitation Between States Before World War 11,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 555 (1982).
489. Some courts will project the boundary line along its original course when
that line is approximately perpendicular to the road right-of-way-in effect giving
nearly the same results as the perpendicular method. See, e.g., Langley v. Meredith,
376 S.E.2d 519, 523-24 (Va. 1989) (discussing riparian rights).
490. In Bradley v. Wilson, 58 Me. 357 (1870), the court stated:
If one of the lines is described as ending at a point on one side of a street
opposite a point on the other side, we think there can be no doubt that a
straight line between the two points must cross the street at a right angle.
And such a description is too plain and too free from doubt to be con-
trolled or affected by parol evidence.
Id at 360.
491. Shawmut Mfg. Co. v. Town of Benton, 123 Me. 121,124, 122 A. 49,50 (1923)
("By implication of law, in the absence of negativing words, the side lines of a ripa-
rian proprietor, whose estate is bounded by an innavigable river, are extended from
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streams are highways of commerce." The Law Court has stated
that the rules of construction applied to streams are applicable to
roads, and the reverse also has been asserted.493 Consequently,
logic and case law support the presumption that the boundaries ex-
tending between the center of the road and edge of the right-of-way
within public road easements should be fixed at the shortest dis-
tance, perpendicular to the center.
F. Marginal Street Doctrine
Under the marginal street doctrine the grant of land along a street
where the grantor had title to the far side, but no farther, conveys all
the title in the street to the grantee. The presumption is that the
grantor would not intend to keep a small strip between the center
and far side of the road. 9  Maine does not appear to have ad-
dressed this particular question under the common law. However,
certain statutes495 would appear to support such an interpretation.
While the situation is not uncommon, litigation involving this ques-
tion is rare.
G. Government Subdivider
In some states the common law holds that a subdivision made by
the government does not convey title in the roads to the abutting
landowner; the government keeps the fee simple title underlying the
the termini on the margin, at right angles from the stream, to include one half of the
bed of the river.").
492. Smart v. Aroostook Lumber Co.. 103 Me. 37, 46, 68 A. 527. 531 (1907);
Warren v. Thomaston. 75 Me. 329, 332 (1883).
493. Warren v. Thomaston, 75 Me. at 332-33 ("Whether the highway be by land
or water, the same rule of construction must apply."); Stuart v. Fox. 129 Me. 407,
411, 152 A. 413,415 (1930) ("An almost perfect analogy with the rule as to highways
is that governing the boundaries of land on non-navigable streams."). See, eg.,
Brown v. Heard, 85 Me. 294, 297-98, 27 A. 182, 183 (1893).
494. Everett v. Bosch, 241 Cal. App. 2d 648, 655 n.3 (1966) (-The 'marginal
street' doctrine has been thus stated: 'The grant of land adjoining a street or high-
way which has been wholly made from, and upon the margin of, the grantor's land is
deemed to comprehend the fee in the whole of the street.' ") (citation omitted). See
Wolff v. Veterans of Foreign Wars, Post 4715, 74 A.2d 253 (NJ. 1950), where the
court stated:
[Tihe presumption is that the intention was to invest the grantee with all
property rights in the full width of the highway. "Vhere the highway has
been, as in the present case, wholly made from and upon the margin of the
grantor's land, his subsequent grant of the adjoining land should be
deemed to comprehend the fee in the whole road-bed, upon the same prin-
ciple that exists for giving the fee to the center in the other cases. The
grantor should be presumed to have intended by his conveyance the full
investiture of the grantee with all appurtenant property rights in the
highway."
Id. at 257 (quoting Haberman v. Baker, 128 N.Y. 253, 259, 28 N.E. 370, 371 (1891)).
495. Se ag., title 33, §§ 460, 467 (Vest 1988).
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roads. Ordinarily, the grantee stands to benefit most from having
the title underlying a road easement conveyed to him. Where the
government is the grantor, however, there remains an overriding in-
terest for the government to retain title. Title retained by the gov-
ernment would allow the installation of utilities, ditches, drainage
with accompanying tree removal, snow storage, and construction to
go unimpeded and without requiring compensation to landowners.
While this question does not appear to have been addressed directly
by the Law Court, that court has addressed a similar issue with re-
spect to range-ways. 496 Furthermore, the negative analogy used by
the Law Court to justify title in railroad corridors as compared to
road easements would support the proposition that title remained
with the government where the government subdivided the
property.
497
IX. CONCLUSION-COUNSELING THE CLIENT
A real estate attorney must have a thorough understanding of
easements to ensure a successful practice dealing with real estate
conveyance. Often the practitioner is in a position to counsel her
client on creating new easements, for example, when creating a sub-
division plan. After discussing most of the problems with ease-
ments, the practitioner must follow certain rules.
The practitioner should review carefully the proposed easement
to make sure the easement is located properly and described ade-
quately in terms of dimensions. The practitioner should make sure
the allowable use is stated clearly. If utilities are to be installed in
the access easement, they must be expressly allowed. It is advisable
to define clearly conditions for termination of the easement so that
the easement will not be a burden after its purpose or use has
ceased. To avoid conflict, the easement should be monumented in
the field and described clearly in the records. For certain easements,
other statutory requirements also must be met.49 8 To avoid the con-
ditions that often arise by implication, the practitioner should en-
sure that the title underlying the easement is obvious.
Consequently, he should exercise extra care to avoid merely calling
or showing a parcel along or by the road without expressly stating
limitations, to avoid unintended implied easements (see Figure 27).
The servient and dominant estates should be described clearly in the
supporting documents and rights made to vest immediately or
within the parameters set by the Rule Against Perpetuities. The
practitioner should avoid extending the use of easements to others
not a party to the transaction, except to the public where dedication
496. See, e.g., Howard v. Hutchinson, 10 Me. 335 (1833).
497. See Stuart v. Fox, 129 Me. at 417, 152 A. at 417.
498. See, e.g., title 33, §§ 1401-1402 (West 1988), which govern solar easements.
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is intended. In this situation the title and conditions accompanying
the acceptance should be made clear.
FIGURE 27
By implication
an easement By implication
appurtena t ' title to the center
the lot is" is convey
conveyed ',1jLot sold A__
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. ..........................................
The practitioner should be wary of uninteded consequences and expressly state the
extent of title.
In examining a parcel already benefiting from an easement, bur-
dened by an easement, or calling for an easement as a boundary, the
practitioner should investigate certain documents and conditions. If
possible, she should examine the documents creating the easement
to ensure that it was created properly. The location, dimension, and
allowable use should be determined and compared with the then-
existing situation at the site. The practitioner should be wary of sev-
eral situations: (1) improvements intended to be within the ease-
ment that are outside the easement boundaries (for example,
asphalt roads); (2) improvements meant to be outside the easement
that are encroaching on the easement (for example, buildings); (3)
overburdening of the easement (for example, for a contiguous par-
cel that was not benefitted originally by the easement); (4) improper
use of the easement (for example, utilities located in private ease-
ments created after 1990 when such easements do not allow ex-
pressly for utilities); and (5) circumstances attending the
extinguishment of the easement (for example, obstruction of the
easement by the servient owner).
In some cases, the practitioner should examine carefully the site
conditions and the sequence of conditions accompanying the origi-
nal conveyancing to determine if there are implied, prescriptive, or
common law easements. In other cases, the practitioner must ex-
amine carefully the latest documents dealing with former easements
to determine if these easements were extinguished improperly or
only partially extinguished. Possible easements or problems should
be disclosed to the client.
If at all possible, practitioners should identify and describe parcel
boundaries within easements. Where the location of the title
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boundary cannot readily be determined, the client nevertheless
should be notified of this situation. Therefore the practitioner
should place the following or similar wording on retracement plans
or other documents depicting or describing land bounded by one or
more roads where the title boundary cannot be established without
litigation:
The owner of land adjoining roads may have ownership rights
extending into the road. This document does not intend to
limit, deny, or locate these rights. The boundaries as shown
are the boundaries described in the deed and not necessarily
the extent of title that passes by implication or operation of
law.
For deed descriptions the following or similar language may be ap-
propriate: Together with any right, title, or interest in the road that
the grantor herein may have.
Similar notes would be appropriate for parcels bounded by water
or burdened with common law easements.
